Myers v. Metzger. and it is signed by the executors as executors. There is no rule of construction which will permit any other term to be added to this agreement. The language so far being free from ambiguity, there is no place for construction to vary the terms of the writing. The executors alone agreed to that part of the agreement, and it cannot be extended, by interpretation, to include other parties. It is immaterial whether, in fact, the executors had any title to the premises referred to in the contract. Mrs. Wright manifestly dealt with them under the impression that they had the power to convey, and, under her agreement, she acquired such right only as her contract gives her, which was the obligation of the executors to give the option to purchase. By the stipulation of the parties in the case it appears that Emanuel Metzger devised these lands to his said executors, in trust for his widow, Martha M. Metzger, during her lifetime, and at her death devised the same to his children. At the time of the making of the agreement the executors had an estate per autre vie in the lands; the other parties who signed the agreement had a vested remainder. To pass title to the fee it was necessary for all these parties to join in the conveyance. The executors' obligation is not to sell during the continuance of their estate without giving Mrs. Wright the refusal of the property, and if an implied promise binding upon the children can be found in the writing, it is no more comprehensive than the promise of the executors not to sell during the continuance of the estate per autre vie. The second term of the agreement: "Also, that we will not build, or allow to be built, any building whatsoever upon said ground while under our control or held as part of the estate of said Emanuel Metzger," is an obligation not restricted by its language to the executors of Metzger; the words "the executors of Emanuel Metzger," following the word "we" in the first member of the agreement, are omitted in the second member, and therefore the latter clause binds all persons who signed the contract. It is not permissible Myers v. Metzger. to say that difference in the language used by the parties was not intentional. This gives effect to every part of the agreement, and it is not, therefore, admissible to resort to interpretation to impose a duty upon the defendants not found in its terms. But conceding that this is not the clear legal purport of the contract, it cannot be said that it is plain that the children have engaged not to sell after the expiration of the trust. If it is a doubtful question, specific performance will not be decreed; uncertainty in the contract is fatal to a claim for specific performance. McKibbin v. Brown, 1 McCart. 13; Potter v. Hollister, 18 Stew. Eq. 508; Brown v. Brown, 6 Stew. Eq. 650. Under the contract, as construed by the complainant, the defendants are not constrained to sell whenever Mrs. Wright or her assigns desire to buy. Their right to purchase arises only when the defendants have offered to sell, or done some equivalent act. The fact that judicial proceedings were taken by the children of the said testator to procure a partition of these lands among themselves does not charge them with an attempt, or an intention, to sell, nor can such an intention be fairly drawn from the fact that sale was ordered by the court, by reason of inability to make an actual partition, and that thereupon Eliza Metzger, one of the defendants, became the purchaser. I suppose it would not be contended that if one only of the heirs had conveyed her share to the others, the contingency would have arisen which entitled the complainant to demand a conveyance. The case does not seem to be different where one of the heirs, to protect her interest, buys in the other shares and desires to hold the property subject to the agreement. The right of the complainant to a conveyance does not attach so long as the entire title remains in one or more of the heirs. The decree should be reversed. Kempson v. Kempson. For reversal-THE CHIEF-JUSTICE, VAN SYCKEL, DIXON, GARRISON, COLLINS, FORT, HENDRICKSON, PITNEY, KRUEGER, VREDENBURGH, VOORHEES-11. For affirmance--GARRETSON, BOGERT, ADAMS, VROOM-4. ST. GEORGE KEMPSON, appellant, υ. HELEN A. KEMPSON, respondent. [Filed June 16th, 1902.] 1. A husband and wife having their matrimonial domicile in this state, and the domicile of the wife being also here-Held, that the court of chancery, on a bill filed by the wife, had jurisdiction to enjoin the husband from prosecuting a suit for divorce in another state, the jurisdiction of which he had invoked on a false and fraudulent allegation of his residence in that state. 2. On such a bill filed by the wife, an injunction to stay the prosecution of the foreign suit was served on the husband personally in New York before he had been brought into court by appearance, service of subpœna or publication of notice.-Held, that he was bound to obey the injunction and was punishable for disobedience. 