ing that, notwithstanding God having ordained that some should commit sin in spite of themselves, "He is nevertheless not the author of sin," is the same in amount, morally speaking, as if a man were to dig a pit into which his neighbour should fall, and not be held responsible for the injury inflicted. When the expression, God is not the author of sin, is used in its plain meaning, detached from the consideration of doctrine, no man, who has a share of moral sense, can refuse his assent to it. Yet the expression is not a correct one; for sin is not an abstract principle, nor a principle at all. It is the general term for immoral actions and sayings that are disrespectful to God. That man is sinful is an effect, not of God's will, but of the abuse of His gifts by the creature, within whose reach he placed happiness as the result of obedience to His established laws; and with perfectly benevolent design, God prepared punishment for the breach of them, and which inevitably follows, in some shape, sinful, and even what are termed careless actions. This view is not only compatible with moral sentiment and observation, but with an explanation of the extent to which the term predestination may be carried. If God has established creation, and added man to it on condition that if he be obedient he shall reap benefit, if disobedient he shall experience punishment, there is a fixed determination on the part of the Almighty that such condition shall be fulfilled, or otherwise that certain consequences shall be the result of non-fulfilment: this may be called predestination or decreeing. But to say that God had from all eternity determined to bring certain individuals into existence, that He might compel them to disobey His laws, others that He might favour them by opposite treatment, is to affirm so great a breach of morals on the part of the Deity, as to blot out justice and benevolence from among His attributes, and to remove from beings endowed with moral sense, all inducement to worship Him.

The second proposition is, "Although God knows whatsoever may or can come to pass upon all supposed conditions, yet hath He not decreed anything because He foresaw it as future, or as that which would come to pass upon such conditions."

There is an obscurity in this which seems to arise from the divines having had a glimpse of the risk, involved in their doctrine, of imputing to the Deity the want of wisdom and justice. It seems to mean that, if God foresaw that certain events would happen, there was no need for His decreeing that they should happen; that whatever He decreed to happen, would not happen, under any circumstances, contrary to His will. They appear anxious to free God from necessity-that is, supposing He had

established certain laws for matter and mind, the ordinary and certain results of their operation might be interfered with, in particular cases, by His decree; so that He might determine that things should happen, not because He foresaw them, but willed them. This, however, does not clear up the mystery, nor remove the imputations laid on the character of the Deity by the doctrine; nor does it prepare us for

The third and fourth propositions; "By the decree of God, for the manifestation of His glory, some men and angels are predestined unto everlasting life, and others pre-ordained unto everlasting death."

"These angels and men thus predestinated and fore-ordained, are particularly and unchangeably designed, and their number is so certain and definite, that it cannot be either increased or diminished."

To an ordinary understanding, such affirmations lower the moral character of the Deity, substituting injustice and wanton cruelty for justice and mercy. They completely destroy another doctrine, that this life is a state of probation, which it cannot possibly be if the fate of every individual be irrevocably fixed. There is something degrading also in

The fifth proposition; "Those of mankind that are predestinated unto life, God, before the foundation of the world was laid, according to His eternal and immutable purpose, and the secret council and good pleasure of His will, hath chosen, in Christ, unto everlasting glory, out of His mere free grace and love, without any foresight of Faith or good works, or perseverance in either of them, or any other thing in the creature as conditions, or causes moving Him thereunto, and all to the praise of His Glorious Grace."

Besides assuming that God acts blindly, without cause, without the impulse of His perfect goodness, this proposition would, if admitted, fix on the Almighty Creator the most childish caprice and vanity. It declares that God pays no regard to those who obey his laws, or to those who do not, but grants to certain individuals the highest favour, and dooms certain others to destruction, simply because He wills to do so for the purpose of His grace being praised-Praised?-By whom? By beings doomed to destruction, however carefully they may exert themselves to do His will? Does God need any praise? He has manifested His glory in other ways, not to gain praise-but to gratify His own benevolence and justice. We shall be able to see into the doctrine more clearly, if we proceed to the remaining propositions.

The sixth states, "As God hath appointed the Elect unto

Glory, so hath He, by the eternal and most free purpose of His will, fore-ordained all the means thereunto. Wherefore they who are elected, being fallen in Adam, are redeemed by Christ, are effectually called into faith in Christ by His spirit working in due season, are justified, adopted, sanctified, and kept by His power through Faith unto salvation. Neither are any other redeemed by Christ, effectually called, justified, adopted, sanctified and saved, but the Elect only."

Seventh; "The rest of mankind God was pleased, according to the unsearchable counsel of His own will, whereby He extendeth or withholdeth mercy, as He pleaseth, for the glory of His sovereign power over His creatures, to pass by, and to ordain them to dishonour and wrath for their sin, to the praise of His glorious justice."

