and as M. Paul Boncour said at the time, there is no way of adopting one without rejecting the other. We may add that the method based on the Covenant and followed by the Disarmament Commission could not be applied to the proposal of the Soviets, which was based on a classification of the states and on arbitrarily assigned coefficients of their strength which will for many years be incompatible with security.

To sum up, limitation or reduction of armaments must be based on a subordination of armament reduction to security; on the interdependence of army, navy, and air forces; on the type of military system specially adapted to each state; and on controlling peace-time armaments. As a practical matter, these last are the only armaments that can be limited-with any prospect of checking to make sure the limitations are carried out

without employing means of control that no sovereign state can accept.

If we consider all three types of armament together, it becomes relatively easy to deal with the limitation of armies. What are the controlling factors? Men, equipment, money.

S%
SO FAR as land armaments are con-

cerned, it is essential to define the man power, the amount of matériel, and the military expenditures that will be allowed in time of peace. These are the only factors with which one can deal because no one can possibly know what expansion of armaments will take place in time of war.

The man power of peace-time armies, however, falls into two categories, both of which can be limited. The first category consists of the men actually in service in the armed forces; the second consists of the men in service in other forces which have a military organization. It includes forces of every sort except the army, which, because of the way in which they are organized, trained, armed, and equipped, can be utilized in time of war without preliminary mobilization. Specific examples are the customs officers, the federal constabulary, and the local police. It is the business of every state to decide for itself the relative importance of these two categories, but an obvious relation between them remains, if only because it is part of the army's duty to help maintain domestic order. A state which needs a relatively strong army for its defense may, therefore, be content with a rather weak police force; whereas a state which enjoys such security that it can get along with a small army may, perhaps, need more police especially if it must maintain order over an extended area.

A

COUNTRY'S effective man power has value not only in proportion to its number, but also in proportion to its quality. Certain people have proposed quality. Certain people have proposed limitation according to quality. Let us, for an instant, examine their fantastic reasoning. Since the quality of an army depends upon the degree of its training, and since this training itself depends on the instructors who give it and the amount of time available for the purpose, they have proposed to limit both the number of instructors and the training time permitted.

Now, the influence of the training cadres on the quality of the army is proportionate to the value and the number of the training cadres themselves. In practice, however, the number of the training cadres is all that matters; for anyone, no matter how ignorant of

military questions, must see that every state will certainly try to secure training cadres of the best possible quality. Inferior cadres would train an inferior army; and it costs so much to support an army that one cannot afford to neglect it. It would be ridiculous and futile, therefore, to try to compel a state to support an army which would give no protection in time of danger, because its value had been systematically diminished.

All that remains, therefore, is to limit the number of men in the training cadres. Certain opponents of the conscription system have tried, by doing so, to reduce the strength of the army after its mobilization has been completed. By establishing a certain proportion between the numbers of the training cadres and numbers of the army itself, they would like to hinder the mobilization of conscript armies, which, before they can undertake warlike operations, must mobilize and train their peace-time effectives. Meantime, however, these same people would leave intact the professional armies which are constantly ready for war. Such a short-sighted point of view cannot be admitted.

To make matters worse, this plan would hinder any conceivable reduction of the length of service in conscript armies. In other words, it would prevent the one thing that public opinion most desires: tax reduction. The shorter the term of military service, the more intensive must military training be; and,

therefore, more instructors are needed. Hence, training cadres must be larger. The Preparatory Disarmament Commission has therefore simply agreed that -in order to prevent the number of officers and non-commissioned officers from exceeding legitimate needs - each army shall submit figures showing the size of the cadres it thinks it needs; and that it shall agree not to exceed the number thus fixed.

THE

HE second element in the quality of armies, length of service, depends on two distinct conditions. The first of these is the time required for instruction, and the second is the necessity of keeping under arms, at all times, enough men to protect a country's territory. The minimum length of time required to train a soldier varies according to the military aptitude of the population in question and according to the amount of money available. The more rapid instruction must be, the more difficult it becomes. As has already been seen, rapid instruction means an increase in the number of instructors. It involves also long and frequent periods in camp and on the target range. It would, therefore, necessitate buying or renting a great deal of land, constructing and maintaining barracks, thus increasing the amount of work required of garrisons, increasing the amount for supporting the troops, and using up uniforms and equipment more rapidly. The ultimate result would be to increase the military budget and therefore increase taxes.

