Argument, Inference and Dialectic: Collected Papers on Informal LogicChapters 1-12 of this volume contain the papers on infonnal logic and argumentation that I've published and/or read at conferences over the last 17 years. These papers are reproduced here pretty much unchanged from their first appearance; it is my intention that their appearance here constitute a record of my positions and arguments at the time of their original publication or delivery. I've made minor changes in fonnat, in the style of references, etc., for the sake of consistency; I've also corrected typographical errors and the like. The only extensive changes in wording occur in the last few pages of Chapter 7, and were made only to enable the reader to see more clearly what I was getting at in my first attempt to write about the notion of coherence. Chapter 13 was written expressly for this volume. It looks retrospectively at the contents of the first 12 chapters and attempts to highlight the unifying themes that run through them. It also revisits the ideas about dialectic that occupied my first in light of later developments in my thinking but also re paper, reworking them emphasizing themes about which I've tended to remain silent in the last few years. |
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Contents
DIALECTIC AND THE STRUCTURE OF ARGUMENT | xvii |
2 PRESUMPTION AND BURDEN OF PROOF | xviii |
3 DO THERE HAVE TO BE OBJECTIVE STANDARDS FOR ASSESSING ARGUMENTS? | xx |
4 CONCLUSION | 4 |
GENERALIZING THE NOTION OF ARGUMENT | 6 |
1 DOXASTIC ATTITUDES OTHER THAN BELIEF | 7 |
2 PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDES OTHER THAN DOXASTIC ATTITUDES | 11 |
3 NONPROPOSITIONAL OBJECT OF CONSCIOUS ATTITUDES | 13 |
3 IS THE UNDERSTANDING OF A DOMAIN SUSCEPTIBLE OF PROPOSITIONAL OR SENTENTIAL REPRESENTATION? | 71 |
4 UNDERSTANDING COHERENCE AND RATIONALITY | 74 |
LOGICAL FORM AND THE LINK BETWEEN PREMISSES AND CONCLUSION | 77 |
2 SEMANTIC ENTAILMENTS | 81 |
3 INDUCTIVE INFERENCES AND GOODMANS PARADOX | 85 |
4 THE EFFECT OF PRAGMATIC CONSIDERATIONS ON THE VALIDITY OF INDUCTIVE GENERALIZATION | 91 |
5 CONCLUSION | 92 |
ARGUMENT SCHEMES AND THE EVALUATION OF PRESUMPTIVE REASONING | 94 |
FURTHER QUESTIONS | 15 |
LOGIC EPISTEMOLOGY AND ARGUMENT APPRAISAL | 17 |
2 APPRAISING PREMISES | 19 |
3 SUITABILITY OF INFERENTIAL LINK | 22 |
4 CONCLUSION | 27 |
THE RELATION OF ARGUMENT TO INFERENCE | 28 |
2 INFERENCE | 35 |
3 LOGICAL PRAGMATICS ARGUMENTATION THEORY AND THE EVALUATION OF INFERENCE | 39 |
INCONSISTENCY RATIONALITY AND RELATIVISM | 42 |
2 HOW SERIOUS A FAULT IS INCONSISTENCY? | 45 |
3 WHEN IS IT REASONABLE TO TOLERATE INCONSISTENCY? | 47 |
4 WHAT ABOUT RELATIVISM | 50 |
POST HOC ERGO PROPTER HOC | 52 |
LOGIC COHERENCE AND PSYCHOLOGY | 60 |
LOGIC COHERENCE AND PSYCHOLOGY REVISITED | 69 |
2 UNDERSTANDING A DOMAIN AS NECESSARY BACKGROUND OF ANY REASONING | 70 |
2 ARE THERE NORMATIVE ARGUMENT SCHEMES? | 96 |
PRESUMPTION AND ARGUMENT SCHEMES | 101 |
2 ARGUMENT SCHEMES | 104 |
3 DO ARGUMENT SCHEMES HAVE NORMATIVE FORCE? | 105 |
4 WHAT IS THE POINT OF IDENTIFYING ARGUMENT SCHEMES? | 107 |
COGNITIVE SCIENCE AND THE FUTURE OF RATIONAL CRITICISM | 109 |
2 WHAT IF THE ELIMINATIVISTS ARE RIGHT? | 113 |
LOGIC DIALECTIC AND THE PRACTICE OF RATIONAL CRITICISM | 122 |
2 THE NATURE OF THE UNDERTAKING TO WHICH THESE PAPERS ARE DEVOTED | 124 |
3 REVISITING DIALECTIC AND THE STRUCTURE OF ARGUMENT THE ROLE OF DIALECTIC | 126 |
4 REVISITING DIALECTIC AND THE STRUCTURE OF ARGUMENT RELATIVISM | 130 |
5 CONCLUSION | 136 |
REFERENCES | 137 |
141 | |
Other editions - View all
Argument, Inference and Dialectic: Collected Papers on Informal Logic with ... R.C. Pinto Limited preview - 2013 |
Argument, Inference and Dialectic: Collected Papers on Informal Logic with ... Robert Pinto No preview available - 2010 |
Argument, Inference and Dialectic: Collected Papers on Informal Logic with ... Robert Pinto No preview available - 2013 |
Common terms and phrases
accept additional appears appraisal arguing argument schemes assessment assumption attempt attitudes basis belief causal causes Chapter claim cognitive coherence conception conclusion condition consequence considerations considered consists context course criteria critical critical practice deductive depends determining developed dialectical dialectical interchange dialogue discussion domain entail epistemic evaluation evidence example explain fact fallacy false follows formal give given grounds hold hypothesis idea important inconsistency inductive inference instances interesting issue kind least light logical form matter means Moreover necessary normative notion objects occur offer particular person Pinto position possible post hoc practice premisses present presumptive reasoning principle problem projecting proposition question rational reasoning relation relative relativism requires respect role rules sample seems sense simply sort standards story suggest suppose theory things tradition true truth turn understanding validity Walton