The Theory and Principles of Tort LawBeard Books, 1999 - 500 pages |
From inside the book
Results 1-5 of 72
Page vii
... matter printed in a smaller type than that which is used for the ordinary text . While admitting the efficacy , within certain limits , of that theory of negligence in which the negligent act is viewed exclusively as the breach of a ...
... matter printed in a smaller type than that which is used for the ordinary text . While admitting the efficacy , within certain limits , of that theory of negligence in which the negligent act is viewed exclusively as the breach of a ...
Page ix
... matter of damages . For this reason we have handled the law of telegrams with the utmost care . The reader will note the absence of a discussion of the infringement of patents and copyrights . The reason for this omission is that the ...
... matter of damages . For this reason we have handled the law of telegrams with the utmost care . The reader will note the absence of a discussion of the infringement of patents and copyrights . The reason for this omission is that the ...
Page 3
... matter of primary principle , negligible in wrongs of direct violence , must be taken as meaning not that this factor is necessarily absent in such wrongs , but merely that law takes no account of it . In truth , all law starts more or ...
... matter of primary principle , negligible in wrongs of direct violence , must be taken as meaning not that this factor is necessarily absent in such wrongs , but merely that law takes no account of it . In truth , all law starts more or ...
Page 5
... matter of legal inference . A man , it is said , must be conclusively presumed to intend the natural conse- natural quences of his acts . This principle is a rule of law because it is a rule of common sense . It supplies the only possi ...
... matter of legal inference . A man , it is said , must be conclusively presumed to intend the natural conse- natural quences of his acts . This principle is a rule of law because it is a rule of common sense . It supplies the only possi ...
Page 24
... matter than damage to property . " Reg v . Heppinstale , 7 W. R. 178 . Doubtless so to the person hurt , but in the eye of the law it would seem to be otherwise . See Entick . Carrington ( 1765 ) , 19 How . St. Tr . 1029 . II law ...
... matter than damage to property . " Reg v . Heppinstale , 7 W. R. 178 . Doubtless so to the person hurt , but in the eye of the law it would seem to be otherwise . See Entick . Carrington ( 1765 ) , 19 How . St. Tr . 1029 . II law ...
Contents
LXXII | 212 |
LXXIII | 214 |
LXXIV | 216 |
LXXV | 223 |
LXXVI | 231 |
LXXVII | 234 |
LXXVIII | 238 |
LXXIX | 242 |
| 35 | |
| 37 | |
| 38 | |
| 41 | |
| 45 | |
| 49 | |
| 51 | |
| 55 | |
| 56 | |
| 57 | |
| 59 | |
| 60 | |
| 62 | |
| 63 | |
| 65 | |
| 67 | |
| 68 | |
XXVIII | 71 |
XXIX | 73 |
XXX | 84 |
XXXI | 86 |
XXXII | 89 |
XXXIII | 91 |
XXXIV | 95 |
XXXV | 96 |
XXXVI | 98 |
XXXVII | 101 |
XXXVIII | 107 |
XXXIX | 109 |
XL | 120 |
XLI | 122 |
XLII | 124 |
XLIII | 125 |
XLIV | 127 |
XLV | 134 |
XLVI | 136 |
XLVII | 140 |
XLVIII | 142 |
XLIX | 144 |
L | 147 |
LI | 149 |
LII | 155 |
LIII | 156 |
LIV | 157 |
LV | 159 |
LVI | 162 |
LVII | 164 |
LVIII | 170 |
LIX | 172 |
LX | 175 |
LXI | 178 |
LXII | 182 |
LXIII | 184 |
LXIV | 186 |
LXV | 191 |
LXVI | 193 |
LXVII | 198 |
LXVIII | 202 |
LXIX | 204 |
LXX | 206 |
LXXI | 211 |
LXXX | 246 |
LXXXI | 250 |
LXXXII | 255 |
LXXXIII | 257 |
LXXXIV | 261 |
LXXXV | 263 |
LXXXVI | 265 |
LXXXVII | 267 |
LXXXIX | 273 |
XC | 281 |
XCI | 291 |
XCII | 296 |
XCIII | 299 |
XCIV | 300 |
XCV | 302 |
XCVI | 307 |
XCVII | 313 |
XCVIII | 316 |
XCIX | 318 |
C | 322 |
CI | 323 |
CII | 326 |
CIII | 334 |
CIV | 335 |
CV | 337 |
CVI | 342 |
CVII | 347 |
CVIII | 361 |
CIX | 365 |
CX | 372 |
CXI | 374 |
CXII | 377 |
CXIII | 382 |
CXIV | 385 |
CXV | 389 |
CXVI | 392 |
CXVII | 393 |
CXVIII | 398 |
CXIX | 399 |
CXX | 413 |
CXXI | 415 |
CXXII | 418 |
CXXIII | 421 |
CXXIV | 425 |
CXXV | 432 |
CXXVI | 435 |
CXXVII | 437 |
CXXVIII | 441 |
CXXIX | 443 |
CXXX | 457 |
CXXXI | 460 |
CXXXII | 471 |
CXXXIII | 472 |
CXXXIV | 477 |
CXXXV | 479 |
CXXXVI | 491 |
