REPUTATION. See Evidence, 8.
RES JUDICATA. See Illinois, 5; Maryland, 1.
1. A plaintiff in attachment who indemnifies the attaching officer, and
afterwards takes upon himself the defence when that officer is sued
is concluded by the judgment against that officer where such plaintiff
is afterwards sued for the same trespass. Lovejoy v. Murray, 1.
2. The court-deciding that a case before it was the same in fact as one
already twice decided by it in the same way-rebukes, with some as-
perity, the practice of counsel who attempt to make the judges bear
the "infliction of repeated arguments" challenging the justice of their
well-considered and solemn decrees; and sends the case represented
by them out of court, with affirmance and costs. Minnesota Co. v.
National Co., 332.
1. Levy of an execution, even if made on personal property sufficient to
satisfy the execution, is not satisfaction of the judgment, and, accord-
ingly, therefore, does not extinguish it if the levy have been aban-
doned at the request of the debtor and for his advantage; as ex. gr.
the better to enable him to find purchasers for his property. United
States v. Dashiel, 688.
2. A judgment against one joint trespasser is no bar to a suit against an-
other for the same trespass. Nothing short of full satisfaction, or
that which the law must consider as such, can make such judgment a
bar. Lovejoy v. Murray, 1.
I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES CONCERNING.
1. In interpreting a section of a statute which remains in force, resort
may be had to a proviso to it, although the proviso be repealed.
Bank for Savings v. The Collector, 495.
II. OF THE UNITED STATES. See Appeal, 1, 5; Capturing Force; Com-
mon Carrier, 5, 6; Customs of the United States, 1, 2, 3, 5, 6; Enrol-
ment and Registry of Vessels, 1-6; Evidence, 12; Indians, 1, 2; Ju-
risdiction, 1-5; Rebellion, 1, 2, 3.
2. The 12th section of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which gives to the Circuit
Courts concurrent jurisdiction of all crimes and offences cognizable
in the District Courts, is prospective, and embraces all offences the
jurisdiction of which is vested in the District Courts by subsequent
statutes. United States v. Holliday, 407.
3. Therefore the Circuit Courts have jurisdiction of the offence of selling
ardent spirits to an Indian, under the act of February 12th, 1862 (12
Stat. at Large, 339), although by that act jurisdiction is vested only
in the District Court. Ib.
4. Under the second section of the act of 8th August, 1840, "to regulate
the proceedings in the Circuit and District Courts," which-after
authorizing the transfer of criminal causes from either court to the
other on motion of the district attorney-says, that "the court to
which such remission is made, shall, after the order of remission is
filed therein, act and proceed in the case as if the indictment and all
the other proceedings in the same had been originated in said court,"
-an indictment may be remitted from the District Court to the Cir-
cuit Court, though it have come into the District Court originally
only by being sent there from the Circuit Court. And a demurrer to
the indictment made in the District Court, may properly receive a
rejoinder in the Circuit Court. United States v. Murphy, 649.
5. A license granted by the United States, under the Internal Revenue
Act of July 1st, 1862, to carry on the business of a wholesale liquor
dealer, in a particular State named, does not, although it have been
granted in consideration of a fee paid, give the licensce power to
carry on the business in violation of the State laws forbidding such
business to be carried on within its limits. McGuire v. The Common-
wealth, 387.
6. Under the Internal Revenue Act of June 30th, 1864, as amended by
the act of March 3d, 1865, the sales of stocks, bonds, and securities
made by "brokers" for themselves are subject to the same duties as
those made by them for others. United States v. Cutting, 441.
7. Under that act, amended as above said, "bankers" who sell Federal
securities no otherwise than for the United States and for themselves,
and who, therefore, do not sell them for others or for a commission,
are not liable to pay the duties imposed by the 99th section, upon
"brokers and bankers doing business as brokers." United States v. Fisk,
445.
8. The first section of the act of Congress of March 3d, 1851) 9 Stat. at
Large, 635), entitled "An act to limit the liability of ship-owners,
and for other purposes," exempts the owners of vessels in cases of
loss by fire from liability for the negligence of their officers or agents,
in which the owners have not directly participated. Walker v. The
Transportation Company, 150.
9. The proviso to that act allowing parties to make their own contracts
in regard to the liabilities of the owners, refers to express contracts. Ib.
10. Upon a comparison of the 25th section of the act of 3d March, 1863,
passed during the rebellion, "for enrolling and calling out the na-
tional forces, and for other purposes," with the 12th section of the
act of 24th February, 1864, enacting that any person who shall for-
cibly resist or oppose any enrolment of persons for military service,
&c., shall be punished, &c.; held, that the former act is limited to
the prevention of resistance to the draft, and the latter to preventing
resistance to the enrolment. Comparing the two acts together, the
latter one is to be regarded as a legislative construction of the first,
by which a service in relation to the draft, is not a service in relation
to the enrolment. United States v. Scott, 642; Same v. Murphy, 649
An amendment, neither increasing nor diminishing their liability, will
not discharge the sureties to the usual bond given on release of a
vessel seized by process of the admiralty. Newell v. Norton and Ship,
357.
TARIFF. See Customs of the United States.
TAXATION. See Internal Revenue.
TELEGRAPH. See Common Carrier, 4.
TERRITORIES. See Quo Warranto.
The statute of Texas, relating to the organization, &c., of its District
Courts, which enacts that when a party shall file an affidavit of the
loss of an instrument recorded under the statute, or of his inability
to procure the original, a certified copy of the record shall be ad-
mitted in like manner as the original-does not dispense with the
proof which is exacted when the original instrument is filed, in case
an affidavit (which the statute also allows) alleging a belief of its
forgery, is made. It only allows the certified copy to take the plac
of the original when that is lost or cannot be procured: and the copy
produced under such circumstances will have no greater weight than
the original itself. Younge v. Guilbeau, 636.
To avail himself, therefore, of the statute, the party must, in all cases,
file, as therein prescribed, the original or the copy from the record,
and give notice of the filing; and even then the statutory proof will
be insufficient, if the affidavit alleging a belief of its forgery be made.
Such affidavit being filed, the party relying upon the deed must make
proof of its execution, with all its essential formalities, as required by
the rule of the common law. 16.
1. A bond of indemnity given by a plaintiff in an attachment to induce
the officer to hold, after levy, property not subject to the writ, makes
such plaintiff a joint trespasser with the officer as to all that is done
with the property afterwards. Lovejoy v. Murray, 1.
2. A judgment against one joint trespasser is no bar to a suit against an-
other for the same trespass. Nothing short of full satisfaction, or
that which the law must consider as such, can make such judgment
a bar. lb.
3. A plaintiff in attachment who indemnifies the attaching officer, and
afterwards takes upon himself the defence when that officer is sued,
is concluded by the judgment against that officer where such plaintiff
is afterwards sued for the same trespass. Ib.
A usage opposed to a statute is void.
WISCONSIN. See Judicial Proceedings.
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