In order to safeguard their territorial integrity, nations must have a certain number of men with the colors. They can, if they like, get them by calling for volunteers serving a long enlistment period which has no relation to the relatively short period served by the conscript army. Such an army is a professional army. This is out of the question for a power which already has a conscript army to maintain, especially if the population is rather small in proportion to the number of men required for its defense. The only way to obtain a sufficient number, therefore, is to increase the length of service; and the weaker the population, the longer that length of service will have to be. Since all these conditions differ in different states, each must remain the sole judge of its own needs, and no system of measurement can be imposed on it from the outside. The Preparatory Disarmament Commission was, therefore, wise in arranging that each state should be free to determine its own length of service. However, so long as the proposed convention remains in force, this duration of

service, once fixed, must not be modified in any way that would increase the military power of a signatory state.

ATÉRIEL is certainly the most

complex element. Not only does it involve everything that is necessary to train soldiers and arm them, it involves also the indispensable extra equipment which they will receive on mobilization and the necessity of providing arms for

From Byezbozhnik, Moscow

A SOVIET FLING AT AMERICAN POLICY BESIDE A PACIFIC and soft-spoken President stand the armed dogs of war.

the reservists who will join the colors on mobilization.

It is easy to draw a line between the peace-time soldiers, whose number is determined by laws, and the war-time soldiers who exist only on paper, with no other limit except the 'human potential of the country.' But the case is very different where matériel is concerned.

Certain people, being very eager to prevent conscript armies from using their reserves, have sought to attain their purpose by limiting their 'reserves of matériel.' But this expression, though frequently employed, is nevertheless so badly defined that one still sees the delegates of Great Britain and the United States proposing the limitation of stored matériel for land armies, meanwhile vigorously refusing to do the same with vigorously refusing to do the same with their own naval matériel. If a formula could be established, so gross a contradiction would be inexplicable. It is all the more difficult to understand because during the World War all the belligerents

used naval matériel with their land forces. This included artillery, armor plate, munitions, and the arms of marines used on land- a striking example of the way in which land and naval armaments are interdependent.

'If that is the case,' say others, 'let us limit all reserve matériel.' But it is not easy to define what reserve matériel is. In time of peace it is usual for armies to replace their matériel as it wears out, by drawing on the supply designed for mobilization; and this supply is then filled up again by the factories. The question therefore rises: Is matériel in the factory or in course of manufacture to be regarded as part of the reserve? If the answer is the affirmative, at what stage of its manufacture is it to be regarded as matériel suited to war? The barrel of a field gun which is useless without a gun carriage can always be used to replace a worn-out barrel. A wheel which is no use by itself

—

can be used for repair. If, on the other hand, the answer is in the negative, if there is to be no limitation on matériel in the factory, would not this create an obvious danger?

The question becomes still more complicated when, emerging from the purely technical, we pass to application. War matériel is very expensive, and it is natural that governments should try to reduce to a minimum this unproductive expenditure. The paradoxical part is that the larger the country, the easier it is to reduce its war expenses. A highly industrialized state will neither make nor keep on hand in time of peace any more matériel than it actually needs at the very beginning of a war. It knows that in a few months its factories will provide everything it needs. If this state has a high grade of economic development, it can easily without laying up reserve stores find on its territory a great deal of matériel without which modern armies cannot live: automobiles of every kind, tires, gasoline, oil, horses, wireless stations, railway supplies. On the other hand, a state which is not industrialized and whose economic development is weak must store up in time of peace the matériel which it will need in time of war.

If, therefore, we try to limit the kind of war matériel in quantity or in weight. by the methods that apply to man power, we shall achieve an unfair result. We shall simply limit the poor states; whereas the powerful states will be just as able as ever to utilize their resources to full capacity.

If states are not able to limit the amount of their war matériel, can they (Continued on page 238)

E

By John Bakeless

UROPEAN opinion of the Kellogg

Treaty, as reflected in press comment, ranges all the way from an ardent faith which proclaims that now at last the era of the great peace has dawned to cynical reminders that ever since 1914 treaties have been little better than waste paper. These extreme opinions, as might have been expected, are those of the less powerful and consequently less responsible journals. The more important newspapers and weeklies, though their views represent an infinite variation in detail, are pretty well agreed that the Kellogg Treaty represents a distinct advance in international relations; but they also agree in warning their readers against expecting too much or believing that the friends of peace can for a moment relax their vigilance. Many point out that although the powers are perfectly willing to sign peace treaties, they exhibit no enthusiasm for laying aside their armaments, which are now theoretically useless, since every important nation in the world has agreed never to attack any other nation.