CXXXVII | 496 |
CXXXVIII | 498 |
CXXXIX | 499 |
Common terms and phrases
actual agent alleged appears assumpsit authority bailment battery breach cause of action Chapter chattels common law conception consequence contract contributory negligence conversion courts dangerous deceit decision defamation defamatory defendant defendant's disseisin doctrine duty effect element ex delicto Exch fact false field fraud fraudulent gence gist ground guilty harm held liable horse House of Lords hurt idea implied injury intent interference judges jury land legal wrong liability libel Lord Lord Herschell maintain malice malicious prosecution Mass matter ment nature nuisance owner particular party person plaintiff possession premises principle privilege proximate cause question reason recover remedy representation result right of action risk Rolle Abr rule scienter servant slander slander and libel special damage statement statute telegram telegraph Tenn theory thereby tion tort trade-mark trespass trover true truth unlawful Volume warranty Western Union words writ
Popular passages
Page 88 - ... such as may fairly and reasonably be considered either arising naturally, ie according to the usual course of things, from such breach of contract itself, or such as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties, at the time they made the contract, as the probable result of the breach of it.
Page 116 - The question always is, Was there an unbroken connection between the wrongful act and the injury, a continuous operation ? Did the facts constitute a continuous succession of events, so linked together as to make a natural whole...
Page 498 - What hindered him from seeing this, was the childish fiction employed by our judges, that judiciary or common law is not made by them, but is a miraculous something made by nobody, existing, I suppose, from eternity, and merely declared from time to time by the judges.
Page 107 - J., observed that in order for it to apply "there must be reasonable evidence of negligence, but where the thing is shown to be under the management of the defendant or his servants, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen, if those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendants, that the accident arose from want of care.
Page 96 - Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided upon those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or doing something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do...
Page iii - The truth is, that the law is always approaching, and never reaching, consistency. It is forever adopting new principles from life at one end, and it always retains old ones from history at the other, which have not yet been absorbed or sloughed off. It will become entirely consistent only when it ceases to grow.
Page 167 - ... if the defendants desire to succeed on the ground that the maxim " Volenti non fit injuria" is applicable, they must obtain a finding of fact ' that the plaintiff freely and voluntarily, with full knowledge of the nature and extent of the risk he ran, impliedly agreed to incur it.
Page 171 - ... the workman, or in case the injury results in death, the legal personal representatives of the workman, and any persons entitled in case of death, shall have the same right of compensation and remedies against the employer as if the workman had not been a workman of nor in the service of the employer, nor engaged in his work.
Page 64 - Now the jury have distinctly found, not only that there was no negligence in the construction or the maintenance of the reservoirs, but that the flood was so great that it could not reasonably have been anticipated, although if it had been anticipated, the effect might have been prevented ; and this seems to us in substance a finding that the escape of water was owing to the act of God.
Page 192 - Something has been said of a right to a reasonable support for the surface ; but we cannot measure out degrees to which the right may extend ; and the only reasonable support is that which will protect the surface from subsidence, and keep it securely at its ancient and natural level.