4. Wilful neglect.

5. Habitual intemperance.

6. Conviction of felony. [Amended March 30, 1874.] ·

Adultery defined.

§ 93. Adultery is the voluntary sexual intercourse of a married person with a person other than the offender's husband or wife.

Extreme cruelty.

§ 94. Extreme cruelty is the wrongful infliction of grievous [1] bodily injury, or grievous [2] mental suffering, upon the other by one party to the marriage. [Amended March 7, 1905.]

Desertion.

§ 95. Wilful desertion is the voluntary separation of one of the married parties from the other with intent to desert.

Desertion, how manifested.

§ 96. Persistent refusal [1] to have reasonable matrimonial intercourse as husband and wife, when health or physical condition does not make such refusal reasonably necessary, or [2] the refusal of either party to dwell in the same house with the other party, when there is no just cause for such refusal, is desertion,

In case of stratagem or fraud.

§ 97. When one party is induced, by the stratagem or fraud of the other party, to leave the family dwelling place, or to be absent, and during such absence the offending party departs with intent to desert the other, it is desertion by the party committing the stratagem or fraud, and not by the other.

In case of cruelty.

§ 98. Departure or absence of one party from the family dwellingplace, caused by cruelty or by threats of bodily harm from which danger would be reasonably apprehended from the other, is not desertion by the absent party, but it is desertion by the other party.

Separation by consent not desertion.

§ 99. Separation by consent, with or without the understanding that one of the parties will apply for divorce, is not desertion.

Absence becomes desertion, when.

§ 100. Absence or separation, proper in itself, becomes desertion whenever the intent to desert is fixed during such absence or separation. [Amended March 30, 1874.]

Consent to separate revocable.

§ 101. Consent to a separation is a revocable act, and if one of the parties afterwards, in good faith, seeks a reconciliation and restoration, but the other refuses it, such refusal is desertion.

Desertion, how cured.

$ 102. If one party deserts the other, and before the expiration of the statutory period required to make the desertion a cause of divorce, returns and offers in good faith to fulfill the marriage contract, and solicits condonation, the desertion is cured. If the other party refuse such offer and condonation, the refusal shall be deemed and treated as desertion by such party from the time of refusal. [Amended March 30, 1874.]

Wife must abide by husband's selection of home.

§ 103. The husband may choose any reasonable place or mode of living, and if the wife does not conform thereto, it is desertion.

If the place is unfit.

§ 104. If the place or mode of living selected by the husband is unreasonable and grossly unfit, and the wife does not conform thereto, it is desertion on the part of the husband from the time her reasonable objections are made known to him.

Wilful neglect.

§ 105. Wilful neglect is [1] the neglect of the husband to provide for his wife the common necessaries of life, he having the ability to do so; or it is [2] the failure to do so by reason of idleness, profligacy, or dissipation.

Habitual intemperance.

§ 106. Habitual intemperance is that degree of intemperance from the use of intoxicating drinks which [1] disqualifies the person a great portion of the time from properly attending to business, or [2] which would reasonably inflict a course of great mental anguish upon the innocent party. Habitual intemperance for one year.

§ 107. [1] Wilful desertion, [2] wilful neglect, or [3] habitual intemperance must continue one year before either is a ground for divorce. Divorces denied, on showing what.

§ 111. Divorces must be denied upon showing:

1. Connivance; or,

2. Collusion; or,

3. Condonation; or, 4. Recrimination; or,

5. Limitation and lapse of time.

Connivance.

§ 112. Connivance is the corrupt consent of one party to the commission of the acts of the other, constituting the cause of divorce.

Corrupt consent.

§ 113. Corrupt consent is manifested by passive permission, with intent to connive at or actively procure the commission of the acts complained of.

Collusion.

§ 114. Collusion is [1] an agreement between husband and wife that one of them shall commit, or [2] appear to have committed, or to [3] be represented in court as having committed, acts constituting a cause of divorce, for the purpose of enabling the other to obtain a divorce.

Condonation.

§ 115. Condonation is the conditional forgiveness of a matrimonial offense constituting a cause of divorce.

Requisites to condonation.

$116. The following requirements are necessary to condonation.

1. A knowledge on the part of the condoner of the facts constituting the cause of divorce;

2. Reconciliation and remission of the offense by the injured party; 3. Restoration of the offending party to all marital rights.

Condonation implies what.

§ 117. Condonation implies a condition subsequent; that the forgiving party must be treated with conjugal kindness.

Evidence of condonation.

§ 118. Where the cause of divorce consists [1] of a course of offensive conduct, or [2] arises, in cases of cruelty, from excessive acts of ill-treatment which may, aggregately, constitute the offense, [a] cohabitation, or [b] passive endurance, or [c] conjugal kindness, shall not be evidence of condonation of any of the acts constituting such cause, unless accompanied by an express agreement to condone. [Amended March 30, 1874.] Condonation can only be made when.

§ 119. In cases mentioned in the last section, condonation can be made only after the cause of divorce has become complete, as to the acts complained of. [Amended March 30, 1874.]

