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Powers and Duties of Health Officers.

than one township, he must make a separate report for each board, just as distinct and separate as though made by different persons. Lawful Physician.-He must be a lawful physician--holding a certificate of authority to practice medicine.

Compensation. His fees and compensation are fixed by the local board. If given an annual salary, such salary will be deemed full compensation for all service rendered within his duties as health officer, unless otherwise provided by the board.

Contagious Disease-Self-protection.-In visiting premises where Diphtheria and Scarlet Fever prevail, it is not necessary that the clothing should be changed in ordinary cases, but the face, whiskers and hands should be thoroughly cleansed with corrosive sublimate solution or strong carbolic acid. The former is preferred, as it is a germicide; the acid is doubtful.

In Small-pox there should be worn a loose gown of glazed muslin, long enough to cover the feet, buttoning closely at the neck and wrists, and having a waist-band; the head-all the hair, if possible— covered by a cap of like material. This should be put on out of doors and taken off on retiring from the house. After removing the cap and gown, the hands, face and all exposed parts of the body should be washed well in soap and water and then rubbed freely with a weak solution of corrosive sublimate, the best germicide known. Wearing apparel, such as coat, vest and pants, that cannot well be washed or boiled, can be thoroughly disinfected by steam, hot air (two hundred and twelve degrees Fahrenheit) or by sprinkling them and pressing them slowly and thoroughly with a flat-iron as hot as can be used without burning the goods. No reliance can be put in sulphurous fumigation, and it should not be used.

Decisions of Supreme Court.

DECISIONS OF SUPREME COURT.

The Supreme Court has given the following decisions upon cases involving the liability of physicians to make return of births and deaths to the Clerk of the District Court, and upon the expenses and powers of local boards, and upon nuisances:

PHYSICIAN'S RETURN OF BIRTHS AND DEATHS.

Action in law to recover a statute penalty. A demurrer to the petition was sustained and judgment rendered thereon for defendants. Plaintiff appeals.

BECK, J.-I. The petition is in ten counts and claims to recover ten collars on each as a penalty for the failure of the defendant, who is a physician, to render a report of a death or birth specified in the count, as requested by the State Board of Health, under provisions of chapter one hundred and fifty-one, Acts of the Eighteenth General Assembly; McClain's Statutes, page four hundred and fifty-one; Miller's Code, page four hundred and twenty

one.

The petition shows that defendant was required by the regulations of the State Board of Health to report in each case of death referred to, the sex, nationality, place of birth, period of residence in this State, and the place and date of burial of the decedent, and the complications connected with the cause of death, and to report in each case of birth, "the number of the child of the mother,” the nationality, place of birth, and age of each parent; the maiden name of the mother, and her place of residence. It is also alleged in the petition that defendant was furnished with blanks prescribed by the State Board of Health for his reports, as required by law, and that he "knowingly and willfully failed and neglected and refused to make his report in each case for more than twenty days."

The demurrer of the petition was sustained upon the ground that the statute, so far as it authorizes the Board of Health and the plaintiff to require the defendant to report the information demanded of him, is in conflict with the Constitution of the United States, and of this State, and is unjust and oppressive, and contains requirements which were impossible for the defendant to perform.

We have not been favored with the argument on behalf of the defendant and are, therefore, not informed of the grounds upon which the statute in

Decisions of Supreme Court.

question was assailed in the court below, and it is claimed to be unconstitutional. It cannot be expected that we shall consider arguments of which we have not heard, or that we will imagine objections and discuss them. Our consideration of the case will, therefore, be brief.

It is proper to remark that, under the statute brought in question, the defendant may be required to report the information sought in the manner prescribed by the Board of Health.

II. The statute requires the collection of statistics pertaining to the population of the State, and the health of the people, which may impart information useful in the enactment of laws and valuable to science, and the medical profession, to whom the people will look for remedies for disease, and for means tending to preserve health. The objects of the statute are within the authority of the State, and may be attained in the exercise of its police power. Similar objects are contemplated by States requiring a census to be periodically taken, the constitutionality of which we have never heard questioned.

III. We need not inquire whether the provisions of the statute are unjust or oppressive. These are matters for the consideration of the legislative part of our government. We may observe, that it is difficult to discover oppression or injustice in requiring the medical profession to make known to the world statistics which may promote, and are promoting the public health.

IV. One ground of the demurrer is, that defendant, under the statute, is required to do that which it is impossible for him to perform. The law requires of no man impossibilities. If the information sought from defendant could not have been obtained by him in the bona fide exercise of reasonable diligence, the law will not punish him for not imparting it. A physician should honestly endeavor to obtain and report all information required by the regulations of the statute and the Board of Health.

This is his duty as a citizen, and is imposed as an obligation by the ethics of the useful and honorable profession of which he is a member.

In our opinion the demurrer to the plaintiff's petition was erroneously sustained.(1)

REVERSED.

EXPENSES IN SMALL-POX CASES.

Action to recover for expenses alleged to have been incurred in providing for certain persons infected with Small-pox, and in providing for the safety of the inhabitants. There was a trial to the court, and judgment was rendered for the plaintiff.

