(3) Section 133 of the Liquor License Act, so far as in question, is as follows: "The council shall forthwith after the first and second readings of the proposed local option bylaw or repealing by-law and before the third reading and passing thereof publish . . a notice stating

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that a vote thereon will be taken on the date and at the hour and places fixed as provided by this Act . . . and that the further consideration of the proposed local option by-law or repealing by-law, after taking the said vote, is fixed for the time and place appointed therefor by the council (naming such time and place) and such notice shall be published for at least 3 weeks before the vote is taken, but no more than one insertion each week shall be necessary." The objection under this section is threefold: that no appointment for further consideration was made by the council; that the notice did not specify the polling places or the late of voting; and that the publication was not for 3 weeks.

There is no evidence that the council did not fix a time and place for further consideration. The notice distinctly says they did, and I am bound to presume that to be correct, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary: Caswell v. South Norfolk. 15 Man. L. R. 620. The certified copy of minutes filed does not shew such a resolution, but there is nothing to shew that this contains all the proceedings of the council in this connection. The onus is on the applicant: Re Hickey and Town of Orillia, 17 O. L. R. at pp. 327, 331. See also Re Dillon and Village of Cardinal, 10 O. L. R. 371, and cases there cited.

The notice reads that a vote "will be taken on the date and at the hour and places fixed as provided by the Liquor License Act, and being the same as that fixed by the polling at the annual elections of such Local Improvement District number 186, between the hours of 3.30 p.m. and 5 p.m., Mountain Standard time, and at the same places at which such polling is or should be held." Pursuant to sec. 26 of the Local Improvement Act, printed notices of the annual elections, specifying the date and the place of polling in each division, were freely posted over the district. These also contained a paragraph giving notice of the local option vote at the same time and place. There were only 6 polling places, and paragraph 6 of the affidavit of H. H. Turner, secretary-treasurer, sets forth "that the said polling places are well known, and a number of them had in previous

years, to my knowledge, been used as polling places for the municipal elections." Paragraph 7 testifies to general discussion and knowledge of the time and places of voting. While I think the newspaper notice would have been better and more correctly given if it had specified the date directly in terms of the calendar, and the polling places directly and individually, yet it may be questioned, in practical effect, if that would really have added anything material and substantial to the information which the notice actually contained. In any event, while not indorsing the notice as the proper form contemplated by the Act, I think it is sufficiently definite and explicit to meet the requirements of the section in question. At least it is substantially in accordance therewith, and, if defective, I am satisfied that such defect did not affect the result of the voting. Section 142, therefore, applies to cure any non-compliance, mistake, or irregularity which may exist in this connection. See Caswell v. South Norfolk, cited above; In re Salter and Township of Beckwith, 4 0. L. R. 51; and In re Huson and Township of South Norwich, 19 A. R. 343.

The objection chiefly urged was as to publication. The by-law was read a first and second time on the 22nd October, 1910. The notice was published in a proper paper on the 18th and 25th November and on the 2nd December, 1910. The voting was on the 12th December, 1910. It is contended that this is a publication for only 13 days, and that 21 days must elapse between the first and the last publication to constitute a publication "for at least 3 weeks." The principal authority for this contention is the recent judgment of Howell, C.J.A., in Re Shaw and Rural Municipality of Portage la Prairie, 15 W. L. R. 718. The language of the Manitoba statute is the same as ours, except that the period is one month instead of 3 weeks. With great respect. it is sufficient for me to say that I am convinced rather by the construction of the statute adopted in the same case by Richards and Cameron, JJ.A., who hold sufficient a publication similar to that in the present case. In both the latter judgments, Hall v. South Norfolk, 8 Man. L. R. 438, is cited approvingly. I refer particularly to the judgment of Cameron, J.A., who reasons the matter out in some detail, and will quote only his paraphrase of the statute, which is as follows: "And such notice shall be published in such newspaper for a period of not less than one calendar month

before the day the vote is taken on the by-law, but one insertion of such notice during each week of that period of one month in such newspaper shall be deemed sufficient and all that is necessary to constitute the publication required by this section." The opposing constructions are also well and clearly stated by Richards, J.A. The paraphrase adopted by Howell, C.J.A., is as follows: "The notice shall be published as soon as possible after the first and second reading, and in any event it shall be published for a period of at least one month; but in the interval between the first and last publications, making the period of at least one month, you need not publish daily; one in each week shall be sufficient-and this shall be considered a continuous publication for one. month." He adds: "To hold otherwise is to hold that publication on the 11th is to be deemed publication on the 14th."