Concealment of facts in certain cases.

§ 120. A fraudulent concealment by the condonee of facts constituting a different cause of divorce from the one condoned, and existing at the time of condonation, avoids such condonation.

Condonation, how revoked.

§ 121. Condonation is revoked and the original cause of divorce revived: 1. When the condonee commits acts constituting a like or other cause of divorce; or

2. When the condonee is guilty of great conjugal unkindness, not amounting to a cause of divorce, but sufficiently habitual and gross to show that the conditions of condonation had not been accepted in good faith, or not fulfilled.

Recrimination.

§ 122. Recrimination is a showing by the defendant of any cause of divorce against the plaintiff, in bar of the plaintiff's cause of divorce.

Condonation, when to bar defense.

§ 123. Condonation of a cause of divorce, shown in the answer as a recriminatory defense, is a bar to such defense, unless the condonation be revoked, as provided in section one hundred and twenty-one, or two years have elapsed after the condonation, and before the accruing or completion of the cause of divorce against which the recrimination is shown. [Amended March 30, 1874.]

Divorce, when denied.

§ 124. A divorce must be denied:

1. When the cause is adultery and the action is not commenced within two years after the commission of the act of adultery, or after its discovery by the injured party; or,

2. When the cause is conviction of felony, and the action is not commenced before the expiration of two years after a pardon, or the termination of the period of sentence.

3. In all other cases when there is an unreasonable lapse of time before the commencement of the action. [Amended March 30, 1874.]

Lapse of time establishes certain presumptions.

§ 125. Unreasonable lapse of time is such a delay in commencing the action as establishes the presumption that there has been connivance, collusion, or condonation of the offense, or full acquiescence in the same, with intent to continue the marriage relations, notwithstanding the commission of such offense.

Presumptions may be rebutted.

§ 126.

Presumptions arising from lapse of time may be rebutted by showing reasonable grounds for the delay in commencing the action. Limitation of time.

$ 127. There are no limitations of time for commencing actions for divorce, except such as are contained in section one hundred and twentyfour.

Residence of plaintiff.

§ 128. A divorce must not be granted unless the plaintiff has been a resident of the state one year, and of the county in which the action is brought three months, next preceding the commencement of the action; provided, that a cross-complainant in an action for divorce need not be or have been a resident of the state or of the county in which the action is brought or pending in order to entitle such cross-complainant to a divorce in said action; and provided, further, that in an action for divorce a crosscomplainant must personally verify the cross-complaint. [Amended April 6, 1911.]

Proof of actual residence required.

§ 129. In actions for divorce the presumption of law, that the domicile of the husband is the domicle of the wife, does not apply. After separation, each may have a separate domicile, depending for proof upon actual residence, and not upon legal presumptions.

Divorce not to be granted by default, etc.

§ 130. No divorce can be granted upon the default of the defendant, or upon the uncorroborated statement, admission, or testimony of the parties, or upon any statement or finding of fact made by a referee; but the court must, in addition to any statement or finding of the referee, require proof of the facts alleged, and such proof, if not taken before the court, must be upon written questions and answers. [Amended March 30, 1874.] Interlocutory judgment.

§ 131. In actions for divorce, the court must file its decisions and conclusions of law as in other cases, and if it determines that no divorce shall be granted, final judgment must thereupon be entered accordingly. If it determines that the divorce ought to be granted, an interlocutory judgment must be entered, declaring that the party in whose favor the court decides is entitled to a divorce, and from such interlocutory judgment an appeal may be taken within six months after its entry, in the same manner and with like effect as if the judgment were final. After the entry of the interlocutory judgment, neither party shall have the right to dismiss the action without the consent of the other. [Amended April 16, 1909.]

Final judgment, after one year.

$ 132. When one year has expired after the entry of such interlocutory judgment, the court on motion of either party, or upon its own motion, may enter the final judgment granting [1] the divorce, and such final judgment shall [2] restore them to the status of single persons, and [3] permit either to marry after the entry thereof; and [4] such other and further relief as may be necessary to complete disposition of the action, but if any appeal is taken from the interlocutory judgment or motion for a new trial made, final judgment shall not be entered until such motion or appeal has been finally disposed of, nor then, if the motion has been granted or judgment reversed. The death of either party after the entry of the interlocutory judgment does not impair the power of the court to enter final judgment as hereinbefore provided; but such entry shall not validate any marriage contracted by either party before the entry of such final judgment, nor constitute any defense of any criminal prosecution made against either. [Enacted March 2, 1903.]

Relief may be adjudged in some cases.

§ 136. Though judgment of divorce is denied, the court may, in an action for divorce, provide for the maintenance by the husband, of the wife and children of the marriage, or any of them. [Amended March 21, 1905.] Alimony.

§ 137. When an action for divorce is pending, the court may, in its discretion, require the husband to pay as alimony any money necessary to enable the wife to support herself and her children, or to prosecute or defend the action. When the husband wilfully deserts the wife or when the husband wilfully fails to provide for the wife or when the wife