mercial moving pictures, standards of acting and plot must definitely be growing higher - hard as that may be to believe.

FRENCH POETS AND A POET'S WIFE

W

THEN Paul Verlaine, who was called variously a madman, a decadent, and the greatest poet of his time, fired two revolver shots at his brother poet, Arthur Rimbaud, in Brussels in 1873, because the latter threatened to leave him, he was condemned to eighteen months in prison. There was much shaking of heads on the part of nice people who had always said that no good could come of the kind of poet who dressed in rags, gulped absinthe, and was even reputed to dye his hair green. Those who recall this incident will be interested in a newly unearthed anecdote concerning another occasion two years earlier when Rimbaud had risked his life by too close contact with the dangerous Verlaine family.

Rimbaud came to Paris in September of 1871 to live with the Verlaines, but Madame Verlaine soon grew jealous of her husband's friend, and resolved to rid herself of him. To disarm her husband,

she said that she wanted to study steel engraving; Paul Verlaine agreed, and his wife worked assiduously for a short time ma

MODERN SCIENCE AIDS THE OLD MASTERS

in a nearby atelier. When Rimbaud of BECAUSE the old masters of brush

his own free will, however, finally decided to move from the Verlaines' rooms in the rue Nollet to the rue Campagne Première, she dropped steel engraving like a hot muffin.

'Pooh,' said his wife, 'I never meant to be a steel engraver at all.'

and color ground their own pigments, it is possible, by a method devised centuries later, to distinguish spurious from real paintings. That is, by means of the modern spectroscope and very

'Aha,' said Verlaine maliciously, 'you powerful electric rays, the pigments of couldn't stick to it!' any picture of doubtful origin may be examined and compared with those of compositions already authenticated. 'What!' cried the poet. "Then why Imposture is thus made very difficult. did you go into it?'

"To make this, so that I could kill Rimbaud!' she answered fiercely, and showed him a keen steel dagger she had fashioned.

When Verlaine later told this story on himself, his listeners asked him how he had answered his wife.

M. Cellerier, director of the National Conservatory of Arts and Works in Paris, and director of the laboratories in the Louvre, has specialized in this art of detection, and many have been the revelations which have resulted from his tests. The last few years, which he has spent in his laboratories in the employment of

'I kissed her on both eyes,' he said, the French government, have been given laughing.

A few months later Verlaine and his wife had their final quarrel over Rimbaud. This time the poet left her, never to see her again, and followed Rimbaud, first to England, then to the Ardennes, and finally to the shooting in Brussels.

over entirely to this study. His methods are variable, but they involve the use of ultra-violet radiation, together with an application of the X-ray to detect alterations and retouchings. Thus does the science of to-day protect the reputations of the master craftsmen of a bygone age.

Harvest

By George Rylands

From the Nation and Athenæum, London

By Clarence M. Lewis

LTHOUGH many weeks have elapsed

A

since the publication of the 'acceptance addresses' of the two principal candidates for the presidency of the United States, neither Hoover nor Smith has, in subsequent discussions of foreign policies or international relations, added any item of great significance to the previous expressions of their views. This need not be wondered at, as these acceptance speeches were each made nearly eight weeks after the nominating conventions had acted, an interval sufficient for careful study and preparation, the delivery occurring before the beginning of the active operations of the campaign. The addresses represented, in fact, the opening guns of a campaign in which exceptional activity has developed, and probably constitute the most deliberate and thoroughly considered utterances which have come from either Smith or Hoover since their nominations. We are therefore justified in applying to these messages, for the purpose of the truest interpretation and understanding of their authors, such qualities of keen contemplation and close attention as may be mustered to that service.

In statements of the generalities and abstractions of foreign policy, the acceptance messages of Hoover and Smith were in near accord. Each in turn declared for peace in language practically identical. Each prefers arbitration to less amicable methods for the settlement of international disputes. Each favors disarmament instead of international competition in preparedness for war.

But the two announcements were quite different in tone and background; the emphasis so dissimilar as to produce in the mind of an analytical reader - and there are many of these nowadays - quite conflicting impressions.

