THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Defendant in Error, vs. GEORGE CLARK, Plaintiff in Error. Opinion filed October 26, 1912-Rehearing denied Dec. 4, 1912. I. CRIMINAL LAW-qualification of rule that statutory offense may be charged in words of statute. The rule that it is sufficient to charge a statutory offense in the language of the statute or in terms substantially equivalent thereto is subject to the qualification that the indictment must, either by the statutory description or by other apt words, so identify the offense as to meet the requirements of the constitution. 2. SAME-legislature may provide that property which is the subject of a crime may be described generally. While the legislature cannot constitutionally enact a law which dispenses with a statement in the indictment of the essential elements of the crime charged against the accused, still it has power to provide that the property which is the subject of the crime may be described in general terms. 3. SAME offense of confidence game is complete without regard to kind or amount of money obtained. Under section 98 of division I of the Criminal Code the obtaining of money, in any amount or of any kind or value, by means and use of the confidence game, is an offense the character of which is not affected by the kind or value of the money. 4. SAME-word "money," in and of itself, imports value. The word "money," in its ordinary sense, signifies cash or its equivalent, and while it includes coin it is not confined thereto but includes whatever is lawfully current in buying and selling, and such word, in and of itself, imports value. 5. SAME-when subject of the crime may be described merely as money. It is within the power of the legislature to provide that it shall be sufficient, in charging an offense where the subject of the crime is money and the grade of the offense does not depend upon the amount, to simply use the word "money," without the addition of other words of particular description. 6. SAME-statute prescribing form of indictment for obtaining money by means of confidence game is not invalid. Section 99 of division I of the Criminal Code, which specifies what shall be sufficient to charge the offense of the confidence game, is not, as to offenses where the subject of the crime is money, alone, in violation of clause 9 of the bill of rights. (Morton v. People, 47 Ill. 468, explained.) WRIT OF ERROR to the Circuit Court of Winnebago county; the Hon. ARTHUR H. FROST, Judge, presiding. DAVID D. MADDEN, for plaintiff in error: In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to demand the "nature and cause" of the accusation against him. Const. art. 2, sec. 9. The "nature and cause" of a criminal prosecution or accusation are not equivalent to the "mode or manner." The "nature and cause" refer to the crime committed; the "mode or manner" refers to the specific agency used to accomplish the result. Wolf v. State, 19 Ohio St. 254; State v. Schnelle, 24 W. Va. 767; Noles v. State, 24 Ala. 672; Rowan v. State, 30 Wis. 149; Cathcart v. Commonwealth, 37 Pa. St. 108; Newcomb v. State, 37 Miss. 383. Even though the form of the indictment is prescribed by statute, the nature and cause of the accusation must be sufficiently averred to notify the defendant of the crime charged. State v. Schnelle, 24 W. Va. 767; Rowan v. State, 30 Wis. 129. While the general rule is that it is sufficient to state the substantive elements of the crime in the language of the statute creating the offense, yet in cases of felony the indictment must, either by the statutory description or by other apt averment, so identify the offense as to meet the requirements of the constitution. West v. People, 137 Ill. 189; United States v. Simmons, 96 U. S. 3623; United States v. Carll, 105 id. 612; United States v. Hess, 124 id. 483; State v. Mace, 76 Me. 64; United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542; Commonwealth v. Clifford, 8 Cush. 215; Commonwealth v. Bean, 14 Gray, 52; Commonwealth v. Filburn, 119 Mass. 297. In criminal pleading the highest degree of certainty is always required. Wilkinson v. People, 226 Ill. 135; United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542; United States v. Simmons, 96 id. 360. Following the general language of the statute will not answer only in those instances where all the facts which constitute the offense are set forth in the statute itself. State v. Terry, 109 Mo. 601; Hughes on Crim. Law and Proc. sec. 2704; Titus v. State, 47 N. J. L. 36; State v. Smith, 17 R. I. 371; West v. People, 137 Ill. 196; Johnson v. People, 113 id. 99; Cochran v. People, 175 id. 28; McNair v. People, 89 id. 441; United States v. Simmons, 96 U. S. 362; Bishop's New Crim. Proc. sec. 627. Where money has been obtained, the indictment should describe it with the same particularity and certainty as in an indictment for larceny. State v. Crooker, 95 Mo. 389; State v. Rochford, 52 id. 199; State v. Terry, 