On the contrary, Aristotle, acknowledging with Plato that there are in the mind ideas which cannot be explained by sensible experience, instead of setting out from these ideas to elevate himself by abstraction to their invisible source, seeks to follow them into reality. The one seems to aspire to go out from the world, the other to plunge into it. Plato is the genius of abstraction; Aristotle, that of classification. The first has more elevation; the second, more extent."

The idealism and internalism of Plato may be seen in his affinity for the theories of the Ionian dynamicists and of the Eleatic school. Ritter says, "From the dynamical physiology, as perfected by Heraclitus, he derived the principal feature of his own theory of the universe, which he regarded as a perfect living or ensouled being, subject to the perpetual flux of becoming, and destined by its order and proportion to be the most perfect representation of the eternal ideas. Still more decided is his bias for Eleatic opinions. The animating principle of this philosophy, that the perfect alone truly and immutably subsists, is rigorously marked out by Plato, who has attempted to illustrate, in a variety of ways, the identity of whatever appears to be different. He accordingly adopts the Eleatic contrariety of the rational knowledge of truth and the sensuous opinion; softening, however, its asperity, in order to do justice to the other elements of Greek philosophy."

The sensualism and externalism of Aristotle may be seen in the sensuous character of his system, in his tendency to subtle argumentation, and in the great diversity and want of scientific coherency which characterize his thought, and which led Brucker to remark, "As the result of the brief survey which we have taken of the philosophy of Aristotle, it may be asserted, that it is. rather the philosophy of Words than of Things; and that the study of his writings tends more to perplex the understanding with subtle distinctions, than to enlighten it with real knowledge."

Although both Plato and Aristotle constructed philosophy upon the ground of Psychology, or of the Consciousness, they started from opposite points: Plato from Ideas and from Intuition, and Aristotle from Phenomena and from Sensation; the method of Plato being consequently deductive, while that of Aristotle was inductive. Plato, therefore, arrived at the true idea of science; which is, that phenomena are governed by ideas or general laws; the discovery of which, by the consciousness, enables us to under

metaphysics succeeded the interesting but limited researches of moral philosophy. The common character of Stoicism and Epicureanism is to reduce philosophy almost entirely to morality."

With regard to the system of Epicurus, which succeeded the Aristotelian or peripatetic philosophy, as the most external element in Psychology, we need not enlarge, as it is generally understood to be a system of materialism, sensualism, and atheism. Cousin says, "Epicurus concludes that we should guard against introducing trouble into the soul, by allowing in it a place for domestic affections, or for patriotism, which is still more dangerous; and Epicureanism resolves itself into a perfect egotism, adorned by the beautiful name of impassibility. Having set out from Sensation, it arrives first at materialism and at atheism; finally, in morality, at absolute egotism, both public and private, an egotism which, if it is consistent, and if the soul has energy, would arrive legitimately at iniquity and crime, but which ordinarily limits itself by mere indifference to others. Epicureanism is the last development of Greek sensualism: it places upon the stage of the general history of philosophy the Indian sensualism of Kapila; and I need not ask you to observe how much it surpasses it in extent, in rigor, and in clearness."

With regard to Stoicism, which succeeded Platonism as the internal, intellectual, and ideal side of psychology, he says, "Stoicism is precisely the opposite of Epicureanism, with which it forms a perfect contrast. For Stoicism, as well as for Epicureanism, morality is philosophy par excellence. Like Epicureanism, too, it admits physiology and logic as the introduction to morality. But if, in the doctrine of Stoicism, more than one distinct trace of sensualism and often of materialism is found, it is impossible to mistake in it an unequivocal theism; although sometimes it is produced under the form of Pantheism. Since reason is the foundation of humanity, of nature, of God, it follows that the practical law, par excellence, is to live conformably to reason. This is the fundamental maxim of Stoic-morality. Behold now the series of consequences derived from this maxim! Pain and pleasure, being neither conformed nor nonconformed to reason, are neither good nor bad; and the physical consequences of actions are as if they did not exist. This must have conducted, and has conducted, Stoicism to a jurisprudence entirely opposite to Epicurean jurisprudence. If we must do what is reasonable, without regard to the consequences, it is not for the utility which results from it, but for the excellence which is in itself. What

prevents man from conforming to reason? Passion: Passion, then, is the enemy which it behooves to combat. It is not the struggle against the passions, it is their entire destruction, which it recommends; forgetting that, in extinguishing the flame, its source is destroyed; that is, the principle which alone can put man in conformity with reason and in relation with God. Thus philosophy is only an apprenticeship to death, and not to life: it tends to death by its image, apathy, and ataraxy, and is ultimately resolved into a sublime egotism. You see it is precisely the counterpart of Epicureanism."

