petitions circulating. Our politicians all nailed their colors to the constitution that went under in April; and the masses are well enough content with things as they are. Wait a few months-give our politicians time to turn in the popular breeze-to explain-to define their position, before you send them back to Madison. Let the echoes of their speeches in favor of the defunct constitution die away in the halls of our capitol before you call upon them to contradict, oppose, and undo all that they said and did in the late convention. In the meantime we are relieved yet a little longer from the burden of state taxation-and the people will have more time to discuss and deliberate upon the principles which a constitution ought to embrace.

One thing seems to be agreed upon on all hands-that the fewer members the people elect to frame a constitution, whenever another convention shall be formed, the more concise, consistent, sensible, and satisfactory will be the constitution which may result from their labors.

THE BOUNDARY QUESTION

[December 25, 1847]

MR. EDITOR: Suppose our convention extends the constitutional mantle over but a part of the territory designed by the Ordinance of 1787 for the "fifth" state, what is to become of what is left out?

Virginia ceded to the United States the territory northwest of the Ohio River, in trust, and for a specific object, specified in the deed of trust. Now if the trustee should make five states out of less than the whole of the territory, does not the remainder revert back to the original owner? In other matters of trust it would, and why not in this? Or suppose the trustee divides the territory into states different from the provisions of the deed of trust: would it not be a violation of the trust and cause the premises to revert back to the grantor? Or, suppose the trustee gives to one state more territory than the deed of trust authorizes, can that state hold it as against the grantor? Among men and at common law, and in common honesty it could not. What, then, can hinder Virginia from claiming back all the disputed district of Illinois, if we do not claim and get it?

A deed of trust, like a power of attorney, gives no powers beyond what it specifies; and if the attorney or trustee transcends his pow

ers, so far as he transcends his acts are void. If these views be correct, then our convention must spread its mantle over the whole of the district designated by the ordinance for the "fifth" state, and Congress must grant it, or Virginia may—and I am informed willdeclare the compact annulled by the breach of trust on the part of the trustee and claim the territory not legally disposed of.

With the other four states we have nothing to do at present; our concern is with our own. And here, like men, we should take our stand and not come into the Union till we can do it with all our rights. Those who are itching for seats in Congress or on the bench of the federal courts may, and probably will, view this subject in a different light. But what say the mass of the people who have no such aspirations to "enlighten" them? Have not New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Virginia greater relative might in the national councils than the smaller states? And if we become a great state, with twenty, thirty, or forty representatives, shall not we have the same advantage? And shall we be in such a hurry to get into the Union that we will sacrifice our greatest rights, merely to gratify a few aspirants for office, as if they were "the only men, and wisdom was to die with them"? And suppose Congress refuse at first to admit us with all our rights-which is not exactly certain-will they always do it? Little Vermont stuck it out like men and gained their point. Is not Wisconsin as good stuff? Pity, if we are not.

A. BRUNSON

SELECTIONS FROM THE POTOSI REPUBLICAN

THE CONVENTION-NUMBER OF DELEGATES, ETC.

[October 14, 1847]

The coming sessions of the legislature and of the convention, which it is very well understood it is the object of their meeting to authorize and call together, are becoming the engrossing topics for the consideration of the public of Wisconsin at the present time. The presses of the territory already begin to teem with suggestions of those who are hereafter to fill the seats in the convention and to promulgate the doctrines they would wish to give shape and character to the deliberations of that body. It is not the object of this article to question the correctness of those views, much less the propriety of their being placed distinctly before the people; but it would seem that there is another question, having reference to the action of the legislature now about assembling, which calls for more immediate attention.

At the present it matters little as to the merits or demerits of the rejected constitution-the people decided that point at the polls last April; and it is believed that another important point was equally as well settled in their minds-that there was a radical defect in the organization of the old convention as established by the law of 1846. This is said in relation to the representation fixed in that law and the members that constituted the convention. When the large number of that body was known after the taking of the census in June and the apportionment made by the governor, much was predicted of the evil effects which would result from the action of so cumbersome a body. It is no more than candid now to admit that those suspicions were well founded and that most of the errors which were committed in the convention (and the friends and apologists of their action will not deny that there were many and grave errors chargeable to them) had their origin in the too great number which composed it, giving rise to too wide dissimilation of opinions, the broaching of strange and novel doctrines, and all the evil consequences resulting from such a state of things.

