(264 Ill. 156) a list of witnesses to be called by the people upon the trial of this case and that the names of these witnesses were upon that list. No attempt was made by plaintiff in error to show that he was surprised by the action of the state's attorney in calling these witnesses; the only objection interposed being that the names of these witnesses were not indorsed upon the indictment. Under such circumstances, there was no abuse of discretion on the part of the court in permitting these witnesses to testify. [8] The court admitted in evidence, over the objection of plaintiff in error, an order of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois made June 4, 1913, finding Patrick O'Donnell, James Rosenthal, and Frances Houlihan not guilty of obstructing justice. None of these parties were witnesses in this case, but it had developed during the trial that they were attorneys and represented Kirby and his wife in various proceedings taken against them in the bankruptcy matter on the charge of concealing assets from the trustee of the bankrupt's estate. Proof that in the bankruptcy proceedings they had been found not guilty of obstructing justice was wholly irrelevant in this case and could have been of no assistance to the jury in arriving at a verdict. While the admission of this order in evidence was error, it was harmless error, as it could not have influenced the jury in returning a verdict of guilty against plaintiff in error. [9] As hereinbefore stated, Kirby positively identified the defendant Snarley as one of the persons present in the rooms at 1710 Michigan avenue on October 28th and 29th, and testified that Snarley at that time did not have a beard. Plaintiff in error offered to prove by several witnesses that Snarley during the latter part of October had a beard, and further that on October 29th he was in Springfield. The court refused to permit this proof to be made, and in this particular erred. The evidence offered was competent for the purpose of discrediting the testimony of Kirby, if the jury should have seen fit to give to it that effect. The admission of this testimony, however, could not have affected the verdict. The story detailed by Kirby was in so many particulars confirmed by the testimony of various other witnesses, that in the absence of any evidence offered by plaintiff in error to deny or explain the material parts of Kirby's testimony connecting plaintiff in error with the crime the jury must necessarily have found him guilty, notwithstanding they may have disbelieved Kirby's testimony regarding the presence of Snarley at the alleged pool room on the occasion when Kirby was there. There are no such errors in the record as require a reversal of the judgment. The judgment of the criminal court is affirmed. Judgment affirmed. SCHULTZ v. HENRY ERICSSON CO. (Supreme Court of Illinois. June 16, 1914. Rehearing Denied Oct. 7, 1914.) 1. MASTER AND SERVANT (§§ 285, 286*)—AcTIONS FOR INJURIES QUESTION FOR JURY. Plaintiff was in defendant's employ, and was engaged in wheeling mortar along a runway in a building in course of construction. In passing another workman returning with an empty wheelbarrow at a point where, though plaintiff was within 15 inches of the unguarded edge of the runway, and the edge of the wheelbarrow was even with the edge of the between the two wheelbarrows, a wire on one runway, there was a space of only two inches of them touched the other and unbalanced plaintiff, causing the wheelbarrow to tip and throw him from the runway. Held, that whether the afford adequate protection to the workmen, and runway was unsafe and of insufficient width to whether such condition was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury, were for the jury. Servant, Cent. Dig. §§ 1001-1003, 1006-1008, [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Master and 1010-1033, 1035-1044, 1046-1050, 1053; Dec. Dig. §§ 285, 286.*] 2. COURTS (§ 189*) MUNICIPAL COURTS PLEADING STATEMENT OF CLAIM. Rev. St. 1913, c. 37, § 266), providing that, in Under Municipal Court Act, § 3 (Hurd's cases of the fourth class authorized to be brought in that court, the issue shall be determined without other written pleadings than those expressly provided for, and section 40, requiring the filing of a statement of plaintiff's claim consisting, if the suit be for a tort, of a brief statement of the nature of the tort and such further information as will reasonably inform defendant of the nature of the case he is called upon to defend, and providing that it need not set forth the cause of action with the particularity required in a common-law declaration, a statement of an employé's claim for injuries caused by his employer's failure to furnish him a proper, safe, and sufficient scaffold on which to work was not insufficient be1913, c. 48, par. 79, requiring scaffolds erected cause of its failure to refer to Hurd's Rev. St. or constructed for use in the erection of any building to be constructed in a safe, suitable, and proper manner so as to give proper and adequate protection to persons employed thereon. