As to the charge of murder, the only evidence against him consists of the opinions of some persons as to his appearance on the day the murder was committed, and his telling different stories as to when and how he heard of the murder; the evidence of his having and spending certain coins similar to some in the possession of Mrs. Legrand, some time prior to her murder, not being evidence on this charge, because there is no evidence that any such coins were stolen from her. In Clark on Extradition, p. 249, he says: "But in an extradition case he (the magistrate) is to ascertain, not the commission of certain acts upon whose character another and higher tribunal may decide, but that there is sufficient evidence that the crime specified in a foreign warrant has by the prisoner been committed." In this case there is no evidence that the prisoner committed murder, and, as I have already said, there is no evidence that any theft was committed. The prisoner must, therefore, be discharged. SASKATCHEWAN. JOHNSTONE, J. APRIL 3RD, 1911. TRIAL. WAITE v. EDWARDS. Costs-Principal and Agents Joined as Defendants-Action Successful against Principal but Unsuccessful against Agents-Alternative Claim-Costs of Successful Defendants-Costs of Plaintiff-Default Judgment. A principal and two agents were sued as defendants in one action, the agents in the alternative. The principal did not appear, but the plaintiff did not sign judgment against him for default. The two agents defended, E. denying everything in the statement of claim, and C. confining his defence to the alternative cause of action. At the trial, without a jury, the plaintiff recovered judgment against the principal, and his action was dismissed as against the agents: Held, that the principal should not be ordered to pay the costs of his co-defendants; that the plaintiff should have his costs against the principals, but only as of a judgment upon default; that the plaintiff should pay the defendant C. his costs of defence; and that there should be no costs for or against the defendant E. The plaintiff, under Rule 3% of the Judicature Ordinance, obtained leave to join the agents with the principal, suing the former in the alternative. The principal did not appear and defend the action, but both his co-defendants, the agents, did. Edwards practically denied everything in the statement of claim; Churchill admitted the allegations set out in the statement of claim, except those as to the cause of the action against the agents in the alternative, which he was, of course, at liberty to do. The plaintiff, although it was open to him to take such a step, and discontinue his action, with leave, at least as against the other defendants, failed to sign judgment against the principal, but, instead, proceeded to trial, which trial resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff against the principal, and a dismissal of the action against the agents. The trial was one without the intervention of a jury. The question of costs was reserved. T. D. Brown and H. F. Thomson, for the plaintiff. C. E. D. Wood, for the defendant Churchill. W. B. Scott, for the defendant Edwards. No one for the defendant Little. JOHNSTONE, J.-I have examined carefully the authorities cited, as well as others bearing upon the question. As said by Romer, L.J., in Sanderson v. Blyth Theatre Co., [1903] 2 K. B. 533, in exercising the jurisdiction which a Judge unquestionably has to award costs to a successful defendant as against the unsuccessful defendant, a Judge should have regard to the circumstances of the case, and be satisfied that it is just that the unsuccessful defendant should, either directly or indirectly, be compelled to pay the costs of the successful co-defendant. I cannot see, in the circumstances of this case, why Little, the principal, should be called upon to pay the costs of his co-defendants. He admitted liability to the plaintiff through not having appeared, and the latter could have obtained judgment without trial; and why should this defendant be muleted in costs occasioned by unnecessary proceedings taken as against him and as against the other defendants as well? The plaintiff will, therefore, be entitled to costs against the defendant Little as of default of appearance or pleading, as the case may be. The plaintiff will pay to the defendant Churchill his costs. of defence. I have had same difficulty in arriving at a conclusion as to what order should be made as regards Edwards. If judg ment had been obtained against Little earlier in the proceedings, and the action as against the other defendants discontinued before the trial, costs of the trial in any case would have been thereby avoided, but the plaintiff chose to proceed to trial, and not only to try the issue between him and the defendant Edwards, concerning the cause of action against Little, with which Edwards had nothing to do, but also the issues as to the alternative claim against the agents, which at the trial had to be abandoned because of the verdict in his (the plaintiff's) favour against Little. In my judgment, there should be no costs for or against Edwards. See cases cited in notes to Rule 7, Order XVI., Annual Practice, 1911. JOHNSTONE, J. SASKATCHEWAN. TRIAL. APRIL 3RD, 1911. STEVENS v. ULLERICH. Sale of Land under Order