The first important step, then, in this matter of forming a new constitution is that we have a suitable body of men to form that instrument. And as far as that object is to be attained in the one

important point of numbers, it is to be done through the action of the present legislature.

Now we are not of the number of those who think that a very small body of men-say three or five-could frame a constitution better calculated to subserve the interests of the people than any greater number. Such views bespeak a very restricted knowledge of the wants and the rights of the people and are, besides, very far from being democratic. It is in representative bodies, as in everything else there is a golden mean; they should be neither too large nor too small. They should not be so small as not to admit a full expression of opinion and a fair and adequate discussion of every principle involved, or to render them liable to assailment from combinations or sinister and corrupt influences. They should not be so large as to grow passionate, confused, and anarchical. It is difficult to say which should be most sedulously avoided-the evils that flow from placing great powers in the hands of a few, or from trusting them to the impotency and intemperate zeal of too many. And large bodies, though composed of the best and wisest men, are equally objectionable. "In all very numerous assemblies, of whatever character composed, passion never fails to wrest the scepter from reason. Had every Athenian citizen been a Socrates, every Athenian assembly would still have been a mob."

The foregoing principles are not only very plain to the sense of everyone, but they are about the only ones which should govern in deciding upon the number of which the next constitutional body is to be composed. It is conceded that they have not as direct an application to such a body, as to one clothed with legislative powers; for a convention met for the forming of such an instrument as a constitution partakes much less of the strictly representative character.

A constitution is a charter in which the people are guaranteed their whole rights-a code composed of general principles, and not a law in which each particular section is immediately interested and in which their interests may be diversified and contrary. But all this only shows stronger reasons why the convention to be authorized should consist of a number much smaller than that which met a year ago. Indeed it is difficult to see that the reasons which are usually urged for a large representation in matters of direct legislation are in any very great degree applicable to an assembly met for the object of forming a constitution.

It is presumed that no one wishes to see any men in the convention except those of ability and decided worth. It is also evident that beyond a certain point the chances for obtaining men of such a stamp grow much less as the numbers increase. The number of men of requisite talents and experience who can be induced to enter such a body is not large in a newly settled country like our territory; and the most populous counties would not probably be as faithfully or efficiently represented by fifteen or twenty delegates as they would by a number one-third or one-fourth as large. These views may seem invidious to some, but it is believed that they are nothing more than a correct expression of the general public sense.

But these are not the only respects in which a small convention, not exceeding one-half the number of the old one, is preferable. The expense, of course, is diminished proportionately or very nearly so, to the number that composes the convention. And this saving will be felt not only in the decreased daily expense, but also in the fact that they will accomplish the same amount of business in a much shorter period. It is conceded that very large bodies of men do not act with that decision, promptness, and energy with which smaller ones do. A duty such as that, for instance, of an important committee is never discharged with that vigilance and devotion when placed in the hands of a dozen, as when three or four are charged with it. Further, the difficulty of settling those nice questions in which concession and harmony are required is greatly enhanced as we commingle a greater diversity of elements, and strengthen the innovating and radical by adding to their numbers. A man who would retire quietly into his seat and do it honor, after having perhaps once or twice given vent to his newfangled whims, might throw commotion into the most reasonable body of men when seconded by a few spirits as visionary and imprudent as himself.

But the reasons which lie at the foundation of the views above set forth are so apparent to the good sense of the whole public that it would be useless to extend them further at this time. Now if they are correct—and we cannot but think that they are-does it not behoove the press to spread them before the people and the legislature about to meet, so that their good effects may be realized in the action which is soon to take place? Particularly is this the duty of the Democratic press, seeing that so large a portion of those about to assemble are from the party in which they minister.

The newspapers of our country are often made responsible at the bar of public opinion for much that takes place in public bodies,