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Courts, Cent. Dig. §§ 409, 412, 413, 429, 458; Dec. Dig. § 189.*] 3. COURTS (§ 189*) MUNICIPAL COURTS PLEADING STATEMENT OF CLAIM. (Hurd's Rev. St. 1913, c. 37, §§ 266, 303), a Under Municipal Court Act, $$ 3, 40 statement of an employé's claim in an action in the municipal court, stating that it was for injuries sustained while in defendant's employ failure to furnish him a proper, safe, and suffias a common laborer by reason of defendant's cient scaffold upon which to work to his damage in a specified sum, was sufficient to reasonably inform defendant of the nature of the case he was called upon to defend. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Courts, Cent. Dig. §§ 409, 412, 413, 429, 458; Dec. Dig. § 189.*] 4, MASTER AND SERVANT ($125*)—LIABILITY FOR INJURIES-UNSAFE SCAFFOLDS. Under Hurd's Rev. St. 1913, c. 48, par. 79, requiring scaffolds constructed for use in the erection of buildings or other structures to be erected in a safe, suitable, and proper manner, and so as to give proper and adequate protection to persons employed thereon, and paragraph 88, giving a right of action for injuries caused by willful violations thereof or willful Hurd's Rev. St. 1913, c. 48, par. 79, requiring scaffolds for use in the erection of any building or other structure to be constructed in a safe, proper, and suitable manner, not defining what shall constitute a safe, suitable, and proper scaffold, this is for the determination of the jury as a question of fact. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Master and Servant, Cent. Dig. §§ 1001, 1006, 1008, 10101015, 1017-1033, 1036-1012, 1044, 1046-1050; Dec. Dig. § 286.*] CRAIG, J. This was an action of the fourth class in the municipal court of Chicago for personal injuries sustained by appellee by falling from a scaffold or runway on which he was working while in the employ of the appellant. A trial was had, in which the jury assessed the damages of plaintiff at $1,000. Motions for a new trial and in arrest of judgment were overruled, and judgment entered on the verdict, from which appellant prosecuted a writ of error to the Appellate Court for the First District, where the judgment was affirmed. A certificate of importance and an appeal were granted by that court, and the case certified to this court for further review. (2) that Appellant's chief contentions are: (1) That the statement of claim is insufficient to sustain an action under the statute for willful 6. APPEAL AND ERROR (§ 1033*)-HARMLESS violation of the provisions of the EmployERROR-INSTRUCTIONS - ERROR FAVORABLE ment Act relating to the construction of TO PARTY COMPLAINING-DEFINITIONS-UN- suitable scaffolds, hoists, cranes, or other SAFE SCAFFOLD "WILLFULLY" - "KNOWINGLY"-"WILLFUL VIOLATION." mechanical contrivances used in the erection, In an employe's action for injuries alleged or construction of buildings, etc.; to have been caused by the employer's failure to the evidence fails to establish a case of comfurnish a safe and sufficient scaffold as requir-mon-law negligence against appellant; (3) ed by Hurd's Rev. St. 1913, c. 48, par. 79, an instruction that plaintiff could not recover, unless the employer willfully failed to comply with the law, and to construct a safe, suitable, and proper scaffold, and by a willful violation of the statute was meant a reckless disregard of its provisions, was too favorable to the employer, since "willfully" is synonymous with "knowingly," and a reckless disregard of the provisions of the statute is not necessary to constitute a "willful violation." [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 4052-4062; Dec. Dig. § 1033.* For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 8, pp. 7468-7481; 7835, 7836; vol. 5, pp. 3937-3939.] 7. APPEAL AND ERROR (§ 1094*)-REVIEW OF JUDGMENT OF APPELLATE COURT QUESTIONS OF FACT. The facts found by the jury are conclusively settled for the Supreme Court by the Appellate Court's affirmance of the judgment. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 4322-4352; Dec. Dig. § 1094.*] 8. NEGLIGENCE (§ 136*)-QUESTIONS FOR JURY -PROXIMATE CAUSE. The proximate cause of an injury is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury to be determined from all the attendant facts and circumstances, and only becomes a question of law when the facts are undisputed, and reasonable men can draw therefrom only one inference. that, even if the statement of claim is sufficient to permit a recovery under the statute, appellee has failed to establish by his proofs such a willful violation of the statute as to authorize a recovery thereon; and (4) that the manner of the construction of the scaffold was not the proximate cause of the injury. The contentions will be considered in the order above enumerated. [1] From the evidence it appears that on and prior to June 21, 