HE bitterest sneer is that of Popolo d'Italia, which is edited by Arnaldo Mussolini, brother of Il Duce. 'Of course everybody realizes that henceforth and forever peace reigns upon the globe!' it exclaimed sarcastically, after the treaty had been signed. The opposite mood is exhibited in a moving apostrophe to the French Unknown Soldier, which M. Alfred Detrez contributes to L'Intransigeant: Unknown Soldier, sleeping beneath the Arch of Triumph, there are no more war trumpets to disturb you! Do you hear me? It is a comrade speaking. Mankind is vowing peace.' But L'Intransigeant, speaking editorially, is less sanguine. The treaty, it says, 'is not a definite assurance of peace. It is only one more guaranty against war.'

Paris Temps, probably by government inspiration, declaims sonorously: 'The solemn declaration thus made in the name of the principal powers interested in the pacific settlement of disputes and likely to be drawn into armed conflict, repudiating war as an instrument of national policy, cannot fail to impress

Written especially for THE Living Age

all men of good faith and produce an atmosphere favorable to peace and the development of sound policy.' But in the

afraid that someone will say of us, "The French are easy marks!"'

these resounding periods: 'No one believes that the treaty is in itself sufficient to end war.'

M. Marcel de Bare sounds a somewhat similar note of distrust in La Liberté (Paris). 'Germany is responsible,' he says, 'if popular confidence in the Kellogg-Briand treaty is not absolute. What is the chief argument of those who object to it? A treaty, they say, has only very relative value if violating it is to anyone's interest. If one shows astonishment when these skeptics set forth their cynical views, they ask, "Have you forgotten, then, the scrap of paper in 1914?"

M. de Bare thinks he detects a certain uneasiness in the pronouncements of the diplomats who signed the treaty. ‘In all diplomats who signed the treaty. 'In all their public statements,' he says, 'one observes their care to warn the public against excessive hopes. They are all at pains to specify the fact that the treaty is an important step, but that it cannot completely suppress war if the nations or their governments really want to fight.'

L'Oeuvre (Paris) sounds exactly the opposite note. 'If we were not the victims of so many old prejudices, if we had a burning faith and determined will to peace, with what an outburst of enthusiasm we should have greeted yesterday's dawn, and with what enthusiasm our hearts would have swelled,' it wrote the day after the treaty was signed. 'But this first step, which we have had so much difficulty in taking, toward an enduring and continuing peace does not completely reassure us. Mothers are still clasping children who, they still fear, are not safe from the great menace. Skeptical men are murmuring, "It is too good to be true." They do not wish to seem to be deceived. They are still thinking that treaties are only scraps of paper. The will to conquer is the best guaranty of success. The will no longer to run the mad risks of foolish wars is the firmest guaranty of peace. But we do not have the courage to show that will openly. We are afraid of being deceived. We are

sight of the fact that what we have is simply a declaration of principles,' says the conservative Journal des Débats. "This is not the first time that mankind has believed it saw an era of peace beginning, once for all. Terrible disillusionments have always followed exaggerated hopes, as if to remind the human race that a far-reaching moral reformation which has certainly not yet been accomplished is the true condition of peace and that behind all their pacts of universal fraternity many an evil thought is still lurking. The text which the fifteen states have signed will have all the more effect if it is hailed with more modesty and is not regarded as an achievement in itself, but rather as a small beginning which cannot in itself suddenly modify the state of the world, and which, above all, cannot crush out the ambitions, passions, and greeds which are the underlying causes of war.'

M. André Géraud, whose daily column in the Écho de Paris, signed 'Pertinax,' is eagerly read throughout Europe, remains unconvinced. He fears that the Kellogg Treaty will interfere with the French defensive treaties and alliances. 'France has devoted herself to building up a network of treaties of guaranty and coöperation, as for example with Belgium and Poland,' he writes. 'Although badly managed, the Locarno Treaty belongs in this category. In future, however, the treaties of guaranty will work much more slowly and with more difficulty. Once the aggressor is determined, the signatories of the treaty of August 27 regain their freedom to make war. But as a practical matter, will not the United States, by virtue of this same treaty, feel justified in making its voice heard and will it not be prejudiced against any signatory so bold as to assail an aggressor without previously securing their moral support? And will not this paralyze or delay resistance to an aggressor?'

