pot, and annoyed passengers, by soliciting them to go to his inn, receives notice from the superintendent of the depot that be must do so no more, and he, nevertheless, repeatedly enters the depot, for the same purpose, and afterwards obtains a ticket for a passage in the cars, with a bona fide intention of entering the cars as a passenger, and goes into the depot on his way to the cars, and the superintendent, believing that he has entered the depot to solicit passengers, orders him to go out, and he does not exhibit his ticket nor give notice of his real intention, but presses forward towards the cars, and the superintendent and his assistants therefore forcibly remove him from the depot, using no more force than is necessary for that purpose, such removal is justifiable, and not an indictable assault and battery. A common carrier is bound to carry his passengers over the whole route, and at a proper speed, or supply proper means of transport; to demand only a reasonable or usual compensation; to notify his passengers of any peculiar dangers; to treat all alike, unless there be actual and sufficient reason for the distinction, as in the filthy appearance, dangerous condition, or misconduct of a passenger; and to behave to all with civility and decorum. He must also have proper carriages, and keep them in good condition, and not overload them; and suitable horses and drivers; stop at the usual places, with proper intervals for rest or food; take the proper route; and drive at proper speed; and leave the passengers at the usual stopping-places, or wherever he agrees to. In none of these things can he depart from what is usual and proper at his own pleasure. And if, by any breach of these duties, a passenger is injured, the carrier is responsible. So if he puts his passengers in peril, and one of them be hurt by an ef fort to escape, as in jumping off, it is no defence of the carrier to show that he would have been safe if he had remained. In England, it was held that a common carrier who had received a pickpocket as a passenger on board his vessel, and taken his fare, could not put him on shore so long as he was not guilty of any impropriety. But this may be doubted. The common carrier must certainly employ competent and well-behaved persons for all duties; and for failure in any of the particulars of his duties and obligations, he is responsible not only to the extent of any damage caused thereby, but also, in many cases, for pain and injury to the feelings. He is also bound to deliver to each passenger all his baggage at the end of his journey; and is held liable if he delivers it to a wrong party on a forged order, and without personal default. Lastly, he must make due delivery of the goods to the sender, or to the person whom the sender may appoint, at the proper time, in the proper way, and at the proper place. As to the party to whom the goods should be delivered, he should be the owner or sender, or some one authorized by him. In a case in Massachusetts, it was held, that if A, for whom goods are transported by a railroad company, authorizes B to accept the delivery thereof, and to do all acts incident to the transportation thereof to A, and B, instead of receiving the goods at the usual place of delivery, requests the agent of the company to permit the car which contains the goods to be hauled to a near depot of another railroad company, and such agent assents thereto, and assists B in hauling the car to such depot, and B then requests and obtains leave of that company to use its machinery to remove the goods from the car, then the company that transported the goods is not answerable for the want of care and skill in the persons employed in so removing the goods from the car, nor for the want of strength n the machinery used for the removal of them, and cannot be charged for any loss that may happen in the course of such delivery to A. If a party authorized to receive the goods refuse, or is unable to do so, the carrier must keep them for the owner, and with due care; but now under the liability of a warehouseman, and not of a carrier. In a case in New York, where the consignee of certain kegs of butter, sent from Albany to New York by a freight barge, was a clerk, having no place of business of his own, and whose name was not in the city directory, and who was not known to the carrier, and after reasonable inquiries by the carrier's agent could not be found, it was held that the carrier discharged himself from further responsibility, by depositing the property with a storehouse-keeper, then in good credit, for the owner, and taken his receipt for the same, according to the usual course of business in the trade, though the butter was subsequently sold by the storehouse-keeper, and the proceeds lost to the owner by failure. The court there said, that when goods are safely conveyed to the place of destination, and the consignee is dead, absent, or refuses to receive, or is not known, and cannot, after due efforts are made, be found, the carrier may discharge himself from further responsibility by placing the goods in store with some responsible third person in that business, at the place of delivery, for and on account of the owner. When so delivered, the storehouse-keeper becomes the bailee and agent of the owner in respect to such goods. So the carrier must keep the goods for the owner, if he has good reason to believe that the consignee is dishonest, and will defraud the owner of his property. As to the time when goods should be delivered, it must be within the proper hours for business, when they can be suitably