1909, appellant was engaged in the construction of a steel and brick building on Indiana avenue, in Chicago, on which the work had been completed to about the level of the second floor, where the masons were then at work on the north wall. The materials used-brick and mortar -were loaded in wheelbarrows on the The wheelbarrows were run ground floor. onto a hoist near the center of the building and by it raised to the second floor, where they were wheeled by the workmen over scaffolds or runways to the place where such materials were used. Around the hoist a platform was built, from which a scaffold or runway was constructed to the west wall, and along the west wall to the north wall, where the masons were at work. The runway from the platform to the west wall was about 5 or 6 feet in width, and along the west wall it was between 10 and 11 feet in width, being constructed of 13 10-inch planks laid lengthwise along the wall. Along the Action by August Schultz against the Hen-west wall, and about a foot from the wall, ry Ericsson Company. A judgment for plaintiff was affirmed by the Appellate Court, First District (182 Ill. App. 487), and defendant appeals. Affirmed. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Negligence, Cent. Dig. §§ 277-353; Dec. Dig. § 136.*] Appeal from Branch C Appellate Court, First District, on Error to Municipal Court of Chicago; Hosea W. Wells, Judge. Frank M. Cox, and R. J. Fellingham, both of Chicago, for appellant. Meek & McDonald, of Chicago, for appellee. mortar boards were laid, and next to the motar boards the brick were dumped in piles about 2 feet high along the full length of the runway; the piles sloping down to a few brick on the east edge of the piles, which extended onto the runway, leaving a clear space of about 5 or 6 feet from the pile *For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep'r Indexes of brick to the east side or edge of the runway. No guard rails or other contrivances were constructed along the runway to prevent men or materials from falling off; but a single plank platform was laid about 18 inches east of the runway, for the purpose of enabling the men at work on the runway to step on it in case they lost their balance and fell from the runway. In going to and returning from the place where the masons were at work on the north wall the wheelers would be required to pass one another at various places on this runway. At the time of his injury appellee was about 35 years of age and had had about 2 years' experience in such work, having at various times worked for appellant and other contractors at this kind of work. At the time he was injured appellee was engaged in wheeling a wheelbarrow load of mortar to the masons at work on the north wall of the building. The hoist was so constructed that when a loaded wheelbarrow came up an empty one would go down. The loaded wheelbarrows, as they came up, would be taken from the hoist by the men in rotation as they returned from their trip, so that on each trip the wheelers would have a different wheelbarrow. When the wheelbarrow came off the hoist its handles would be to the south, and the wheeler would take hold of the handles, back the wheelbarrow off, turn to the west and wheel his load to the end of the runway leading to the west wall, and thence north along the runway on the east side of the west wall to the place where the masons were at that a space of about 2 inches only was left between the trays of the wheelbarrows in passing when the wheeler walked on the second plank or 15 inches from the unguarded edge of the platform, with the outside edge of the tray of the heavily loaded wheelbarrow even with the edge of the runway. In attempting to pass Magliano a wire in the rim of the tray of the wheelbarrow used by appellee touched the other wheelbarrow and unbalanced him, and his wheelbarrow dumped over on the east edge of the scaffold, throwing most of the mortar on the lower floor and appellee off the runway and over the single plank east of the runway to the first floor and seriously injured him. Appellee did not know of the wire projecting from his wheelbarrow, as each trip he made he had a different wheelbarrow. As a result of the accident he was removed to the hospital in a dazed condition, where he was confined to his bed for a period of two or three weeks as a result of injuries to his head, shoulders, chest, and ankle; the injury to the ankle being the most serious, as some of the ligaments were torn, necessitating the putting of the foot in a plaster cast. As a result of his injuries he was unable to work for a period of about 30 weeks and required to receive occasional treatments from his physician for a period of about a year and a half. It was stipulated on the trial that appellee had none of the injuries of which he now complains before this accident. Appellant introduced no evidence, and at the close of plaintiff's case moved the court to instruct the jury to find the defendant not guilty, and