Hoover says, 'Our foreign policy has one primary object, and that is peace.' Smith says, "The people of this country wish to live in peace and amity with the world.

by the creation of methods and agencies by which a multitude of incidents may be transferred from the realm of prejudice and force to arbitration and the determination of right and wrong based upon international law.' Upon this point Smith is more emphatic and direct. He declares: 'I pledge myself to a resumption of a real endeavor to make the outlawry of war effective, by removing its

causes, and to substitute methods of conciliation, conference, arbitration, and judicial determination.'

Hoover expresses complete satisfaction with the Kellogg treaty to 'outlaw war,' observing: 'Our offer of treaties open to the signature of all, renouncing war as an instrument of national policy, proves that we have every desire to coöperate with other nations for peace.' Smith approves the treaty as furthering the cause of arbitration but states that its 'usefulness as a deterrent of war is materially impaired by the reservations asserted by various nations of the right to wage defensive wars.' With Mr. Smith, in this misgiving, many cautious observers agree.

Both Smith and Hoover declare for a policy of disarmament in preference to international competition in armament building. And Hoover comments, significantly: 'But in an armed world there is only one certain guaranty of freedom, and that is preparedness for defense.' It was this repeated emphasis upon the importance of military preparedness which so deeply stirred Nicholas Murray Butler, President of Columbia University, in his letter of indignant protest against the principle of 'swagger,' published in the New York Times, August 20th.

Mr. Hoover does not refer to the Washington Treaty of 1921, limiting the construction of warships over 10,000 tons, though the Democratic Platform, published six weeks before, had condemned this treaty as too limited in scope. Smith reiterates this platform sentiment, declaring that 'for seven years the Republican Administration has followed it [this treaty] with nothing effective.' Smith deprecates the fact that nothing has been done concerning the limitation of land armaments, submarines, poisonous gases, or any of the other machinery devised by man for the destruction of human life.' Hoover is silent on these points except to call attention to the unique fact that we have fewer men in army uniform to-day than we have in police uniforms'- from which some might surmise that we have a hard time preserving internal peace and order in the United States. In the same connection

Hoover adverts to the circumstance that 'we maintain a standing invitation to the world [whatever this may mean] that we are always ready to limit our naval armament in proportion as the other naval nations will do likewise.'

Hoover says nothing about Mexico, Nicaragua, or LatinAmerica, though both the Republican and Democratic platforms discuss issues related to these countries. Smith has much to say upon these subjects, and he says it forcefully. He quotes certain celebrated statements of Elihu Root, referred to as 'the great Republican Secretary of State,' and out of Mr. Root's mouth condemns American intervention in Nicaragua. Smith further declares that the evil effect of American policy in Latin America has adversely affected our relations with the rest of the world. A still stronger indictment of American policy in Latin America is implied in the stated apprehension that this may serve as a precedent whereby other nations may seek to justify imperialistic policies, which may threaten the peace of the world. Even the Monroe Doctrine, which Smith declares to be inviolate, is to be maintained, according to Smith's policy, not as a pretext for meddling or interference in the internal affairs of Latin American nations, but as a joint protection alike for our neighbors to the southward and for ourselves.

Smith says, 'Freedom from entangling alliances is a fixed American policy.' Again Hoover is more verbose and less direct, but the idea is the same: 'Our people have determined,' says the Republican candidate, 'that we can give the greatest real help-both in times of tranquility and in times of strain-if we maintain our independence from the political exigencies of the Old World.' Hoover continues: 'In pursuance of this, our country has refused membership in the League of Nations, but we are glad to coöperate with the League in its endeavors to further scientific, economic, and social welfare and to secure limitation of armament.' Without referring to the League of Nations, Smith succinctly

Platform refers to the foreign debts owed the United States. Hoover also is silent on this subject, though the Republican Platform expresses opposition to the cancellation of the war loans, holding that 'obligations justly incurred should be honorably discharged.' The Democratic Platform declares specifically for the fulfilment of the promises made during and since the World War by the United States and the Allied Powers to Armenia, referring, of course, to Armenian rights under the Treaty of Sèvres. The Republican Platform is silent in this respect.

