Bloom v. Koch. Here the right of influx of light and air is property in the proper sense of the term, of which a man cannot be deprived, when taken for private purposes, even upon just compensation made. The questions of law involved in this case may therefore be held to be settled in this state. The facts in the present case are undisputed, and that brings it within the rules laid down in Hart v. Leonard, 15 Stew. Eq. 416. Whatever of apparent hardship there may be in the case for the defendant is much ameliorated by the circumstances. He is a man of experience in building dwellings on small. lots and arranging economically for proper lighting and ventilation. It is quite manifest that he had all that in view when he arranged the different dwellings on these three lots, Nos. 68, 70 and 72; and when he conveyed lot No. 70 to the complainant he must have been thoroughly aware that the fact that the kitchen windows in question looked out on the front lawn of lot No. 72 aided in the sale of the lot, and that he obtained a larger price and a readier sale for it on that account. He may not have understood the law of the land, but that, in a case like this, is no excuse. He may have thought that the complainant might acquire a right to look over his land by long adverse user, and that may have been his motive in erecting the boarding. But, as has been remarked in some of the cases cited, it is not a question here of adverse user, out of which, in this country, no right can arise, but a question of the conveyance of a right by deed. Of course, the extent of the right on defendant's lot is not here in question. The only question here is whether or not the boarding unreasonably obstructs the influx of light and air to complainant's windows; and holding, as I do, that it does so unreasonably obstruct such inflow, I do not necessarily decide that a boarding or a building set five or ten feet farther back would so unreasonably obstruct such influx. That question must be determined when it arises. I will advise a decree for the complainant, with costs. Bulat v. Londrigan. 63 22 a65 719 MARCO BULAT and EDWIN A. STEVENS v. PATRICK and ELIZA LONDRIGAN. [Submitted December 18th, 1901. Decided January 9th, 1902. 1. An affidavit filed by the attorney of a judgment creditor on filing the transcript of a judgment of the district court for over $200 in the common pleas court, which states that the whole amount of such judgment and costs remain due and unpaid, is equivalent to stating that over $10 is due on the judgment, as required to be stated in such affidavit by Gen. Stat. р. 1228. 2. The affidavit in such case failed to state that defendant was not possessed of goods and chattels sufficient to pay the judgment, as required by Gen. Stat. p. 1228, but an execution had been issued and returned nulla bona in the district court, and there was no contention or evidence in a suit to quiet title to real estate sold under an execution of the common pleas that defendant had sufficient personal property to satisfy the judgment. It was generally supposed by the bar at the time of the filing of the affidavit that Gen. Stat. p. 1228 had been repealed by Gen. Stat. p. 1260 §§ 4. 5. There was nothing to show an intent to disregard the statute, or any injury to defendant.-Held, that the defect in plaintiff's title arising from the defect in the affidavit was insufficient as a defence to plaintiff's action to quiet his title. 3. The return of the district court execution nulla bona and the seizure of the lands under the common pleas execution is prima facie proof that defendant had no personal property subject to execution. 4. Defendant was the owner of real estate, which was sold to a judgment creditor, under execution, for a fair valuation, though the evidence as to the value was conflicting. Defendant was embarrassed financially, and disposed of several pieces of property to creditors by execution sale and otherwise, and the judgment creditor who purchased the property in question released the entire judgment at the request of defendant at a time subsequent to the sale, though the property was sold for less than the face of the judgment. There was other evidence tending to show that the creditor was to take the property for the judgment. There was also evidence that defendant, after the sale, notified the tenants in possession of the property to pay the rent to the judgment creditor, and told plaintiff, who subsequently purchased the property of the judgment creditor, that the latter owned the property, and plaintiff should purchase from him; but such facts were denied by defendant. The plaintiff erected valuable improvements, paid mortgages, taxes, &c., on the property for a number of Bulat v. Londrigan. years after acquiring the same, with the knowledge of the defendants.Held, sufficient, in a suit by plaintiff to quiet title, to estop defendants from relying on a defect in the affidavit of the attorney of the judgment creditor, required by Gen. Stat. p. 1228, in filing the transcript of the judgment, which was originally obtained in the district court, in the common pleas court. 5. The request by defendant of the judgment creditor, after the execution sale, that the latter should release the balance due on the judgment, operated as an affirmance of the sale by defendant. 6. The plaintiff, having acquired the property from the judgment creditor by a conveyance containing a covenant of warranty, was entitled to set up such affirmance as an estoppel, though it occurred after plaintiff acquired the property, as the right to set up the estoppel passed at once, under the covenants of the deed, to the plaintiff. 