twenty-five cents under section 14, "for the purpose of finishing paying for a new bridge over Salt Fork river, and for the further reason that the thirty-six cent rate would not raise a sufficient sum to pay all the necessary repairs and improvements on roads and bridges." The commissioners also levied twenty cents in this township under section 15, and it was stipulated by the parties that said levy under section 15 was "to cover certain drainage assessments made by the commissioners of drainage district No. I of the townships of Vance and Catlin against the township of Vance." This tax was also objected to by appellant for the same reasons upon which the objection to a similar tax was based in Catlin township. The objections to the twenty-five cent additional tax under section 14 and the twenty cent levy under section 15 have been sufficiently discussed above in considering similar objections as to Catlin township. For the reasons already given those objections were properly overruled.

In the town of Danville the highway commissioners levied thirty-six cents on the $100 under section 13 of the Road and Bridge act and thereupon certified to the board of town auditors and assessor that an additional levy was needed in said town, and the board of town auditors gave their consent, in writing, to an additional levy in the sum of five cents on each $100. The reasons therefor and the estimated cost of the improvements to be made were as follows: Opening up new road at Atherton cemetery, $1000; two new bridges on Hungry Hollow road, $1000; one new bridge on Jones road, $1000; one new bridge on Georgetown road, $1000; one new bridge on Batestown road, $500; one new bridge on Leverich road, $300. A tax aggregating forty-one cents on the $100 was accordingly levied in said township. The objection to the additional tax of five cents on the $100 in this township is the same objection that has already been considered above in reference to the additional tax in Catlin and Vance townships. The objection to this tax was properly overruled.

Appellant objected to an excess in the levy in the city of Danville of six and two-tenths per cent. This excess amounted to $32.71 in the taxes of appellant. The court sustained this objection in part and reduced the appellant's taxes $17.45 and overruled it as to $15.26. The excess results from a failure of the county clerk to scale the park, library and tuberculosis sanitarium taxes, as required by paragraph 343b of the Revenue act. (Hurd's Stat. 1911, p. 1972.) These taxes were subject, under the statute, to be scaled. (People v. Chicago and Eastern Illinois Railroad Co. 248 Ill. 596.) The taxes levied in the city of Danville for general purposes required a rate of $1.25 to produce the amount levied, and an additional forty cents to produce the amount required for park, library and tuberculosis sanitarium and bonded indebtedness purposes. The county clerk added the latter rate of forty cents to the $1.25, making a total of $1.65, and then reduced the total five cents, leaving the rate $1.60. The five cents taken off was manifestly the excess over $1.20, which is the maximum rate allowed in cities of less than 150,000 inhabitants, and did not reduce the taxes levied for park, library and tuberculosis sanitarium at all. The five cents taken off the $1.25 was clearly an excess in the levy for general purposes and did not reduce the other taxes that were subject to scaling. This was an error. The objection should have been sustained to the excess of $15.26 in these taxes.

The judgment of the county court of Vermilion county is affirmed as to all the taxes involved except as to the excess of the city taxes in the city of Danville. As to that item the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded to the county court, with directions to sustain the objection to the excess of the city taxes.

Affirmed in part and remanded, with directions.

JOHN G. MCDERMOTT, Appellant, vs. FRANK BURKE,

Appellee.

Opinion filed December 17, 1912.

1. NEGLIGENCE-when a refusal to allow the plaintiff to show there was no playground near building is not error. In an action against a building contractor to recover damages for an injury to a small child, who, while playing in the building, was injured by exposed machinery alleged to be attractive to children, it is not error to refuse to allow the plaintiff to prove what was across the streets near the building, for the purpose of showing that there was no playground for children except the streets and sidewalks, where he has already proved facts showing the location of the building with reference to the street and other public places where children had a right to be.

2. SAME-what does not show that trial court weighed the evidence in directing a verdict. The fact that the trial court, in an action for damages for a personal injury, refused to direct a verdict for the defendant at the close of the plaintiff's evidence but directed such a verdict at the close of all the evidence, does not, of itself, show that the trial court weighed the evidence, and if the verdict was properly directed it is not error for the Appellate Court to affirm the judgment.