It had been predicted that Hoover, by reason of his intimate familiarity with world affairs, would in his acceptance speech proclaim a comprehensive international policy for the guidance of the United States, should he become the responsible head of the nation. But Hoover did not do this.

Others foresaw that Smith, by reason of his engrossment for years past in New York State affairs, would ignore foreign relations in his acceptance announcement, or gloss the subject over with light and hurried touch. But Smith did quite the contrary.

Smith's discussion of foreign policies and relations is more definite, detailed, and specific than is Hoover's. In part this may be due to the circumstance that Hoover approves generally of the policies of the seven-year-old Republican administration, while Smith finds many flaws and faults and does not fail to cite examples. Smith's prose is simpler, more fluent and direct than Hoover's. Furthermore, Smith talks foreign policy without splitting his infinitives or inciting disagreement between verbs and their subjects. Hoover doesn't.

At all events, so far as the writer of this paper is concerned, the effort has been that the matter should be discussed

adequately, impartially, without argument and in brief compass, that the readers of THE LIVING AGE, domestic and foreign, may reach conclusions of their

own.

NDER its double aspect

cal and technical - the problem of the limitation and reduction of armaments has been the object of profound studies to which all states, both those which are and those which are not members of the League of Nations, have made their contributions. These studies have enabled us to define the problem before it again becomes threatening, to reveal its extreme complexity, and to trace the method which we must follow if we are to solve it. But they will not achieve their ultimate object unless they end in the adoption of simple, fair, and practical solutions.

Can we attain this object? And if so, how can we attain it?

First of all, we must neither abandon the Covenant of the League of Nations nor the principles which have been evolved in long discussion by the political and technical delegates of the various states.

NDER the terms of Article

UNDE

VIII of the Covenant, the reduction of armaments need be carried only to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations.'

It is no longer possible to doubt the fact that there is a close relation between the security of a country and its armaments. We have gone far beyond the time when idealists, ardent but unreflective, hoped for a general disarmament that would produce security for all nations. The years that have passed and the experience gained in the work that has already been accomplished, force us to put such views far behind us. Before consenting to reduce its defensive armaments under the terms of any international contract, which for a certain period of time is irrevocable, a nation ought to secure genuine guaranties which will give it a feeling of security. Privileged nations may exist whose geographic situations and history have automatically created and strengthened the feeling that no immediate danger can menace them and that in case of conflict they will always have the time

of armaments is to expose oneself to the suspicion either of ignorance or of political manoeuvering.

When, in the pages that follow, I discuss the limitation of land armaments, it must be therefore understood, without further repetition, that they are considered as part only of the general de

JOHN BULL'S NIGHTMARE

to endeavor to discover means for their own security by employing methods that have already been tentatively explored at Geneva: arbitration and conciliation, guaranties of mutual assistance such as were recommended at the Third League Assembly.

The connection which the authors of the Covenant have wisely established between security and the reduction of armaments has been the dominating idea in everything that has been done to increase security by minimizing armaments. It is impossible to give up these methods without condemning oneself to inevitable failure.

A SECOND principle which we may

SECOND principle which we may

lay down is that there is no possibility of dissociating land, naval, and aërial armaments. Combined in proportions which vary according to the conditions, needs, and resources of each state, they constitute a nation's only means of national defense. Any reduction in one branch has an immediate repercussion in the other two, and to question the interdependence of these three forms

fensive scheme of each country. Most of the limitations to which they may be submitted apply equally to naval and aërial armaments, whether the subject under discussion is the number of men, the length of military service, equipment, or expenses.

BEFORE concluding a con

Ivention for the limitation of armaments, one must know what one wants to limit. As a matter of fact, no one to-day is ignorant that under conditions of modern war, armaments gradually come to include the totality of a nation's resources, if its national existence is at stake. The war-time expansion of armaments has its origin in the armaments that exist in the time of peace; but there is no limit to their expansion save the complete utilization of the potential belligerent power of the country, a term which includes all resources of every nature man power, raw materials, industrial and financial strength, etc. Now this potential belligerent power, because it constitutes the strength and prosperity of the nation in time of peace, evidently cannot be limited.

