Dogmatism and Evolution: Studies in Modern PhilosophyMacmillan, 1910 - 259 pages |
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Page 30
... simple elements , is a common pos- tulate of both the rationalistic and the empiricistic systems . The nature of the ... simple conceptions and simple judg- ments ; while the elements which the other contemplates are simple sensations ...
... simple elements , is a common pos- tulate of both the rationalistic and the empiricistic systems . The nature of the ... simple conceptions and simple judg- ments ; while the elements which the other contemplates are simple sensations ...
Page 31
... simple of each series . " 1 And again : " Considering here things merely in their relation to our intelligence , we shall call simple those only the notion of which is so clear and so distinct that the mind cannot divide it into other ...
... simple of each series . " 1 And again : " Considering here things merely in their relation to our intelligence , we shall call simple those only the notion of which is so clear and so distinct that the mind cannot divide it into other ...
Page 32
... simple natures absolutely ; but evidently we may know them without knowing that we know . After what fashion , then , do we possess this knowledge ? Exactly as we retain in memory anything which lies for the moment without the field of ...
... simple natures absolutely ; but evidently we may know them without knowing that we know . After what fashion , then , do we possess this knowledge ? Exactly as we retain in memory anything which lies for the moment without the field of ...
Page 33
... simple elements of thought and the general scheme of rationalism . How does the case stand on the side of empiricism ? Very similarly . Here , it will be remembered , psychological intro- spection has been made the organ of philosophy ...
... simple elements of thought and the general scheme of rationalism . How does the case stand on the side of empiricism ? Very similarly . Here , it will be remembered , psychological intro- spection has been made the organ of philosophy ...
Page 35
... simple ideas as they are in themselves , ' distinguishable ' applies to them as objects of atten- tion , and ' separable ' applies to them as subject to the caprice of imagination . That the separable is distinguishable , and the dis ...
... simple ideas as they are in themselves , ' distinguishable ' applies to them as objects of atten- tion , and ' separable ' applies to them as subject to the caprice of imagination . That the separable is distinguishable , and the dis ...
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Common terms and phrases
absolute idealism abstract actual analysis analytic propositions applied Aristotle assumption becomes belief Berkeley characteristic cognitive complex conceived concept conduct connection consciousness constitutes contingent critical philosophy criticism deduction definition Descartes determined distinction distinguished doctrine dogmatic elements empiricism empiricist essential evolution example existence experienced external fact form of thought function functional psychology fundamental given Hegel human Hume ideas immediate experience immediatism important interpretation intuition judgment Kant Kant's Kantian knowledge law of contradiction laws Leibniz logical mathematical matter means method Mill's mind mode nature necessary object observed organism particular perception philosophy pragmatism pragmatist theory precisely principles priori problem propositions psychological pure question rationalism rationalistic reality reason recognized reference regarded relation representative scientific second place sense significance simple specific Spinoza standpoint subjective idealism substance supposed synthetic propositions thing-in-itself things tion tism true truth ultimate universal universal proposition validity whole wholly
Popular passages
Page 127 - And the tangible fact at the root of all our thoughtdistinctions, however subtle, is that there is no one of them so fine as to consist in anything but a possible difference of practice.
Page 166 - To attain perfect clearness in our thoughts of an object, then, we need only consider what conceivable effects of a practical kind the object may involve — what sensations we are to expect from it, and what reactions we must prepare.
Page 27 - If any man has the faculty of framing in his mind such an idea of a triangle as is here described, it is in vain to pretend to dispute him out of it, nor would I go about it. All I desire is, that the reader would fully and certainly inform himself whether he has such an idea or no.
Page 27 - Thirdly, so long as I confine my thoughts to my own ideas, divested of words, I do not see how I can easily be mistaken. The objects I consider, I clearly and adequately know. I cannot be deceived in thinking I have an idea which I have not. It is not possible 5 [Omitted in the second edition.
Page 176 - The ideas of Sense are more strong, lively, and distinct than those of the imagination; they have likewise a steadiness, order, and coherence, and are not excited at random, as those which are the effects of human wills often are, but in a regular train or series, the admirable connexion whereof sufficiently testifies the wisdom and benevolence of its Author.
Page 176 - Now, of what nature is this fixed order among our sensations? It is a constancy of antecedence and sequence. But the constant antecedence and sequence do not generally exist between one actual sensation and another. Very few such sequences are presented to us by experience. In almost all the constant sequences which occur in nature, the antecedence and consequence do not obtain between sensations, but between the groups we have been speaking about, of which a very small portion is actual sensation,...
Page 34 - For how is it possible we can separate what is not distinguishable, or distinguish what is not different? In order therefore to know, whether abstraction implies a separation, we need only consider it in this view, and examine, whether all the circumstances, which we abstract from in our general ideas, be such as are distinguishable and different from those, which we retain as essential parts of them.
Page 195 - Now if we will annex a meaning to our words, and speak only of what we can conceive, I believe we shall acknowledge, that an idea, which considered in itself is particular, becomes general, by being made to represent or stand for all other particular ideas of the same sort.
Page 42 - By substance, I mean that which is in itself, and is conceived through itself : in other words, that of which a conception can be formed independently of any other conception.
Page 26 - It is certain by experience that when we look at a near object with both eyes, according as it approaches or recedes from us, we alter the disposition of our eyes, by lessening or widening the interval between the pupils. This disposition or turn of the eyes is attended with a sensation, which seems to me to be that which in this case brings the idea of greater or lesser distance into the mind.