There are two things, which, in a particular manner, point to the decline and fall of Psychology in Greece, and which grow out of the fact, that the mind is developed from within outwards. The first is its descent into systems of unqualified moralism; and the second is the development of the sophistical element, which, as we have already seen, attended the destruction of philosophy in the Ontological sphere. On this point, Brucker remarks, “In morals, the principal difference between the Cynics and the Stoics was, that the former disdained the cultivation of nature, the latter affected to rise above it. On the subject of physics, Zeno received his doctrine from Pythagoras and Heraclitus, through the channel of the Platonic school, as will fully appear from a careful comparison of their respective systems. The Stoic philosophy being in this manner of heterogeneous origin, it necessarily partook of the several systems of which it is composed. The idle quibbles, jejune reasonings, and imposing sophisms, which so justly exposed the schools of the dialectic philosophers to ridicule, found their way into the Porch, where much time was wasted, and much ingenuity thrown away, upon questions of no importance. Cicero censures the Stoics for encouraging in their schools a barren kind of disputation, and employing themselves in determining trifling questions, in which the disputants can have no interest, and which, at the close, leaves them neither wiser nor better. It may perhaps be thought surprising, that philosophers who affected so much gravity and wisdom should condescend to such trifling occupations; but it must be considered, that, at this time, a fondness for subtle disputations so generally prevailed in Greece, that excellence in the arts of reasoning and sophistry was a sure path to fame."

As sophistry was followed by scepticism at the close of the ontological period, so we find the same result at the close of the psychological period. Cousin says, "Epicureanism and Stoicism,

born nearly together, have been developed with one another and by one another. Their ardent struggle closed only about a century before the Christian era. I ask, if it was possible that scepticism should not have gone forth from the midst of the struggle which they produced. Yes: it did proceed from it, and on all sides. It went forth from idealism: hence the new Academy. But it was reserved for sensualism to produce true scepticism. A century before the Christian era, from a school of natural philosophers and physicians, went forth a new scepticism with Ænesidemus, who made of it a school, which has since had its fixed principles, its method, its history."

The ontological and psychological developments of philosophy in Greece having been completed, and their destruction consummated by the action of Scepticism, a philosophical epoch is demanded by our science, in which the union of these conflicting elements shall be attempted under the form of Eclecticism, as the representative of Absolute Truth: and as this development was characterized as self-conscious, intellectual, and psychological, while spiritual laws could not at this period be conceived, but only represented by supernatural forms, a dualistic natural development of eclectical philosophy was consequently required, including opposite schools; one being supernatural and mystical, and the other natural and intellectual: the first representing Marriage, or the union of opposites through the sacrifice of the individual, from a conscious, internal, supernatural point of view,— the Hebrews having represented it from an unconscious, external, natural point of view; and the second representing the union of opposites from an intellectual point of view by the heterogeneous combination of opposite systems. We therefore find that two developments of eclectical philosophy, corresponding with this demand, were actually realized; Gnosticism being the principal exponent of the first, and the school of Alexandria of the second. Of the first, M. Cousin writes, "The history of Greek philosophy should have had, and did have, a brilliant final movement, - that of religious philosophy. Its first epoch, under Pythagoras and the Ionians, had been consecrated to natural philosophy; its second, under Aristotle and Plato, had been filled by a philosophy, which, without forgetting the Universe and God, had especially a human and moral character; the third and last epoch was that of religious philosophy. On all sides, sects and schools began to appear, whose ruling character was religious, and whose processes were no longer abstraction nor analysis, but inspiration,

enthusiasm, illumination. Hence the Cabala of the Jews and Gnosticism." Of the second development, he writes as follows: "But I hasten to reach a system which represents the regular and scientific mysticism of this epoch: I mean the school of Alexandria. Without doubt, the avowed object of the school of Alexandria was Eclecticism. The Alexandrians wished to unite every thing, all the parts of Greek Philosophy among themselves, philosophy and religion, Greece and Asia. They have been accused of having ended in syncretism; in other words, of having left a noble attempt at reconciliation to degenerate into a deplorable confusion. Truly they may be reproached with this; and, with more reason, a contrary reproach may be cast upon them. Alexandria wished to unite the Oriental with the Greek spirit; but, in this fusion, it was the Oriental spirit that prevailed. It wished to unite religion and philosophy; but it was religion that ruled. It wished to unite all the parts of Greek philosophy; but it was Plato that ruled, often indeed Pythagoras. Of the three systems into which we have seen the Greek philosophy resolve itself, Idealism remained alone. But a school which is condemned to a single philosophical element is forced to exaggerate it, in order to draw from it philosophy entire; and the exclusive idealism of the school of Alexandria soon drew it into all the follies of mysticism. Mysticism is the true character of the school of Alexandria: it is that which gives it an elevated and original rank in the history of philosophy. With Alexandrian mysticism, Greek philosophy must have ended, and did end."

Upon this school, Brucker remarks, "The founders of this sect formed the flattering design of selecting from the doctrines of all former philosophers such opinions as seemed to approach nearest the truth, and combining them in one system; but, in attempting to combine the leading tenets of each sect in one common system, these philosophers were obliged, in many cases, to understand them in a sense different from that of their original authors. Finding it impossible to produce an appearance of harmony among systems essentially different from each other, without casting a veil of obscurity over the whole, they exerted their utmost ingenuity in devising fanciful conceptions, subtle distinctions, airy suppositions, and vague terms; combinations of which, infinitely diversified, they attempted, too successfully, to impose upon the world as a system of real and sublime truths."

We now come to the third period in the development of Philosophy, which is the Eclectical sphere, and for which a similar