Applying this construction to the case of weekly newspapers, which very largely predominate, the notice must be published each week for 5 weeks to secure an interval of at least 21 days between the first and the last publication. That is, 5 weekly insertions are necessary to comply with the statute requiring publication "for at least 3 weeks before the vote is taken, but no more than one insertion each week shall be necessary." I cannot believe this to be the meaning or intent of the statute. To put it in another way, each nublication is deemed sufficient for the week in which it occurs, except either the first or the last, according as the reckoning be backward or forward, and this publication is deemed valid only for the date on which it is made. If that be the 11th, it is not a publication on the 14th, although each other publication is deemed sufficient for the entire week in which it is made. I can find no reason for this distinction or any ground for holding the effect of any one publication to be different from that of any other. The Act expressly says: No more than one insertion each week shall be necessary." I think that must apply equally to each and every insertion; and, therefore, that each and every publication must be deemed sufficient for the entire week in which it is made. In other words, it constitutes a publication throughout the week in which it occurs. If this be correct, then the 3 publications in this case covered a period of 3 weeks, and therefore complied with the statute.

In Hall v. South Norfolk, mentioned above, the publication was dissimilar, but the language under construction was

precisely the same. Killam, J., said: "Then I take it also that what is required by the statute is at least one publication in each week of the month, and that, for the purpose of reckoning the weeks, we must begin with the day of the first publication, and not with the first day of an ordinary week."

In Re Rickey and Township of Marlborough, 14 O. L. R. 587, 9 O. W. R. 930, the language of the Ontario statute under construction is as follows: "The publication shall, for the purposes aforesaid, be continued in at least one number of such paper each week for 3 successive weeks." I take this language as equivalent to the language of the Manitoba Act and of our own. At all events, Hall v. South Norfolk is eited with approval in this and other Ontario cases, without mention of any difference in the language involved. In this case the judgment of the Divisional Court was delivered by Teetzel, J., who said: "I think the intention is that the period of publication for 3 successive weeks' should embrace 3 successive periods of 7 days each, beginning on the first day of actual publication, and not on the first day of the biblical week in which the first publication appears, and that there should be at least one publication in a newspaper in each of the 7-day periods."

This interpretation is well supported by the additional cases in In re Coe and Township of Pickering, 24 U. C. R. 439; Miles v. Richmond, 28 U. C. R. 333; Re Duncan and Town of Midland, 16 O. L. R. 132; and Re Shoal Lake Municipality, 14 W. L. R. 502-the latter a decision of Prendergast, J., in which he expressly follows Hall v. South Norfolk; and by other cases referred to in the cases cited.

Following these authorities, I hold that the publication in this case fully and accurately met the requirements of sec. 133 of the Liquor License Act.

All grounds for objection failing, the application is, therefore, dismissed, with costs.

YUKON TERRITORY.

DUGAS, J.

APRIL 6TH, 1911.

CHAMBERS.

RE DOME LODE DEVELOPMENT CO.

Company-Winding-up-Order Made by Ontario Court Release of Chattels of Company Seized under Execution in Yukon Territory-Jurisdiction of Yukon Territorial Court Necessity for Order of Transfer Dominion Winding-up Act, secs. 125, 126, 127.

An order having been made by the High Court of Justice for Ontario directing the winding-up of the company, under the Dominion Winding-up Act, the provisional liquidator applied to a Judge of the Territorial Court of the Yukon Territory for an order directing the Sheriff to release the goods and chattels of the company held by him after seizure under a writ of fi. fa. issued pursuant to a judgment recovered against the company in the Territorial Court :

Held, construing secs. 125, 126, and 127 of the Act, that there was no jurisdiction to make the order asked for; the winding-up not having been transferred by order to the Territorial Court; and that Court could not assume jurisdiction upon the consent of the parties.

Application by the provisional liquidator of the abovenamed company (an order having been made in Ontario for the winding-up of the company, under the Dominion Winding-up Act) for an order releasing the goods and chattels of the Dome Lode Development Company Limited, now held by the Sheriff under an execution issued in a cause between the Northern Commercial Company and the Dome Lode Development Company Limited, from such execution, or for such other order as to the said Judge may seem proper, to put into force the orders of the High Court of Justice for Ontario produced and filed with the clerk of the Territorial Court in the present matter.

The notice of motion was served upon the solicitor for the Northern Commercial Company and upon the Sheriff of the Yukon Territory.

J. L. Bell, for the liquidator.

J. P. Smith, for the Sheriff and the execution creditors.

DUGAS, J.-It appears that upon a petition of one Alfred E. Davison, on the 14th February last, before Mr. Justice Teetzel, one of the Judges of the High Court of