stored; or if the goods are delivered to the sender himself, or at his house, then at some suitable and convenient hour. In a case in Connecticut, a common carrier received from the plaintiff a package of money, to convey it from S. to P., and deliver it at the bank in P.; it appeared that when the defendant (the carrier) arrived at P. the bank was shut; that he went twice to the house of the cashier, and, not finding him at home, brought the money back, and offered it to the plaintiff, who declined to accept it, and that the defendant then refused to be further responsible for any loss or accident; it was held that, in the absence of any special contract, (none being proved in this case,) these facts did not constitute a legal excuse to the defendant for the non-performance of his undertaking. There must be no unnecessary delay, and the goods must be delivered as soon after a detention as may be with due diligence. In an English case, it appeared that a parcel had been delivered to the defendants in London, on the 8th of August, addressed to the plaintiff at Birmingham, where it ought to have arrived on the 10th, but did not arrive until the 3d or 4th of September. It was held, upon this evidence, that the plaintiff was entitled to recover damages-the duty to deliver within a reasonable time being a term ingrafted by legal implication upon a promise or duty to deliver generally. As to the time of delivery a carrier is no in surer, but is liable only for default; and in some cases a considerable period of detention will not discharge the carrier's obligation. Thus, in an English case, where the defendant contracted to carry the plaintiff's goods, from Liverpool to Leghorn, and on the vessel's arrival at Falmouth, in the course of her voyage, an embargo was laid on her "until the further order of Council;" it was held that such embargo only suspended, but did not dissolve the contract between the parties; and that even after two years, when the embargo was taken off, the defendants were answerable to the plaintiff in damages, for the non-performance of their contract. A somewhat remark- As to the way and the place at which the goods should be delivered, much must depend upon the nature of the goods, and much also upon the usage in regard to them, if such usage exists. able case on this point was decided in Vermont. common carriers on Lake Champlain, from Burlington to St. Albans, touching at Port Kent and Plattsburg, long enough to receive freight and passengers. This action was brought against them to recover for the loss of a package of bank-bills. It appeared in evidence, that the package in question, which was directed to "Richard Yates, Esq., Cashier, Plattsburg, N. Y.," was delivered by the teller of the plaintiffs' bank to the captain of the defendants' boat, which ran daily from Burlington to Plattsburg, and thence to St. Albans, and that, when the boat arrived at Plattsburg, the captain delivered the package to one Ladd, a warfinger, and that it was lost or stolen while in Ladd's possession. No notice was given to the consignee by the captain of the boat of the arrival of the package, nor had he any knowledge of it until after it was lost. principal question in this case was, whether the package was sufficiently delivered to discharge the defendants from their liability as carriers. The defendants offered evidence to show that a delivery to the wharfinger, without notice, under the circumstances of the case, was a good delivery, according to their uniform usage, and the usage of other carriers similarly situated. The case was before the Supreme Court of Vermont three times, and the court, upon each occasion, held that, in the absence of any special contract, a delivery to the wharfinger, without notice, if warranted by the usage of the place, was sufficient, and discharged the defendant from liability. The The goods should be so left, and with such notice, as to secure the early, convenient, and safe reception of them by the person entitled to have them. Something, also, must depend, on this point, on the mode of conveyance. A man may carry a parcel into the house, and deliver it to the owner or his servant; a wagon or cart can go to the gate, or into the yard, and there deliver what it carries. A vessel can go to one wharf or another; and is bound to go to that which is reasonably convenient to the consignee, or to one that was agreed upon; but it is said a vessel is not bound to comply with requirements of the consignee as to the very wharf the goods should be left at, but may leave the goods at any safe, convenient, and accessible wharf at which such goods are usually left. Where not delivered to the owner personally, or to his agent, immediate notice should be given to the owner. In fact, it may be said, that the carrier cannot be made responsible without a notice of delivery to him, unless the delivery is itself a notice; and so, also, he cannot make adequate delivery without similar notice. But if the carrier has pointed out a place or way of delivery to himself, as at his station or in his box, he must take notice; and if the owner has in any way designated how the goods may be delivered to himself, he is bound by it. The notice must be prompt and distinct. And if the goods are delivered at an unsuitable or unauthorized place, no notice will make this a good delivery. Railroads terminate at their station, and although goods might be sent by wagons to the house or store of consignees, this is not usually done, as it is considered that the railroad carrier has finished his transit at his own terminus. Usually, the