ADAMS, J.-One of the persons provided for was one Christina Shutt, who, at the time she was taken sick with Small-pox, had come to Clinton a few days before with the intention of making that city her home. She was a native of Denmark, and had not gained settlement elsewhere. The statute

(1) J. E. Robinson, Clerk of the Courts, Appellant, v. D. M. Hamilton, M. D., 60 Iowa, 134.

Decisions of Supreme Court.

upon which the plaintiff relies, sections twenty-one and twenty-two, chapter one hundred and fifty-one, of the laws of the Eighteenth General Assembly, McClain's Statutes, 455, provides, where relief is furnished as in this case, for charging the county to which the sick or infected person belongs.

The defendant insists that a person belongs only to the county in which he has a settlement, and if the sick or infected person has no settlement in the State, no county can be charged.

The statute, however, above cited, makes it the imperative duty of the local board of health to provide for such person, regardless of his settlement, and if no county can be charged there is no provision in the statute in question for the payment of their expenses. It appears to us that where there is no settlement the sick or infected person must be deemed to belong to the county where the relief becomes necessary.

We proceed next to examine certain items, which the defendant insists ought to have been rejected. One is for food and clothing furnished persons other than the sick. Under the statute above cited it becomes the duty of the local board of health to provide for the removal of the sick person, if he can be removed, and, if not, to provide for him where he may be, and also to provide for the safety of the inhabitants.

In the case at bar the sick persons were not removed, but were provided for in the houses respectively where they happened to be. No question is raised as to the proper exercise of the discretion of the board in this respect. Only two families were afflicted, and the means adopted for the safety of the inhabitants was the confinement of the members of these two families within their respective houses, with the view of securing as complete isolation as might be practicable. The prompt arrest of the contagion, and extinguishment of the disease, demonstrated the wisdom of the board.

The isolation, however, was necessarily continued through several weeks, and during at least a part of this time it was found necessary to supply the two families with food. Not all the members were sick, and yet all necessarily shared in the food.

The defendant insists that it cannot be charged, under the statute in question, for food furnished to well persons. It insists that a county can be charged with only those expenses for which the sick person is primarily liable; and it contends that neither of the sick persons in this case could be charged with food furnished to either of the well persons. But in our opinion its position cannot be sustained. The well persons, without doubt, constituted the nurses and attendants of the sick ones. If so, the food furnished constituted a part of the expenses of the sickness. But it constituted a part of the expenses in another and more important sense. It was a part of the expense of isolation; and while that was adopted for the safety of the inhabitants, it was made necessary by the sickness. Section twenty-one of the statute provides expressly for the removal of the sick person for the safety of the inhabitants, and for charging the expenses to the sick person. The expense of isolation is of precisely the same character.

It is true that we find isolation provided for only by the general words:

Decisions of Supreme Court.

"Such other measures as may be deemed necessary for the safety of the inhabitants," and we find that provision only in section twenty-two, which contains no provision whatever for expense. The only provision for expenses is to be found in section twenty-one. But sections twenty-one and twenty-two should be taken together. Whatever expenses are incurred under either section are, we think, to be charged alike. In our opinion, they are to be construed as if the provisions of both sections had been embraced in one section, and the provisions as to charging had been placed at the close. If we are correct, then, the sick person is properly chargeable with all the expenses which may properly be incurred under either section, including the expenses of removal, if that is adopted, and the expense of isolation, if that is adopted; and we think that the county is ultimately liable for the same, if the sick person, and those liable for his support, are unable to pay.

The board caused the clothing worn by the members of the families to be burned, and supplied other clothing. The burning of the clothing was necessary for the safety of the inhabitants. The payment therefor, or supply of other clothing, was an expense necessarily incident to the sickness. It was, we think, primarily chargeable to the sick person, and those liable for his support, and secondarily to the county.

The court allowed a recovery of one hundred and eighty-five dollars, as money paid the attending physician, Dr. Smith. The defendant insists that in this the court erred. Its objection is based upon the ground that Dr. Smith had been employed and paid by the year, by the county, to attend to all such poor persons as he should be required to attend, under the direction of the overseer of the poor. Its objection is based upon the further ground that Dr. Smith was employed by the year by the board of health. As to the first ground, it is to be said that the services in question were not rendered under the direction of the overseer of the poor, and perhaps could not have been properly, so long as the board assumed exclusive control. As to the second, it is to be said that while Dr. Smith was employed by the board of health, at three hundred dollars per year, the court found that one hundred and eightyfive dollars was such proportion of three hundred dollars as the services in question bore to the year's services. Possibly it should have appeared in evidence, if it did not, that the aggregate charges, amounting to one hundred and eighty-five dollars, were all reasonable. But the evidence is not set out, and no question is raised by the appellant upon this point. We see no error, and the judgment is (1)

AFFIRMED.

Action to recover the value of certain lumber furnished by plaintiff upon the request of the board of health of the city of Le Mars and the overseer of the poor, which was used in building a pest-house necessary for the proper care of persons found in the city afflicted with Small-pox. A demurrer to the petition was sustained, and the plaintiff standing upon the petition, judgment was rendered against him. He now appeals.

(1) City of Clinton vs. County of Clinton, 61 Iowa, 205.

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