of Court-Right to PossessionTime for Order Confirming Sale-Land Titles Act. The plaintiff was the highest bidder at an auction sale of lands held on the 3rd August, 1910, under an order of the Court in a mortgage action. The sale and transfer of the lands to the plaintiff were, on the 20th September, 1910, confirmed by an order of the Court in that action; and a certificate of title was issued to the plaintiff on the 8th October, 1910. The plaintiff, on the 1st September, 1910, entered upon the lands, then in the possession of the defendant, as tenant of the mortgagor under a lease made after the execution and registration of the mortgage, and cut wheat, but the defendant removed it from the premises, and threshed and sold it: Held, that the plaintiff was not, on the 1st September, in a position legally to enter and cut the grain of the defendant; the latter was entitled to hold possession until divested thereof by an order of the Court or under the provisions of the Land Titles Act. Action of detinue. T. S. McMorran, for the plaintiff. JOHNSTONE, J.-The following facts were admitted at the trial: (1) That the plaintiff was the highest bidder for the south half of section 10, township 17, range 18, W. 2nd, at a sale held under order of the Court in an action of Gilbert v. Ullerich on the 3rd August, 1910. (2) That the action of Gilbert v. Ullerich was brought on a mortgage referring to the said lands, dated the 2nd July, 1907, and registered in the land titles office of the Assiniboia land registration district, at Regina, on the 4th July, 1907. (3) That the sale referred to and the transfer of the said lands to the plaintiff were confirmed on the 20th September, 1910, by order of this Court made in the action of Gilbert v. Ullerich. (4) That a certificate of title, pursuant to the transfer and order, was issued to the said lands, in the name of the plaintiff, on the 8th October, 1910. The plaintiff, on or before the 1st September, entered upon the said lands so purchased by him, then in the possession of the defendant. He cut and stooked thereon about 60 acres of growing wheat of the defendant, who was, at the time, a tenant to the mortgagor under a verbal lease entered into after the execution and registration of the mortgage mentioned. The defendant, shortly after this, removed from off the said premises the wheat so cut and stooked by the plaintiff, to a farm adjoining, where he, the defendant, threshed and sold the grain. The plaintiff thereupon brought this action, an action of detinue. In my opinion, the plaintiff was not, on the day he so entered into possession of the lands so purchased by him, in a position legally to enter and to cut the grain of the defendant. The defendant, holding through the mortgagor, the registered owner, was entitled to hold possession until divested thereof by an order of the Court in that behalf or under the provisions of the Land Titles Act. Under this Act, the plaintiff would not, that is, on the 1st September, be entitled as of right to enter. The order for sale contained the following provisions. Terms of sale to be: 25 per cent. down at the time of sale, and the balance upon delivery of a transfer duly confirmed within 2 months of sale; the deposit to be forfeited if the purchaser failed to accept transfer and to carry out the sale (that is, to pay the balance.) Upon delivery of the transfer duly confirmed, title of the mortgaged premises to vest in the purchaser. All the defendants save Holden, who held under a mechanics' lien, and all claiming under them, should be bound by the decree and should give up possession of the lands to the purchaser within 20 days after service upon them of the order. The Registrar of land titles to cancel the existing certificate of title, that is, the certificate of title to the mortgagor, and to issue a new certificate of title to the purchaser. This order, under which possession was directed to be delivered up to the plaintiff, bears date the 20th September, 1910. When it was served does not appear. I presume, however, that, shortly after the date of the order, the same was served upon all the persons concerned excepting the defendant, who was never made a party to the suit, and seems to have had no notice of the proceedings carried on by way of redemption and sale. Whether he had or had not notice, however, would make no difference in this case. There will be judgment for the defendant, with costs. SASKATCHEWAN. FORBES, DIST.CT J. APRIL 3RD, 1911. DISTRICT COURT OF PRINCE ALBERT. AGNEW v. DAVIS. Principal and Agent-Sale of Goods to Agent-AuthorityEstoppel. In an action for the price of goods sold, it was held, that the person to whom the goods were sold and delivered was the duly authorised agent of the defendant to buy and receive the goods, or that the defendant was estopped by his conduct from denying the agency; and therefore the defendant was liable for the price of the goods. Action for the price of goods sold by the plaintiff to the defendant, amounting to $38.15 and some small amount for interest. With his dispute-note the defendant paid into Court $5.30, and as to the balance denied his liability. A. E. Doak, for the plaintiff. FORBES, DIST.CT.J.:-At the hearing it was agreed that the issue in this case was whether the person to whom the |