CHAPTER IV

THE DEVELOPING CONCEPT AND ITS FUNCTIONS

II. THE GENERAL CONCEPT

So far we have not concerned ourselves directly with that level of cognitive experience at which the concept of the simple object has been differentiated into the universal concept, denoting any member of a class, and the individual concept, denoting a particular member of the class; although in what has preceded we have had occasion to refer to such a type of experience. The earliest objects, like the earliest sense-images, are, of course, neither universal nor particular, but possess certain characteristics of both types. The fully developed universal is no doubt a product of a very late stage of development, as is also the fully developed individual. In advance, however, of a complete differentiation of the two, objects must have fallen into groups, more or less indeterminate, to be sure, but within which quasi-logical relations became established which bore certain analogies to the later logical relation between class and individual member.

This may be illustrated by the behavior of young children. Very early there appears an instinctive recognition of other children. The sight of another child elicits signs of interest and delight, which the appearance of adults or other animals does not call forth. Such behavior is, of course, instinctive, and indicates no more than that some distinction is made between the appearance of a child and that of an adult or animal. Moreover, no distinction is at first made between one child and another -any child calls forth the response. The child it sees on the street while out in its go-cart meets the same response that is given to the neighbor's child who is a constant visitor, or even to its own reflection in the mirror. But very soon, if the child is thrown with other children, distinctions between individuals are

noticeable in its behavior, and we have the beginnings of classification. The child at such a stage recognizes a certain resemblance between all children, which it does not recognize between children and adults; for, in spite of the differences in its behavior toward individual children, its attitude toward any child is characteristically different from its attitude toward adults. Furthermore, the recognition of this general resemblance develops pari passu with the recognition of individual differences. There is no grouping of children together until particular children come to be distinguished. But that there is a grouping, which is correlative to the growth of individual distinctions, seems evident.

As general conditions for the formation of the earliest class concepts, we find, first, a failure to distinguish between a number of objects, which are, however, distinguished from other objects; second, the emergence of a distinction between one or more of the objects in question and others of the number, which is valuable for certain purposes or in certain situations, while it still remains of advantage to the individual to treat them similarly except under these specific conditions. The mere failure to distinguish between them must, that is, be transformed into a positive recognition of their general resemblance, such recognition being essential to their classification. These fundamental conditions being fulfilled, the further development of the incipient class concepts depends upon the conscious differentiation and accentuation of this common character, effected by the focusing of attention upon it.

We are now ready to inquire what relation the general concept bears to the more primitive concept of the simple object. In the first place, like the latter it is an organization of associations, actual or potential, and not a particular process. In other words we have here to draw the same distinction between the general concept and its psychological representative, the idea, that we found necessary in the case of the simple object. If, however, we compare the organization constituting the general concept with that which constitutes the concept of the s'mple object,

we find a characteristic difference. The concept of the simple object is an organization of various conditional possibilities of experience which have become associated by virtue of their direct functional relation to each other. In the general concept, however, we find an altered state of affairs. While the members of this organization exhibit, indeed, a type of internal relationship similar to that subsisting in the concept of the simple object, a modification of structure has taken place under the operation of what has traditionally been called 'association by similarity."1 The system is based, not simply upon the direct functional relation of the associated experiences to each other, but upon the common significance for conduct of a variety of objects. What may be called potential resemblances between objects become actual, and general concepts of them are formed, only when some interest attaches to the recognition of these resemblances and attention is directed toward them.