3. A court of equity should not command a defendant to do what he plainly has not power to do. On appeal from an order advised by Vice-Chancellor Pitney, whose opinion is reported in 16 Dick. Ch. Rep. 303. Mr. Robert Adrain, for the appellant. Mr. Alan H. Strong, for the respondent. The opinion of the court was delivered by DIXON, J. The parties to this suit were married in 1882 and thereafter lived in this state as husband and wife until at least December, Kempson v. Kempson. 1898. On April 10th, 1899, the wife, still residing in New Jersey, presented to the chancellor a bill of complaint, with affidavits annexed, in which she alleged that on March 29th, 1899, her husband had commenced a suit in North Dakota asking a divorce from her on the ground of cruelty; that in his petition he had averred his residence in North Dakota for a period of three months; that such a residence was necessary to induce the court in North Dakota to take cognizance of the cause; that the husband's averment of residence was false and fraudulent, and that his residence was still in New Jersey; thereupon she prayed an injunction commanding her husband to desist and refrain from all further proceedings in the North Dakota action until the further order of the chancellor. On April 28th, 1899, an injunction, according to the prayer of the bill, was issued, and on May 31st, 1899, it was served on the husband personally in the city of New York; nevertheless he proceeded with his suit in North Dakota, and on October 4th, 1899, procured a decree of divorce therein. Subsequently he was attached in this state for violating the injunction, and an order was made by the chancellor adjudging him to be in contempt and directing that he be fined $5 and costs; that he cause the decree of divorce to be set aside, and that he stand committed to the custody of the sheriff of Middlesex county until he shall have done so. From this order he now appeals. The first question for consideration is whether the chancellor had jurisdiction of the cause in such sense as to support an injunction against the defendant, who had not been brought into court by the service of process or by appearance, and who was not within the state. If such jurisdiction did not exist, the defendant was not bound to obey the injunction (Dodd v. Una, 13 Stew. Eq. 672), but if it did, the injunction was obligatory. It may be regarded as settled, by a long train of adjudications, culminating in Atherton v. Atherton, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 544, that the state, wherein are the matrimonial domicile and also the domicile of the complaining spouse, has the right to confer upon its courts jurisdiction over the matrimonial status, no matter where the other spouse may be. In such circumstances the matrimonial status is deemed to have a situs within the state, Kempson v. Kempson. resembling, for the time being, the situs of land, and the proceeding respecting that status is quasi in rem. This power is recognized and upheld by foreign states, provided the state exercising it has made and carried out reasonable provision for giving to the defendant notice and an opportunity to be heard. Felt v. Felt, 14 Dick. Ch. Rep. 606. This authority is most frequently exercised in actions for divorce, but the principle that maintains it for dissolving the marriage status must likewise maintain it for preserving that status. To this effect is the language of Judge Cooley, in Cooley Const. Lim. 400, where he says: "We conceive the true rule to be that the actual bona fide residence of either husband or wife" (coupled, in the present case, with the matrimonial domicile) "within a state will give to that state authority to pass upon any questions affecting his or her continuance in the marriage relation." Equally broad are the expressions of Chancellor Zabriskie in Coddington v. Coddington, 5 C. E. Gr. 263, and of Judge Adams, speaking for this court, in Hervey v. Hervey, 11 Dick. Ch. Rep. 424, and they are fully warranted by the practice of the English courts touching all manner of matrimonial causes. Under the laws of New Jersey jurisdiction over questions affecting the marriage relations of its citizens is vested in the court of chancery. That such jurisdiction includes the right to annul foreign judgments 'fraudulently obtained affecting those relations is established by the cases of Doughty v. Doughty, 1 Stew. Eq. 581; Magowan v. Magowan, 12 Dick. Ch. Rep. 322, and Streitwolf v. Streitwolf, 13 Dick. Ch. Rep. 563. If the court has power to annul such decrees for fraud, it must also, on a general principle of equity, be able to enjoin parties from attempting to obtain such decrees by fraud. But it is argued that the jurisdiction of the court is not complete until certain steps have been taken to give the defendant notice of the suit. Undoubtedly this is true; for even the state's authority is dependent upon some reasonable provision being made to that end; and the state has made the jurisdiction of the court dependent on compliance with certain prescribed regulations. For the purpose of pronouncing a decree in the cause |