framers of this statute have taken pains to be exact and to give persons who are in favour of local option all the assistance possible. It seems clear to me that the object of this schedule was to prevent any possibility of fraud being practised on the council. If the petition is in accordance with the statute, those who are opposed to local option can at once ascertain if the persons whose names are signed to the petition had really signed the same, and, if so, whether they are qualified so to sign as required by the Act. Any other construction would lead to the greatest difficulty and open the door to the greatest fraud. Suppose one John Smith signs a petition, without, in the case of a city, giving any street number or name, but merely the word "Moose Jaw" added; there may be 10 John Smiths in the city, and, to ascertain which John Smith signed his name, it might be necessary to go around the city hunting up the various John Smiths to ascertain this. But, if the statute is followed, as it should be, this can be at once ascertained. Moreover, the statute says that the street address shall be given, and it is imperative that it should. Why "Moose Jaw" was added I do not know. It was not necessary, because in the first part of the petition the petitioners declare that they reside in Moose Jaw, and had resided here for a period of 3 months; and, when it comes to the schedule, what the Act requires is the street address and not the name of the city, because that is already given. It is plain that this is the intention of the framers of the Act, because not only is 12 Albert street given for the purpose of denoting the street address, in the case of a city, of the signer of the petition, but, if he resides in a village, the name of the village must be given, or, in the case of a rural municipality, his quarter section must be put down. The objection raised to the petition by Mr. Mackenzie was that the petition was bad, because the additions and alterations were made to the petition by the secretary of the Social and Moral Reform League; but I hold that, so far as the petition is concerned, it is bad whether "Moose Jaw" was added to it by Mr. Macpherson, or whether the address of the petitioner was put down by himself as "Moose Jaw." Wherever the petitioner puts down his address as "Moose Jaw," or "Moose Jaw" was added by Mr. Macpherson, the petition is not properly signed in accordance with the statute.

Sub-section 2 of sec. 130 of the Liquor License Act says: "Such petition shall be signed, in the case of a city, by at least 100 persons possessing the qualifications set out in paragraph 1 of form U., and such petition shall be in form U." Looking at the petition put in at the hearing, I find that 31 persons only have complied with the statute, so far as the ' signing of this petition goes, and in this number I have allowed in favour of the by-law those who gave the name of the street only, without the number. No evidence was given before me to shew that the streets of the city of Moose Jaw are numbered, but the petition itself shews that some of the streets are, and I think I can take judicial notice of the fact that, if not numbered, they are at least named. But, apart from this, whether the streets are numbered or not, and whether the streets are named or not, the statute requires that some description of the locus in which the petitioner resides shall be given, and, unless this has been given, the statute has not been complied with.

Having thus found that this petition is only signed by 31 persons who are qualified to sign the same, I must hold that no valid petition was presented to the council, and that by-law 468, having been founded on that petition, is invalid.

In reference to the additions and alterations made in the petition by the secretary of the Social and Moral Reform League, I may say that the rule of law governing the alteration of a public document is that set out by Macdonald, J., in Larkin v. Polson, 12 W. L. R. 144. In his judgment in that case the learned Judge, at p. 146, says: "As the person presenting the petition was responsible for its mutilation, I think it may be held that everything will be presumed in odium spoliatoris. The proceedings

are statutory, and the provisions of the statute must be followed to the letter to give a municipality jurisdiction to act." On appeal to the Court of Appeal in Manitoba the judgment of Macdonald, J., was affirmed: 12 W. L. R. 491. Then in Adams v. Wood, 12 W. L. R. 135, Metcalfe, J., arrived at the same conclusion; and in Hatch v. Rathwell, 12 W. L. R. 141, the decision was to the same effect; and the decision of Adams v. Wood was affirmed in the Court of Appeal in Manitoba: vide 12 W. L. R. 491.

The decision of Moore v. McKibbin, 12 W. L R. 358, is of no assistance to the city, for the reason stated by Metcalfe, J., at p. 360, where he says: "The plaintiff urges

the decision of Adams v. Wood,

but in that case

the documents which constituted the petition were admittedly signed in a form different to the form presented to the council."

