These studies make little claim to systematic unity. Unity of a certain sort, indeed, they will be found to possess, namely, unity of purpose and of point of view, but not that of the monograph or treatise. There is one omission, however, which we especially regret. After considerable prominence is given to the theory of relations in the first and second parts, the subject is only incidentally treated in the third. But one of the writers having been forced to withdraw from the work, the attempt to supply this omission would have meant the indefinite postponement of publication. The book is the product of a genuine collaboration. Some division of labor was necessary at the outset; but almost endless discussion, together with repeated revision by both writers, has made the work in a peculiar sense our common property. BRYN MAWR COLLEGE, September 12, 1910. CONTENTS PAGE UNIVERSAL MATHEMATICS versus UNIVERSAL PSYCHOLOGY. CHAPTER II THE COMMON BASIS OF EMPIRICISM AND RATIONALISM-I. THE CERTAINTY OF IMMEDIATE EXPERIENCE. CHAPTER III THE COMMON BASIS OF EMPIRICISM AND RATIONALISM-II. |