submitted the proper instruction therefor in writing. The court denied the motion, and the jury returned a verdict of guilty and assessed plaintiff's damages at $1,000, upon which the court entered judgment, after overruling motions for a new trial and in arrest of judgment. work. At this time 7 or 8 men were engaged in wheeling materials in iron wheelbarrows, some being filled with brick and others with mortar. About 25 wheelbarrows were employed altogether on the work. In taking the wheelbarrow from the hoist to the place where the masons were at work the men wheeling the loaded wheelbarrows would pass those returning with the empty wheelbarrows at various places on the runway. Appellee [2,3] The substance of the statement of commenced work at about 8 o'clock that claim filed by appellee, in so far as it is mamorning and was directed by the superin- terial to be considered here, is that it is tendent to go to work on the second floor, for injuries sustained June 21, 1909, while wheeling brick and mortar to the masons. in the employ of appellant as a common laThe first trip he made he noticed the width borer, by reason of its failure to furnish him between the brick piles and the east edge of a proper, safe, and sufficient scaffold upon the runway or scaffold and the piles of brick, which to work, etc., to the damage of appellee but had no trouble in passing prior to the in the sum of $1,000. Appellant insists that last trip. At about 10:30 o'clock in the morn- these allegations of the statement of claim ing he received a load of mortar as it came are insufficient to sustain an action under up the hoist and proceeded to the west run- the statute, for the reason that no reference way or scaffold and north on it about 20 feet, is made to the statute in the statement of where he met another one of the laborers, claim. Section 3 of the Municipal Court Act Donato Magliano, returning on the westerly (Hurd's Stat. 1913, p. 723) provides that in side of the runway with an empty wheel- all cases of the fourth and fifth classes the barrow. Magliano stopped with his wheel- issues shall be determined without other barrow as close to the brick pile on the west forms of written pleading than those expressas he could, and appellee, with his wheel- ly prescribed and provided for. Section 40 barrow on the second plank from the east of the same act provides that suits of the edge of the runway, attempted to pass Mag-fourth class shall be commenced by filing a liano. The trays or hoppers on the wheel- præcipe for a summons and a statement of "If the suit be for a tort, it shall consist of a brief statement of the nature of the tort and such further information as will reasonably inform the defendant of the nature of the case he is called upon to defend, but nothing herein contained shall be construed to require the statement of claim in any action for a tort to set forth the cause of action with the particularity required in a declaration at common law." In Edgerton v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Co., 240 Ill. 311, 88 N. E. 808, we had occasion to consider the nature and effect of a statement of a plaintiff's claim or cause of action in suits of this class. It was there said: "As to this class of cases under the Municipal Court Act, where no written pleadings are required, the same rule will govern as controls the form of actions before justices of the peace. We have held that it is the well-settled practice that in such courts the party suing need not even name his action, or, if misnamed, that will not affect his rights, if upon hearing the evidence he appears to be entitled to recover, and the court has jurisdiction of the defendant and of the subject-matter of the litigation.' In Houren v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Co., 236 Ill. 620, 86 N. E. 611, 20 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1110, 127 Am. St. Rep. 309, we affirmed a judgment against the railroad company for obstructing a public highway by stopping a train thereon for more than 10 minutes, in violation of section 77 of chapter 114, in which the statement of claim made no reference whatever to the statute. The holding in each of those cases is in accordance with both the letter and the spirit of the Municipal Court Act, and is decisive of the objections urged against the statement of claim in this case. vent the falling of any material that may be used or deposited thereon." Paragraph 82 of the same act authorizes the state factory inspector to inspect any such scaffold and prohibit its use when found to be dangerous to life or limb, etc.; and by paragraph 88 a penalty of not less than $25 nor more than $500, or imprisonment for not less than three months or more than two years, or both, is provided for a violation of the provisions of the act. It further provides that: "For any injury to person or property, occasioned by any willful violations of this act, or willful failure to comply with any of its provisions, a