If these observations are correct, it would follow that the earliest general concepts must be based, not upon specific and definite similarities between objects, but upon relatively massive and indefinite resemblances, such as would correspond to the common significance for conduct of the objects associated. And this is what seems to be the case with the general concepts of children, as evidenced, for example, by their early attempts at definition. Thus a child of three, when asked: "What is a train?" replied: "A train is something to pull." Similarly, "A toy is to play with," and, “A mamma is a lady to take care of me." Students of pedagogy have compiled sets of definitions given by children, which are similar in character. In these instances the resemblances between the different objects belonging to the class

This psychological mechanism has, from the time of its first mention by Plato, been regarded as separate and distinct from the so-called 'association by contiguity'; and only in very recent times has the fundamental identity of the two modes of connection become probable. It must be admitted that to the psychologist of today 'association by similarity' is rather a name for a problem than a solution. But however problematic the detailed analysis of this mode of association may be, it has become evident that it belongs only to the most highly evolved types of consciousness and is probably attributable only to man himself.

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are markedly indirect. Thus the child will class as a 'train' its toy train of iron, a piece of wood with a string tied to it, a row of blocks, etc. As regards 'toy,' the resemblances are even more indirect, and consist rather in similarities of attitude than in likenesses between the objects considered by themselves. Nevertheless, if the concept be not merely artificial, but is a real functional element in the child's mental economy, it must have content as well as import-the different toys must have some common characteristics by which they may be discriminated from other objects. Thus, for example, toys are also things papa buys in a certain well-known store, they are things given it on festive occasions, things kept in the chest over which it has comparative freedom of control; they are distinctly not things mamma buys in the grocery store, or things kept on the mantlepiece or the desk, however attractive these might be to play with.

So much for the mode of association by which the elements constituting the class concept are related. As compared with the concept of the simple object, it is also to be noted that in the general concept the relations to other concepts are far more definite and constitute a far more prominent element in the structure of the organization. Indeed, as the class and individual concepts become clearly differentiated, such relations pass from a quasi-logical to a logical form. The presence of such true logical relationships is clearly evident where a relatively simple class concept has undergone a further differentiation and has developed into a more general class on the one hand and a subordinate, relatively specific class on the other. We have such a case of differentiation, where the child's earlier concept 'mamma'

1If some early concepts are based upon directly observable sense-differences, these are found upon examination to be no exception to the general rule. 'Big' and 'little,' 'hot' and 'cold' have an import for the child, which the color-tones (for example) ordinarily have not. It is not mere sensible discriminability, however gross, that calls for class distinctions. The common failure among primitive peoples to have special terms for blue and green is not the slightest indication of an undeveloped color-sense. Children, too, are usually very slow in noting differences between colors; but in the kindergarten, where several of the occupations require an attention to such differences, children of barely three years easily acquire an intelligent mastery of a dozen color-names.

(within which are distinguished as individuals the child's own mamma and the particular mammas of certain of its playmates) becomes differentiated into the more general concept 'lady,' including all adult women, and ‘mamma,' including women having children. Where such development has occurred, we have a true case of logical inclusion, as is evidenced in the former definition cited: "A mamma is a lady to take care of me"-though the last word reveals the individual significance which also attaches to the term.

We have next to consider the greater survival-value of the general concept as compared with the concept of the simple object. The very fact that the reference of the general concept to conduct is a stage more indirect means that cognitive control is at once more far-reaching and more delicate. The further differentiation and integration which marks the development of the general concept means that on the objective side the situation has undergone a similar transformation. It has gained at once a far greater degree of continuity with other possible situations and a far greater individuality. The general concept provides a far more efficient instrument for the analysis of the situation, and it is in the analysis of the situation that the specific function of cognition consists. The increased efficiency of control manifests itself in the modification which is observable in the learning-procWhen a given course of conduct fails, the individual is not left to mere groping in the dark, but there are ready to suggest themselves more or less specific alternative modes of behavior. The failure may itself be classified as falling within more or less known limits. The possibility of such classification arises from the fact that for the most part the conduct to be modified is at the level of conceptual thought-no such instinctive affair as it was formerly. Desires, purposes, intentions have undergone a process of evolution correlative to that which has taken place in cognitive life. Failure of a given action results in no vague unpleasantness; on the contrary it is a failure of definite expectations. This is true even where the failure attaches to an habit

ess.