109 id. 601; State v. Blizzard, 70 Md. 385. WILLIAM H. STEAD, Attorney General, and Harry B. NORTH, State's Attorney, for the People: An indictment which charges that the accused unlawfully and feloniously attempted to obtain from a specific person his money "by means and by use of the confidence game," sufficiently describes the offense under the express provisions of section 99 and of section 6 of division 2 of the Criminal Code. Graham v. People, 181 Ill. 477; People v. Weil, 244 id. 176, and 243 id. 208; Morton v. People, 47 id. 468. Section 99 of the Criminal Code is constitutional, and an indictment drawn in the language of said section is sufficient. Morton v. People, 47 Ill. 468; Graham v. People, 181 id. 477. It was not necessary to set out in the indictment the various devices and means resorted to to obtain the confidence of the prosecuting witness to obtain his money. People v. Weil, 244 Ill. 176; DuBois v. People, 200 id. 157. If an indictment for obtaining money by means of the confidence game names the victim the offense is sufficiently identified and a conviction of the offense would bar a second prosecution. DuBois v. People, 200 Ill. 157; Morton v. People, 47 id. 468. Mr. JUSTICE VICKERS delivered the opinion of the court: The plaintiff in error was convicted in the circuit court of Winnebago county upon an indictment containing one count, charging "that George Clark, late of said county, on the fourteenth day of September, in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and eleven, at and within the said county of Winnebago, did unlawfully and feloniously obtain from John Dembinsky his money by means and by use of the confidence game, contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided and against the peace and dignity of the same People of the State of Illinois." There is no bill of exceptions in the record. The record shows the arraignment and plea of not guilty, a trial by jury, and a verdict finding the plaintiff in error guilty of obtaining money by means of the confidence game, in manner and form as charged in the indictment. No motion to quash the indictment was made, but after verdict the record shows a motion in arrest of judgment, specifying particularly that the indictment was insufficient to sustain a judgment, was made and overruled, and the plaintiff in error was sentenced to confinement in the penitentiary for a term of not less than one nor more than ten years. This writ of error brings that judgment up for review, and the only error relied upon is the one assigned upon the overruling of the motion in arrest of judgment. Section 98 of the Criminal Code provides that "every person who shall obtain, or attempt to obtain, from any other person or persons, any money or property, by means or by use of any false or bogus checks, or by any other means, instrument or device, commonly called the confidence game, shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary not less than one year nor more than ten years." Section 99 of the Criminal Code provides as follows: "In every indictment under the preceding section it shall be deemed and held a sufficient description of the offense to charge that the accused did, on, etc., unlawfully and feloniously obtain, or attempt to obtain, (as the case may be,) from A B, (here insert the name of the person defrauded or attempted to be defrauded,) his money (or property, in case it be not money,) by means and by use of the confidence game." The indictment follows the language of the statute and is in the form prescribed in section 99. There is no attempt to describe the money alleged to have been obtained, by stating the kind, character, amount or value thereof, nor is there any averment that a more definite and certain description was unknown to the grand jurors. Plaintiff in error contends that if section 99 of the Criminal Code be held to authorize an indictment in the form of this one the statute is unconstitutional, in that it deprives the accused of the right "to demand the nature and cause of the accusation and to have a copy thereof," which is guaranteed to him by clause 9 of the bill of rights. Whether the objection urged to this indictment could be disposed of on the ground that the defect, if any, was cured by the verdict has not been argued by counsel, and we will pass that question and consider the case as it has been presented. The two sections of our statute relating to "confidence game" were passed in their present form in 1867. In 1868 the case of Morton v. People, 47 Ill. 468, came before this court, in which the constitutionality of the statute was challenged because it authorized an indictment that did not "set out the elements constituting the offense." The objection there urged against the validity of the statute was not sustained. Defendant in error contends that that case and others which follow it are decisive of the question here presented. We do not so understand those cases. |