3. SAME-general rule as to duty of an occupant of premises to trespassers. The owner or occupant of private grounds is under no obligation to keep them in any particular condition to promote the safety of trespassers, intruders, idlers, bare licensees or others who come upon them without any express or implied invitation; and this rule applies equally to adults and children.

4. SAME-duty of occupant of premises to those coming there by invitation. The owner or occupant of premises is bound to use reasonable care to keep them safe for those who come upon them by his invitation, express or implied, and any failure of his duty in that regard will render him liable for a consequent injury to a person who was without negligence or fault.

5. SAME-doctrine of "attractive nuisances." In Illinois, if the owner or occupant of premises leaves a dangerous machine or appliance exposed under such conditions that it may be reasonably anticipated that children of such tender age as to be incapable of exercising proper care for their safety may by their own instincts be attracted to the dangerous thing and thereby exposed to danger, he will be liable for a resulting injury.

6. SAME-what is necessary element of liability for an injury from exposed appliance. It is a necessary element of the liability of an owner of premises for an injury to a child playing with a dangerous appliance, that the appliance be such a thing as the owner might anticipate would be attractive to children and be so located as to attract them from the street or some public place where they have a right to be, and he is not liable for maintaining a dangerous thing for his own use, which could only be found by children going upon the premises as trespassers.

7. SAME it is essential to liability that the attractive thing be the proximate cause of the injury. In order that the owner of premises who maintains a dangerous appliance thereon may be held liable for an injury to a child, it is essential that the thing which attracted the child upon the premises, or something inseparably connected therewith, be the proximate cause of the injury; and such is not the case where a child, attracted by a sand pile on the floor of an unfinished building, leaves the sand pile and goes some distance away to a cable and sheaf used in hoisting material, and is injured thereby.

8. SAME-when a contractor is not bound to barricade door of unfinished building. A contractor engaged in constructing a building is under no obligation to barricade one of the doors to keep children from coming in and playing in a pile of sand on the floor, where the sand pile is not dangerous and can cause no injury to anyone, and where the door was in use by workmen engaged in wheeling bricks into the building.

APPEAL from the Branch "B" Appellate Court for the First District;-heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. EDWARD M. MANGAN, Judge, presiding.

JOHN P. AHRENS, for appellant.

FRANK M. Cox, and R. J. FELLINGHAM, for appellee.

Mr. JUSTICE CARTWRIGHT delivered the opinion of the

court:

The appellant, John G. McDermott, suing by his next friend, brought this action on the case in the circuit court of Cook county against the appellee, Frank Burke, to recover damages for injuries to his left hand, resulting in the amputation of two fingers. The court, upon a trial of the issue formed by the declaration and a plea of the general issue, directed the jury to return a verdict of not guilty, which was done, and judgment was entered on the verdict. The Appellate Court for the First District affirmed the judgment and granted a certificate of importance and an appeal to this court.

The declaration charged the defendant with negligence in permitting the doorway of a building in the course of construction to be open and not barricaded, and a cable and sheave, operated by horse power and used in hoisting material from one floor to another, and which were attractive to children, to be exposed and not guarded or shielded so as to prevent children from having their fingers cut off thereby, and alleged that the plaintiff entered the building and placed his left hand on the cable while it was not in operation, and the cable and sheave were suddenly and without warning to him started, whereby his hand was injured.

The evidence most favorable for the plaintiff tended to prove the following facts: On the north-west corner of Van Buren street and Albany avenue, in Chicago, there was a parish school, attended by from one thousand to fifteen hundred children, and the building stood back six feet from the street line of the avenue. North of the school building there was an open space of sixteen feet, and next north of that open space the Servite Fathers of West Chicago were erecting a parish hall standing fourteen feet back from the street line of the avenue, with a frontage of one hundred feet on the avenue and a depth of about one hundred and twenty-five feet. The defendant was contractor for the masonry and brick work on the parish hall, which was to be three stories high when completed. The walls had been laid to the tops of the windows of the second story and brick and mortar were being elevated from the first