right of action shall accrue to the party injured, for any direct damages sustained thereby," etc. The Appellant insists that in order to recover under this statute it must be shown that the employer knew, or had good reason to. suppose, that the scaffold in use was not erected and constructed in a safe, suitable, and proper manner, and so constructed, placed, and operated as to give adequate protection to the lives and limbs of those employed thereon, and that notice of such fact must be brought home to the employer by complaint from the employè or otherwise, or he will not be liable. With this contention we are unable to agree. Notice of the conditions is notice of the dangerous conditions, if the conditions are, in fact, dangerous. Piazzi v. KerensDonnewald Coal Co., 262 Ill. 30, 104 N. E. 200. This much is, in effect, conceded by counsel for appellant, who insist that appellee is barred from his common-law action under the law of assumed risk, for the reason that all conditions and whatever dangers Neither do we think the statement of claim there were were open and obvious to him, filed was insufficient to reasonably inform and therefore were assumed by him. appellant of the nature of the case appellant same is true as regards appellant, which was called upon to defend when it charged was represented by its superintendent, who that appellee was injured by reason of the was present overseeing and directing the failure to furnish him a proper, safe, and suf- work. What was notice to one would under ficient scaffold upon which to work. The like conditions be equally notice to the other. charge is almost in the language of the stat-No discrimination can be made in this respect ute, with the provisions of which the appel-between the employer and the employé and lant is charged with knowledge as a matter preserve that equality of right which it is the policy of the law to preserve and main[4] Whether or not appellee established a tain. The object to be attained by this statcase of common-law negligence against appel-ute was to prevent injuries to persons emlant is wholly immaterial, inasmuch as we ployed in this dangerous and extra hazardous are of the opinion that appellee made a pri- occupation, so that negligence on their part ma facie case, under the statute, for a fail- in the manner of doing their work might not ure to furnish and maintain a safe, suitable, prove fatal. The language of the statute is and proper scaffold upon which he should that the scaffold "shall be erected and conwork. The statute (Hurd's Stat. 1913, c. 48, structed in a safe, suitable and proper manner, par. 79) provides as follows: and shall be so erected and constructed, placed and operated, as to give proper and adequate protection to the life and limb of any person or persons, employed or engaged thereon." No attempt is made to define what shall be considered or shall constitute a safe, suitable, and proper scaffold, which, from the very nature of things, could not well be done, for what might be a safe, suitable, and proper scaffold for one kind of work under one set of law. "That all scaffolds, hoists, cranes, stays, ladders, supports, or other mechanical contrivances, erected or constructed by any person, firm or corporation, in this state, for the use in the erection, repairing, alteration, removal or painting of any house, building, bridge, viaduct, or other structure, shall be erected and constructed in a safe, suitable and proper manner, and shall be so erected and constructed, placed and operated, as to give proper and adequate protection to the life and limb of any person or persons employed or engaged thereon, or passing under or by the same, and in such manner as to pre-of conditions or circumstances would be whol ly inadequate, insufficient, and unsafe for [5, 6] What was said in the cases cited is doing another kind of work under other con- equally true and applicable to the situation ditions or circumstances and at a different in the case at bar, and for the reasons there height from the ground. Consequently the given the same rule of construction should be Legislature has not attempted to define what adopted in construing the provisions of the shall constitute a safe, suitable, and proper statute here under consideration. The statscaffold, but has cast the burden of construct-ute not defining what shall constitute a safe, ing safe, suitable, and proper scaffolds upon the employer, and he cannot escape liability for injuries sustained by reason of his failing to furnish such scaffolds by pleading ignorance of their dangerous condition when the conditions are known to him. The language of the statute is mandatory and imperative that the scaffold shall be so constructed as to be safe and afford adequate protection to the persons working thereon, and the employer cannot escape liability for a willful violation of the statute where he constructs an insufficient, unsafe, and dangerous scaffold, even though he may have believed the