Dogmatism and Evolution: Studies in Modern PhilosophyMacmillan, 1910 - 259 pages |
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Page 20
... correct and solid as they would have been , had our reason been mature from the moment of our birth , and had we always been guided by it alone . " It is under the influence of this reflection that he determines upon a clean sweep of ...
... correct and solid as they would have been , had our reason been mature from the moment of our birth , and had we always been guided by it alone . " It is under the influence of this reflection that he determines upon a clean sweep of ...
Page 39
... correct in assuming that the negative of a simple concept , if it be itself a concept at all , must also be a simple concept . For since all definition is by means of genus and differentia , the negative is not definable in terms of the ...
... correct in assuming that the negative of a simple concept , if it be itself a concept at all , must also be a simple concept . For since all definition is by means of genus and differentia , the negative is not definable in terms of the ...
Page 54
... all others are divergences , is that the idea is like the thing . This does not mean that the acceptance of an idea as correct is held to imply that an actual comparison between the two has 54 THE REPRESENTATIVE THEORY OF IDEAS.
... all others are divergences , is that the idea is like the thing . This does not mean that the acceptance of an idea as correct is held to imply that an actual comparison between the two has 54 THE REPRESENTATIVE THEORY OF IDEAS.
Page 55
... correct . The meaning of the correctness therefore is that if ( as is inconceivable ) a comparison were made , the idea would be found to be like the thing . This primitive theory is in most highly developed rationalisms recognized as ...
... correct . The meaning of the correctness therefore is that if ( as is inconceivable ) a comparison were made , the idea would be found to be like the thing . This primitive theory is in most highly developed rationalisms recognized as ...
Page 111
... correct thinking . The ' concrete universal ' has been Hegel's most important sug- gestion to later thinkers - one whose fruitfulness has not yet been exhausted . But the theory of the actual as a concrete universal , is , when taken in ...
... correct thinking . The ' concrete universal ' has been Hegel's most important sug- gestion to later thinkers - one whose fruitfulness has not yet been exhausted . But the theory of the actual as a concrete universal , is , when taken in ...
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Common terms and phrases
absolute idealism abstract actual analysis analytic propositions applied Aristotle assumption becomes belief Berkeley characteristic cognitive complex conceived concept conduct connection consciousness constitutes contingent critical philosophy criticism deduction definition Descartes determined distinction distinguished doctrine dogmatic elements empiricism empiricist essential evolution example existence experienced external fact form of thought function functional psychology fundamental given Hegel human Hume ideas immediate experience immediatism important interpretation intuition judgment Kant Kant's Kantian knowledge law of contradiction laws Leibniz logical mathematical matter means method Mill's mind mode nature necessary object observed organism particular perception philosophy pragmatism pragmatist theory precisely principles priori problem propositions psychological pure question rationalism rationalistic reality reason recognized reference regarded relation representative scientific second place sense significance simple specific Spinoza standpoint subjective idealism substance supposed synthetic propositions thing-in-itself things tion tism true truth ultimate universal universal proposition validity whole wholly
Popular passages
Page 127 - And the tangible fact at the root of all our thoughtdistinctions, however subtle, is that there is no one of them so fine as to consist in anything but a possible difference of practice.
Page 166 - To attain perfect clearness in our thoughts of an object, then, we need only consider what conceivable effects of a practical kind the object may involve — what sensations we are to expect from it, and what reactions we must prepare.
Page 27 - If any man has the faculty of framing in his mind such an idea of a triangle as is here described, it is in vain to pretend to dispute him out of it, nor would I go about it. All I desire is, that the reader would fully and certainly inform himself whether he has such an idea or no.
Page 27 - Thirdly, so long as I confine my thoughts to my own ideas, divested of words, I do not see how I can easily be mistaken. The objects I consider, I clearly and adequately know. I cannot be deceived in thinking I have an idea which I have not. It is not possible 5 [Omitted in the second edition.
Page 176 - The ideas of Sense are more strong, lively, and distinct than those of the imagination; they have likewise a steadiness, order, and coherence, and are not excited at random, as those which are the effects of human wills often are, but in a regular train or series, the admirable connexion whereof sufficiently testifies the wisdom and benevolence of its Author.
Page 176 - Now, of what nature is this fixed order among our sensations? It is a constancy of antecedence and sequence. But the constant antecedence and sequence do not generally exist between one actual sensation and another. Very few such sequences are presented to us by experience. In almost all the constant sequences which occur in nature, the antecedence and consequence do not obtain between sensations, but between the groups we have been speaking about, of which a very small portion is actual sensation,...
Page 34 - For how is it possible we can separate what is not distinguishable, or distinguish what is not different? In order therefore to know, whether abstraction implies a separation, we need only consider it in this view, and examine, whether all the circumstances, which we abstract from in our general ideas, be such as are distinguishable and different from those, which we retain as essential parts of them.
Page 195 - Now if we will annex a meaning to our words, and speak only of what we can conceive, I believe we shall acknowledge, that an idea, which considered in itself is particular, becomes general, by being made to represent or stand for all other particular ideas of the same sort.
Page 42 - By substance, I mean that which is in itself, and is conceived through itself : in other words, that of which a conception can be formed independently of any other conception.
Page 26 - It is certain by experience that when we look at a near object with both eyes, according as it approaches or recedes from us, we alter the disposition of our eyes, by lessening or widening the interval between the pupils. This disposition or turn of the eyes is attended with a sensation, which seems to me to be that which in this case brings the idea of greater or lesser distance into the mind.