What we are really discussing, therefore, when we discuss the limitation of armaments, is the limitation only of those armaments which constitute a burden in time of peace. We are discussing the military forces which are already under arms, or at least organized, the length of military service, the financial budget which enables these men to be supported and supplied with the equipment necessary for war.

If agreement had been reached at the outset on this preliminary and essential limitation, the work at Geneva would have gone forward more rapidly. And if, in spite of all efforts, this agreement has not yet been reached, it is

often been contrasted with AngloSaxon ideas. To put it more exactly, two theses have confronted each other. One is almost exclusively the thesis of naval powers while the other is that of continental powers. The real opposition is between nations which, for political reasons, are hostile to the principle of conscription, and nations that insist upon conscription as the principle on which their national defense is founded.

The first group would like to have the limitation of peace-time armaments made to apply to a part of the reserves of men with military training which the conscription system provides for the second group. But they do not carry their logic so far as to include as they might very well do by analogy - the merchant ships which constitute a reserve of matériel and man power far easier to mobilize for war at sea than are the reservists of the land forces in a continental war. Neither will they consent to count the various kinds of civilian experts who, under the mechanical conditions of modern war, might be put to military use immediately on the outbreak of hostilities. In fact, those who favor the limitation of an army's trained reserves would weaken the mobilized power of that army and of the country

which it must protect. Under a pretense of limiting what they describe as 'shock power' - although they are not able to define that term - they would simply reduce the 'defensive power' of all countries whose military system is based on conscription. They confuse two conditions a state of peace and a state of war - which are radically different and which cannot be dealt with in the same way.

When a state goes to war, that war is either legitimate or not, according to whether or not it is waged as a matter of legitimate defense. If a country has the right to defend its territory, no one can deny it also the privilege of having as many trained reserves as it wants. Neither can one deny its right to put them in the front line at the earliest possible moment, to prevent the irreparable destruction due to invasion. If, on the other hand, a country begins an aggressive war, it is only necessary to apply the sanctions authorized by the Covenant of the League of Nations. All the other states, acting with international solidarity, will then intervene at the outset to punish the offending nation.

It is easy to understand why Germany supports the first thesis. The reduction of her armaments is henceforward settled by the Treaty of Versailles, and her participation in the disarmament commission is simply an example of the courtesy which the League of Nations extends to all its members. Being com

pelled to maintain a professional army, Germany would like to forbid conscription to those states which have forbidden conscription to her. Similarly, she would like to impose on them the same disarmament clauses which they have imposed on her. It is not worth while to revise the Treaty of Versailles out of deference to such an idea, but that is just what Germany is after.

Germany's ideas are easy to explain; but it is hard to understand why the great Anglo-Saxon powers, whose naval supremacy no one dreams of contesting, should be so stubborn in their indirect attack upon the principle of conscription. They like to use as an argument the contrast between their peculiar situation and that of the continental states, but their stubborn insistence on modifying the military system of the latter powers is impractical.

If any satisfactory agreement on the limitation of armaments is reached, it will be reached only by respecting the existing military systems, which are due to social, geographic, and military conditions.

IS THE application of the three prinof ciples which I have just enunciated sufficient to persuade governments to limit their defensive armaments by an international convention? What guaranty would each of them require? What assurance would they demand that other signatories have the same respect for that convention? Some say that mutual confidence would be enough. Others demand international control, but France is the only great power to-day which requires identical control for all. If mutual confidence were in itself sufficient, why all the recent discussion? Why conclude any conventions at all? On this important matter of control, the states are divided and the only hope for agreement seems to lie in finding a simple solution. To set limits only on military factors which can easily be verified but not to employ means of control which many governments would refuse that seems to be the only practical method if we really want to succeed in disarmament. This, as we shall see, excludes certain direct methods of limitation in which control would be impractical.

It need scarcely be added that the problem as raised in the Covenant of the League of Nations cannot be reconciled with the proposal for the suppression of all armaments, which the Soviet delegation felt called upon to offer at Geneva with the avowed purpose of unmasking the capitalistic governments. The two methods are radically different