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It cannot be said, indeed, that Berkeley succeeds altogether in banishing intuitions from psychology. The 'notions' which he admits, and especially the notion of himself as a 'spiritual substance,' are convincing evidence to the contrary. The word 'idea' had been used by Locke to denote any content of consciousness. Berkeley restricts its application to sensations and sensationcomplexes, original or revived-that is to say, to those conscious processes which, according to his view, have no reference to any reality beyond themselves. But notions have just such a reference. A spirit, whether human or divine, and the notion of this spirit, are by no means the same. The notion, therefore, aims at a universal and objective validity, which is wholly foreign to the nature of the idea. Now the notions of other spirits are arrived at inferentially, "by reason"; the notion of the self is given directly, "by inward feeling or reflexion." But "inward feeling or reflexion," in the then usual sense of the terms, could impart only a species of ideas. As the source of a notion, which refers to a reality beyond itself, it is a thinly disguised faculty of intuition.

Much the same comment is to be passed upon that mysterious faculty of comparison, which Hume's theory inherits from Locke's, and to which ideas of relations are conceived to be due, -particularly in connection with those classes of relations which are completely determined by the ideas between which they obtain; namely, resemblance, contrariety, degrees in any quality, and proportion in quantity or number. Let us ask how this complete determination of the relation is known. How do we know, for example, that the double of a number must always be its double? This is not the same as asking how we know that the one number is double the other, for that may be known in various ways, direct and indirect, and with all degrees of probability or certainty. At the same time, the answer to the former question must be included in the answer to the latter; for the relation in question is knowable as a necessary relation. Otherwise Hume's explanation would be obvious; namely, that the

determinate character of the relationship is not perceived in the cognition of the relationship itself, but is an induction from experience, not less doubtful than many others. But, in Hume's own language, these four kinds of relation, "depending solely upon ideas [i. e., upon the ideas related] can be the objects of knowledge and certainty," and accordingly "are the foundation of science" in a sense to which no induction from experience can pretend.1 We submit that this means, and can only mean, that in the act of comparison from which the idea of the relation is derived, there is involved an intuition of the determinateness of the relation.

This, however, is a digression. What we wish particularly to make clear is, not that Berkeley or Hume retained elements of intuitionalism in their systems, but the far more important fact, that intuitionalism and empiricism have a common principle in their acceptance of a direct and infallible perception of truth. That in comparison with this fundamental dogma the differences between the two great schools sink into comparative insignificance, will, we trust, become increasingly apparent through the discussions of the following chapters.

1Treatise of Human Nature, Book I, Part III, Section 1.

CHAPTER III

THE COMMON BASIS OF EMPIRICISM AND RATIONALISM

II. THE SIMPLICITY OF ELEMENTS AND THE EXTERNALITY OF RELATIONS

The possibility of an ultimate analysis, or, in other words, the existence of absolutely simple elements, is a common postulate of both the rationalistic and the empiricistic systems. The nature of the analysis to which the possibility of completion is ascribed, is ostensibly different in the two cases. In both, indeed, it is a process of explanation, an exhibition of the true inwardness of that which has been accepted as a rough and ready whole. But for rationalism this must be a definition (or demonstration) of universals; for empiricism it must be a dissection of individuals. For the former it is a discovery of logical presuppositions; for the latter it is a discovery of psychological structure. And the ultimate elements to which the one analysis leads are simple conceptions and simple judgments; while the elements which the other contemplates are simple sensations. The contrast is glaring enough. But that there is, nevertheless, an important identity underlying the two positions can, we believe, be made equally evident.

Let us observe the logical connection between this assumption of the simple, and other characteristic dogmas of rationalism and empiricism.

The connection with the intuitionalistic feature of rationalism is certainly close. On the one hand, it is as a guarantee of the truth of the indefinable and the indemonstrable of that residuum left by the explanatory process, which baffles further effort at reduction that the faculty of intuition is invoked. On the other hand, by reason of the very directness of the cognitive act and the very immediacy with which its objects are presented, the intuitive concept can scarcely admit of explanation. At any

rate, we find that in Descartes's methodology simplicity is not so much used as a mark for the distinguishing of intuitions— perhaps that would have made the intuitionalistic theory too palpably a stop-gap-as the clearness and distinctness of intuitional cognition are regarded as ensuring the simplicity of its content. For, in the first place, "whatever is more simple is whatever is more easy to comprehend, and what we might make use of in the solution of problems;" and, in the second place, "it is to be observed . . . that there are a few necessary elements that we perceive by themselves, independently of all others, I do not say at first, but by the aid of experience and the light that is in us. Also I say that it is necessary to observe these with care; for it is these which we call the most simple of each series."1 And again: "Considering here things merely in their relation to our intelligence, we shall call simple those only the notion of which is so clear and so distinct that the mind cannot divide it into other notions still more simple."

Simplicity, relative or absolute, thus means for rationalism logical priority. Now let it be recalled that according to this view the order of logical priority is irreversible; that in the system of science every inferred truth owes its whole certainty to its premises without contributing anything to theirs; and that accordingly the knowledge of a conclusion is impossible except upon the basis of its own proper premises. This now means that the knowledge of the complex somehow contains the knowledge of its constitutent simple elements-even though these latter may never have attracted attention. "Thus I can know a triangle without ever having noticed that this knowledge contains that of the angle, the line, the number three, figure, extension, etc.; which does not prevent our saying that the nature of the triangle is a compound of all these natures and that they are better known than the triangle, since they are what are comprised in it." We know 1Rules for the Direction of the Mind, VI. Torrey, Philosophy of Descartes, pp. 74, 76.

2Ibid., XII; Torrey, p. 98; italics ours.

3Ibid, XII; Torrey, p. 101; italics ours. So Spinoza holds that, if we have

all the simple natures absolutely; but evidently we may know them without knowing that we know. After what fashion, then, do we possess this knowledge? Exactly as we retain in memory anything which lies for the moment without the field of reflective attention. Even the mind of the unborn child, if it were freed from the all-engrossing impressions of pain, pleasure, warmth, etc., would find within itself the ideas of all self-evident truths.1 To be a rational creature at all is to possess these ideas; and the act of intuition by which they are acquired proves to be only an act of attention to the permanent contents of the thinking faculty.

If

From this point of view the necessity of postulating an absolute limit to the process of explanation becomes quite evident. For without it such knowledge as the rationalist requires would be virtually impossible—possible, perhaps, in the sense of existing in the unfathomable depths of the mind, but not capable of being brought to clearness and distinctness before the attentive consciousness. For an idea's being distinct (or adequate) means that the entire content is perfectly manifest; and the range of attention cannot embrace an infinite content. This applies both to the process of definition and to that of demonstration. With respect to the latter the case can be put even more strongly. the knowledge of a demonstrable truth presupposes the knowledge of its grounds, and the knowledge of these grounds (if they be not ultimate) presupposes in turn the knowledge of their grounds, the series of grounds and consequents cannot possibly be an infinite one. For suppose the knowledge of the demonstrable truth A is B presupposes the knowledge of C is D. Then the former truth is capable of being expressed in the form gism: If C is D, A is B; but C is D; therefore A is B. is D is capable of similar expansion, and the process is conceived any knowledge at all, God is better known to us than anything else. For though one cannot reason from the nature of anything else to the divine nature-that would be to ascend through the scale from effect to cause, which is impossible-yet the fact that one knows anything at all implies that he must already have an adequate notion of God.

of a syllo

Now if C

1Reply to Hyperas pistes; translated in Torrey, Philosophy of Descartes, p. 128, n

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