The sixth proposition involves a matter of importance, viz., that the eternal decree is not supposed to have come into operation until the appearance of Christ, and also that it operates only where Christianity is known and adopted. It is not easy to see how an eternal and irrevocable decree of God could require any thing future to give it effect-any means to secure its fulfilment in any particular whatever. The will of God having had it recorded from all eternity, that certain persons were to be made eternally happy, and certain others eternally miserable, it surely needed nothing to render the chosen worthy of being chosen, or the condemned worthy of condemnation. This doctrine forestals another supposed to be necessary to the fulfilment of the pretended eternal decree, viz. the fall of Adam and the corruption of human nature. But as it is affirmed that Christ came into the world to save it from the consequences of Adam's transgression, and that salvation depends on the acceptance of Christ as a redeemer, it may be asked, how could there be a fall, or a salvation from its effects, in the face of an eternal decree? This is a contradiction, and an imputation against the wisdom of God. To say that Christ took away the sin of the world—the guilt incurred by Adam's posterity, is just saying that Christ restored things to the state they were in before Adam's fall. That state being, according to the Divines, one under the eternal decree, of what avail, it is asked, could Christ's appearance be? He did not come to redeem the elect, because they were the elect before the foundations of the world were laid, and nothing could prevent their being saved, it being impossible that their number can be increased or diminished. He did not come to redeem the condemned, for the same reasons, their number having been also fixed. Who, then, are the redeemed by Christ? None. This doctrine clearly admits that, in consequence of

Adam's guilt, the elect were equally involved in its consequences with the condemned. Thus the grossest injustice is imputed to God, in making all equally guilty, and yet rewarding guilt in some, and punishing it in others.-The seventh proposition is extraordinary; for if men be fore-ordained to be punished for sin, they must necessarily have been fore-ordained to commit sin; and that this should have been deemed worthy of the glorious justice of God, indicates a prodigious preponderance of feeling over intellect, in those who could propound to the world a doctrine that frees man from responsibility, and holds up God as a capricious, cruel, and senseless being! As if a glimpse of the consequences rationally arising out of their doctrine had been caught by the oppressed intelligence of the wondering and bewildered divines, whose own destructive feelings joined to an imagination that they themselves were assuredly elected, they concluded this part of their confession with the eighth and last proposition. "The doctrine of this high mystery of predestination is to be handled with special prudence and care, that men attending the will of God revealed in His word, and yielding obedience thereunto, may, from the certainty of their effectual vocation, be assured of their eternal election. So shall this doctrine afford matter of praise, reverence, and admiration of God, and of humility, diligence, and abundant consolation to all that sincerely obey the gospel." To conclude that men by obedience may be certain of effectual vocation, after taking vast pains to declare that whether men obey or not, their destiny has been fixed from all eternity, does not make it appear that the divines were disposed to use the prudence and care which they recommended to others. Am I to believe this doctrine or not? I cannot believe anything that darkens the slightest ray proceeding from the glorious attributes of God.

S.

ART. IV.-ONE TRACT MORE, OR THE SYSTEM ILLUSTRATED BY "THE TRACTS FOR THE TIMES," EXTERNALLY REGARDED. By a Layman. London: Rivingtons.

THIS 'One Tract More,' is attributed to Mr. Monckton Milnes, a gentleman who in some volumes of poetry, whatever may be thought of their power, has given proof of the possession of the true ethereal temperament, and of a gentle and generous spirit. Mr. Milnes is a reputed Tory and Puseyite,-a Tory, however, rather of the literary than of the political class, an æsthetic Tory, a lover of quiet, of order, of antiquity, fearful of change because it is tumultuary and rears an upstart spirit, in the insolence of its self-confidence, disdainful of the solemn and mighty Past,—and a Puseyite, for much the same æsthetic reasons, because too refined for an Evangelical,-too earnest and spiritual for a Church and King man,-and too much a worshipper of the outward, too sensitive to Art and all external impressions, too enamoured of Cathedrals and the vague solemnitics of Authority, for a Dissenter. Where indeed in the Establishment is there a nook of refuge for religious minds of Mr. Milnes' order except in Puseyism, and how comfortless and unconfiding must have been their repose upon her bosom, until the Catholicism of the English Church began to develop itself? The Evangelical Clergy are Churchmen only by accident; Salvation by Doctrines is the essence of their Christianity, and the external administration the merest circumstantial; and the narrowness in which all the evidences of the true spirit of Christianity in the soul are reduced by them to one spiritual experience, must revolt all philosophic and Catholic minds. The High Church party, however moral and sincerely devoted to the Ethics of Christianity, are rather a religious police than a spiritual Church. With them the Church is subordinate to the purposes of the State, and Religion is not an independent interest of the soul, the supreme affection and authority. With a merely doctrinal Church assimilating in all essentials with the Evangelical Dissenters, or with a merely ethical and political Church in which spiritual life and its developments are not the supreme concern, minds of Mr. Milnes' class can have but little sympathy. They desire earnestness, spirituality, fervour, the acknowledged supremacy of the religious affections, in combination with all artistical and imaginative influences, with a mystic ceremonial, a consecrated priesthood, a traditional authority. An intense life in the in