7. The fact that defendant, through mistake of law, did not know that there was a defect in the affidavit, did not prevent defendant's conduct from operating as an estoppel, as he had knowledge of the suit, and was bound to inquire whether the proceedings were according to law, if he intended to take advantage of any defect therein. On final hearing on bill, answer and proofs taken in open court. Mr. Samuel A. Besson and Mr. James B. Vredenburgh, for the complainants. Mr. Horace L. Allen, for the defendants. PITNEY, V. C. The complainant Bulat is in possession under color of title, and claims to be the owner of a parcel of real estate, situate in Hoboken, in this state. The complainant Stevens is the holder of a mortgage thereon, given by the complainant Bulat and wife. They join as complainants in this bill for the purposefirst, of establishing the title of Bulat to the land in question, as against the defendants, and second, to perpetually restrain an action of ejectment brought by defendants against Bulat in the circuit court of the county of Hudson. The complainants give as a reason for coming into this court that although Bulat is in equity the actual owner of the premises in question, yet, owing to a legal defect in his title, it is highly probable, if not certain, that he will be defeated at law. Bulat v. Londrigan. The grounds upon which he rests his title to relief in this court are-first, that the defect of title relied upon by defendants is purely technical and without the least merit, and second, that defendants are estopped in equity from setting it up at law. A brief outline of the facts is as follows: The defendant Eliza, at and before the 4th day of September, 1885, was the holder of both the legal and equitable title of the premises, subject to certain mortgages, assessments and arrears of taxes and water rents, and with her husband was, on that day, justly indebted, for money lent and advanced to her by one James Williams, in the sum of $300, besides interest; on that day Williams recovered a judgment in the Hoboken city district court, based upon that indebtedness, and actual service of process on both of the defendants, for the sum of $300 debt and $25.20 costs; execution against the goods and chattels of the defendants was duly issued thereon to the sheriff of Hudson county, who duly returned the same unsatisfied for want of goods and chattels whereof to make the same. On the 17th of September, 1885, Williams, through his attorney, James F. Minturn, caused the said judgment to be docketed in the Hudson county common pleas, and a fieri facias de bonis et terris to be issued thereon; the sheriff of Hudson county duly levied upon the premises in question, and caused the same to be duly advertised and sold, and the same were bid off and sold and conveyed to Williams for the sum of $200, which, under the circumstances, was a fair price for the property, and after deducting the sheriff's execution fees left a balance due on the judgment of over $200; Williams took immediate possession of the premises by means of an attornment to him by the tenants of the defendants in the actual occupation of the premises, made by the express direction and consent of defendant Patrick, and retained such possession until the year 1890, when he conveyed them by deed, with full covenants of seizin and warranty, to the complainant Bulat for the sum of $5,500, and Bulat took possession and afterwards destroyed or removed the erections previously on the premises, and erected thereon expensive and valuable buildings at a cost of over $17,000. In the meantime two mortgages, amounting, besides interest, to $3,200, and a considerable arrearage of taxes and Bulat v. Londrigan. assessments, which were liens on the property at the date of the sheriff's sale, were paid off, either by Williams or Bulat, and also large assessments for sewers, &c., which were laid on the property either about the time of the sheriff's sale or between that time and the time that Bulat purchased from Williams, were also paid, and a mortgage upon this and other property of Bulat for $13,000 was given by Bulat and his wife to Stevens for money loaned, which was used by Bulat, with other moneys, in the erection of buildings on the premises. In 1893 the defendants desired to secure money by mortgaging other real estate owned by them in Hoboken, and, finding this Williams judgment an obstruction, Mrs. Londrigan, personally, called upon Williams and obtained from him a satisfaction of the said judgment without paying any money therefor. Williams died before the action of ejectment was brought. The defendants both lived all the time in the city of Hoboken, near the premises, and were fully cognizant of all these facts, acquiesced in them, and never made any objection to the possession and occupation by Williams and Bulat in succession of these premises, and set up no claim or title to them until the year 1899, when they commenced the action of ejectment. The particular defect in the legal title of the complainant is an actual or supposed defect in the affidavit which was made and filed with the transcript from the district court to the common pleas, in order to perfect the docketing of the judgment. The affidavit which was so filed was made and verified by James F. Minturn, attorney of Mr. Williams, and it was in conformity with what was at that time believed by the bar of the state to be the requisites of an act of March 27th, 1882. P. L. of 1882 p. 195; Gen. Stat. p. 1260 §§ 4, 5. That act was generally understood by the bar as dispensing with the provisions of the seventy-seventh section of the original act creating district courts. P. L. of 1877 p. 257; Gen. Stat. p. 1228. After the decision of the case of Grimshaw v. Carroll, 33 Vr. 730, a young lawyer ascertained this defect in the title and communicated it to the defendants, whereupon they brought their action of ejectment. The complainants pray relief, and ask, first, that the title of |