scaffold constructed by him safe and the conditions under which it was being used not dangerous. suitable, and proper scaffold, the question, then, must necessarily be left to the jury for determination as one of fact. In this case the conditions were all before the jury, and this question was submitted to them under instructions much more favorable to appellant than was its right, as the jury were told that appellee could not recover from appellant, under the law, unless he had proven by the evidence that appellant willfully failed to comply with said law and construct a safe, suitable, and proper scaffold, proper and ade quate to protect the lives and limbs of the persons employed thereon, and that by a willful violation of the statute is meant a reck less disregard of the provisions of the statute. The word "willfully" is synonymous with "knowingly," and to constitute a willful violation of the statute it is not necessary that there should have been "a reckless disregard" of its provisions. The employer is The provisions of the statute we are considering are in the same language as section 33 of the Mining Act (Laws 1899, p. 324) in force at the time this statute was passed. In the recent case of Piazzi v. Kerens-Donne-liable not only when the dangerous conditions wald Coal Co., supra, this court held that the mine owner or operator is liable for a willful violation of the mining statute, even though he had the place examined by a mine examiner, who in good faith believed that the place was not dangerous. It was there said: "If the clod in the roof constituted a danger ous condition it was the duty of the mine examiner to discover that fact and mark the place. It was held in Aetitus v. Spring Valley Coal Co., 246 Ill. 32 [92 N. E. 579, 138 Am. St. Rep. 221], that, if conditions in the mine are in fact dangerous, the owner or operator cannot excuse himself from liability for a willful violation of the Mines and Mining Act if he fails to cause the places where the dangerous conditions exist to be marked, even though the mine examiner may have examined those places and in good faith believed that the conditions were not dangerous." And in Aetitus v. Spring Valley Coal Co., supra, 246 Ill. 39, 92 N. E. 581, 138 Am. St. Rep. 221, it is said: "When the mine owner or operator is advised of the conditions in the mine, he must place in the mine, if it is dangerous, the statutory marks, and if he fails to do so he acts at his peril, and he cannot excuse himself because he or his examiner or manager may think the mine safe. To so hold would be to permit the mine owner or operator, or his examiner or manager, to usurp the functions of the court and jury, and to pass upon a question which, in every case like this, is a matter of proof and is to be determined as a fact by the jury. Catlett v. Young, 143 Ill. 74 [32 N. E. 447]; Odin Coal Co. v. Denman, 185 Ill. 413 [57 N. E. 192, 76 Am. St. Rep. 45]; Davis v. Illinois Collieries Co., 232 III. 284 [83 N. E. 836]; Eldorado Coal & Coke Co. v. Swan, 227 111. 586 [81 N. E. 691]; Mertens v. Southern Coal & Mining Co., 235 Ill. 540 185 N. E. 743]; Olson v. Kelly Coal Co., 236 III. 502 [86 N. E. 88]; McCarthy v. Spring Valley Coal Co., 232 Ill. 473 183 N. E. are known to him, but also when by the exercise of reasonable care the existence of such dangerous conditions could have been discov ered and become known to him. Peebles v. O'Gara Coal Co., 239 Ill. 370, 88 N. E. 166. [7] The jury by their verdict have found the issues on the facts against appellant, and the Appellate Court has approved the judg ment of the trial court entered on this verdict. Under the law this question of fact is conclusively settled for this court by the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming the judgment of the trial court. Kellyville Coal Co. v. Strine, 217 Ill. 516, 75 N. E. 375; Illinois Steel Co. v. Olste, 214 Ill. 181, 73 N. E. 422. In Tomasi v. Donk Bros. Coal Co., 257 Ill. 70, 100 N. E. 353, it is said: "Conceding that defendant in error wrongfully and unlawfully fired his shot, whether such act on his part was the proximate cause of the injury, or whether it resulted from plaintiff in error's violation of the statute, as charged in the declaration, were questions of fact to be determined by the jury. Henrietta Coal Co. v. Martin, 221 Ill. 460 [77 N. E. 902]; Mertens v. Southern Coal Co., 235 Ill. 540 [85 N. E. 743]. **The jury has found that the injury complained of resulted from the willful violation of the statute, and that finding has been approved by the Appellate Court, and we have no power, under the law, to review that question." [8] Appellant also insists that the evidence fails to show that the violation of the provisions of the statute was the proximate cause of appellee's injury. What is the proximate cause of an injury is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury, to be determined from a consideration of all of the attending facts and circumstances. It only becomes a |