consignee of goods sent by railroad has notice from the consignor when to expect them; and this is so common, that it is seldom necessary, in fact, for the agent of the railroad to give notice to the consignee. But this should, we think, be given where it is necessary; and should be given as promptly, directly, and specifically, as may be necessary for the purpose of the notice. In a recent case in Massachusetts, the court appear to be of opinion, that the liability of a railroad company as carriers is terminated as soon as the goods are unladen from their car in their warehouse; and that afterwards they are only liable as warehousemen, or depositories, that is for their own fault. Indeed, it was distinctly held that the proprietors of a railroad, who transport goods over their road for hire, and deposit them in their warehouse without additional charge, until the owner or consignee has a reasonable time to take them away, are not liable as common carriers for the loss of the goods by fire, without negligence or default on their part, after the goods are unladen from the cars and placed in the warehouse, but are liable as warehousemen only, for want of ordinary care; although the owner or consignee has no opportunity to take the goods away before the fire. But this decision seems to go very far indeed. A railroad company may be compared to owners of ships in this respect, that they cannot take either the cars or the ships farther than the station or the wharf, and therefore may deliver the goods there. But a carrier by water is bound to give notice that the goods are on the wharf, and is not exhonerated as carrier until he gives such notice; whereas, in this very case, the court intimate that a railroad company is not bound to give notice. The law on the point when the responsibility of a railroad company as a common carrier ends, is not yet settled; nor will it be until it is determined by statutes, by further adjudication, or by established and general usage. It may happen that some third party may claim the goods, under a title adverse to that of the consignor or consignee. If the carrier refuse to deliver them to this third party, and it turns out that the claimant had a legal right to demand them, the carrier would be liable in damages to him. But the carrier may, and should, demand full and clear evidence of the claimant's title; and, if the evidence be not satisfactory, he may demand security and indemnity. If the evidence or the indemnity be withheld, he certainly should not be held answerable for anything beyond that amount which the goods themselves would satisfy, for he is in no fault. If he delivers the goods to such claimant, proof that the claimant had good title is an adequate defence against any suit by the consignor or consignee for non-delivery. In a case in Pennsylvania, the defendants were common carriers of goods between New York and Philadelphia, and had signed a receipt for certain goods as received by A, which they promised to deliver to his order. In an action by the indorsees of this receipt, who had made advances on the goods, it was held that the defendants might prove that A had no title to the goods, but that they had been fraudulently obtained by him from the true owner; and that, upon demand, they had delivered them up to the latter. The same doctrine has also been held in New York. COMMERCIAL CHRONICLE AND REVIEW. THE CHANGE OF SECRETARIES-ME. FESSENDEN AND THE BANKS-THE NEW LOAN PUT UPON THE MARKET-THE SCARCITY OF GREENBACKS CAUSED BY THE RISE IN PRICES-PRICES OF GOVERNMENT STOCKS-RE-EXPORT OF EXPORTed Goods-PRICES OF GOLD AND EXCHANGE, ETC. THE situation of the Federal Treasury, resulting from the change of Secretaries, in the midst of the most pressing financial difficulties, has continued to exercise an overshadowing influence upon the markets generally. The new Secretary has not yet adopted any decided "policy," and in this has, to some extent, disappointed the public expectation. The public mind had become long since wearied with the suspense in which it had, for more than two years, been kept by Mr. CHASE, who continually condemned the paper system while he perseveringly pursued it. Some change in this respect was wanting. There is nothing so detrimental to the interests of business, and, consequently, to those of the Treasury, as uncertainty. Mercantile affairs very soon accommodate themselves to the grooves in which they are to run, if only those grooves are permanent, and an assurance of that was earnestly looked for. It is no doubt the case that the legislation devised for Congress, by Mr. CHASE, had become the rule of action for his successor; but that legislation had always been at such loose ends as to allow the Treasury action to vibrate from the extreme of contraction to the extreme of expansion. The question was then will Mr. FESSENDEN continue the same tortuous course, or will he promptly avow himself in favor of husbanding the taxes, and borrowing his deficits at the market rate? Mr. FESSENDEN took a few days to decide whether he should accept the office, but finally, on the 5th July, entered upon the discharge of the duties. The remnant of Mr. CHASE's loan had been put upon the market again for offers, at a minimum of 104, bids to be opened July 6. That loan was withdrawn. On the 11th July, Mr. FESSENDEN arrived in town, and had a meeting with the Bank officers and financial notables on the 12th. The attendance was large, and representing the financial talent of the city. Mr. WILLIAMS was called to the chair, and Mr. LYMAN, of the Clearing House, appointed secretary. Mr. FES-. |