Here it is admitted that the petition was signed in a form different to the form presented to the council, making this application on that point on all fours with Adams v. Wood. The persons who had charge of this petition have only themselves to blame for the fact that the will of a majority of the ratepayers on the 12th December is to be ruled by the minority. The only persons who saw that the petition was properly signed were, the Reverend Messieurs Chegwin, MacLean, and Reeves. Why the other 16 persons who circulated the petition did not do so, I do not know; and I cannot do better than here quote the judgment of Meredith, C.J., in Re Williams and Town of Brampton, 17 O. L. R. 398, 402, where he says: "There are thousands of temperance people in this country who are pressing these local option by-laws, and they do not seem to take the trouble to follow the plain, simple directions of the law, and are very often getting into difficulty over petitions and by-laws by reason of the loose and careless manner in which the work in connection with them is done; and that, sometimes at all events, frustrates the will of the people and imposes a burden upon the public through the necessity of the matter being brought into Court. There has been a good deal of looseness in this case. If the council had taken the course of saying, 'we require a proper investigation as to this petition, and we must take the time to do it,' as at present advised I should have thought that they were well within their right in so doing. That apparently was not the course taken, but the council have determined to act upon the view of their solicitor in this matter-at all events, have determined that the petition is insufficient." And in the same case, at p. 410, Clute, J., says: "I am, however, of opinion that the petition as filed was insufficient in form. It is to be regretted that difficult questions of law are constantly raised and great expense incurred by the utter carelessness of parties who have charge of matters of this kind. There is no reason whatever why the various papers signed should not have been filed with the clerk in precisely the form in which they were so signed. This was the proper thing to do. But the question remains whether what was done

nullifies the petition. I am forced to the conclusion that it does."

All of this is applicable to this case. In concluding on this objection to the petition, I may say that the petition is bad in two respects: first, because the petition was altered. after it was signed, by adding "Moose Jaw" to the petitioners' names; second, because no street address or description of the locus in which each of the petitioners resided was given in the schedule, as required by the Act.

.

There being no sufficient petition to the council, there can, of course, be no valid local option by-law founded on that petition. Mulock, C.J., in his judgment in Re Williams and Town of Brampton, 17 O. L. R. at p. 405, says: "The duty of the council to submit the by-law arises only after a petition meeting the requirements of the statute has been filed. If, then, what was filed did not meet these requirements, this appeal must succeed. What, then, are the essential statutory requirements of such a petition? The language of the statute is explicit: In case a petition in writing signed by at least 25 per cent. . . is filed . praying for the submission of such by-law, it shall be the duty of the council,' etc. In other words, there are the following essentials to a statutory petition creating a duty on the part of the council: it must be in writing; it must contain a prayer for the submission of the by-law; that prayer must be signed by at least 25 per cent. of the electors; and the petition, meeting these essentials, must be filed." And again, at p. 406, he further says: "Being thus of opinion that no petition, meeting the requirements of the statute, was filed with the clerk, no duty was cast upon the council to submit the by-law, and, therefore, with all respect for the views expressed in the judgment appealed from, I think this appeal should be allowed with costs to the appellant, including costs of the motion below."

There is also another irregularity, amounting, in fact, to a nullity, which renders the petition void, and that is the additions made to it by Mr. Macpherson by adding the figures "1910" to the petition after it was signed. The addition of these figures to the petition becomes important in view of sub-sec. 4 of sec. 130 of the Liquor License Act, 1909, which enacts: "No signature to any such petition shall be valid or of any effect if it has been subscribed thereto or indorsed thereon before the 1st day of July in

the year in which such petition is filed as provided herein." When the petition was signed, the petitioners, in a majority of instances, neglected to put in the year; consequently it was impossible to tell whether it was signed in August, 1909, or August, 1910. If it was signed in 1909, it was bad on its face. It is the contention that the additions were made to cure the defect which existed by reason of sub-sec. 4 of sec. 130, already referred to. The additions of the figures "1910" were unauthorised and unsanctioned by the petitioners. The opponents of this local option by-law have the right to expect that the petition shall go to the council in exactly the same way as it was signed by the petitioners, without any additions or alterations whatever. The additions and alterations could only be ascertained by extrinsic evidence. The statutory requirements of the local option bylaw in Ontario are substantially the same as in Saskatchewan; and in Re Williams and Town of Brampton, Mulock, C.J., in delivering his judgment, at p. 406, says: "The statute does not contemplate the council ascertaining by extrinsic evidence what documents the electors signed, but entitles the council to have filed with the clerk the actual paper containing the very words to which the electors appended their signatures; otherwise grave abuse of the petitioning power conferred upon the electors by the statute in question might result, and it is reasonable to assume that the strict language of the statute was adopted by the legislature in order to prevent such abuse." And Anglin, J., says, at p. 409: "The statute, in my view, entitles the council to require the assurance and guarantee of authenticity which the filing of the actual papers to which the signatures of the electors were affixed by themselves alone can afford. The legislature did not intend that municipal councils should be required, in cases such as this, to weigh the sufficiency of affidavits or to pass upon the credibility or reliability of deponents." It will be noticed that, in his judgment, Anglin, J., laid stress upon the fact that it is only the actual papers to which the signatures of the electors were affixed, by themselves alone, that constitute a valid petition. Unauthorised additions or alterations cannot, therefore, validate it, and without them the by-law is bad, as it cannot be ascertained whether the petition was signed before the 1st July,

1910.