René Marchand, who is famous for his revelation in Un Livre Noir of the preWar scheming of Entente diplomats and who therefore has no particular reason

for trusting the methods of modern diplomacy, takes an optimistic view of the treaties. In La Volonté (Paris), he hails the treaty as a first step toward European federation. 'Although it is still too great a conception for some minds among us, the American idea of a United States of Europe, as the only thing that can assure us a prosperous and rational existence, unquestionably is the future formula to which even the most out-of-date nationalists will one day have to subscribe. . . . The Kellogg Treaty, by cementing an effective agreement among the European states to guarantee the present equilibrium from the threat of another conflict, establishes the basis we need for a unified Europe.'

On the day of the signing M. M. Hamel wrote in the Parisian trade-union newspaper, Le Peuple: 'Let us not attempt to say that the agreement signed to-day will make war forever impossible. But it will render the application of force in international relations more difficult. It will make more concrete the nations' desire for peace, it may provide a new basis for the reorganization of the world. It is no more than a great promise, but so fine a promise that it makes one wish to transform it into solid reality.

"The merit of the Briand-Kellogg Treaty is that it adds a moral element to guaranties already existing, without destroying any of them. It cannot therefore be an obstacle in any future work for peace.

IN AN editorial article headed 'Le Pacte au double visage,' the Journal de Genève observes: 'It is possible to have two contradictory but equally well founded opinions on the Pact which the representatives of the greatest powers in the world are signing in Paris. It all depends whether you look at it from the European or the American viewpoint. For Europe, the treaty to which Mr. Kellogg's name is attached though he is not its author marks a considerable step forward on the road to peace. But for Latin America and some other parts of the world, it marks a retrogression when compared with the Covenant of the League.' William Martin, the famous editorial writer whose articles are a feature of the Journal de Genève and are widely read, suggests that the real meaning of the treaty is that 'American and British imperialism are proceeding to divide the world between them,' an opinion which is echoed by the Russian press. In a subsequent article M. Martin speculates on the possible rejection of the treaty by the Senate: "The other day an American asked this question in a club: "What will Europe think if the American Senate declines to ratify the treaty?" The reply was full of feeling: "Europe is so used to seeing the American Senate reject treaties negotiated by the American Government that nobody will say anything at all." It is not our belief, however, that the Senate will dare reject the treaty. Perhaps it will limit

the treaty or give it a restrictive interinterpretation. But arrière-pensées and mental reservations fortunately cannot accomplish much against written texts, objective facts, and historical necessity.'

IN BERLIN, Germania, the moderate

organ of the Catholic Centre Party, compares the Kellogg Treaty to the mediæval effort to limit warfare by the 'truce of God.' It expresses the hope that the treaty of 1928 will bring to realization the dreams of peace of the year 1028.' Writing in the Berliner Tageblatt, Herr Herbert von Hindenburg, a member of the German diplomatic service who is distantly related to President von Hindenburg, reviews at length the history of the Bryan treaties, which France and England signed in 1914, but which Germany did not sign, thereby making possible the American declaration of war against her in 1917. Regarding this as one of the worst mistakes of German diplomacy, Herr von Hindenburg takes a distinctly hopeful view of the Kellogg Treaty. Again to-day we hear the voices of those who think the Kellogg Treaty Utopian, or those who suspect the United States of some scheme for enslaving the rest of the world. It is perfectly clear that America needs a peaceful world in which people are producing and consuming. In this respect her interests are identical with ours. Utopian? Only if mankind strives toward ideal conditions can it hope to

FROM Czechoslovakia comes

the somewhat doubting voice of the Prager Tageblatt. 'Europe knows that the peace it has to-day is by no means an ideal peace, but Europe is struggling to retain it, knowing that even such a peace is better than none.' The Tageblatt also makes the point that the peace treaty has led to no reduction in armaments. 'We shall be completely at ease,' it says, 'only when no more air manoeuvres are being held over London or any other city, when no more armored cruisers are built, and when the old weapons are laid aside.' This view of the matter is very frequent.

MR.

R. LLOYD GEORGE, in a series of syndicated articles which have been published throughout the world, makes the same point when he says, "The rejoicing amongst the genuine advocates of peace based on judgment and not on violence has been abated considerably by the reservations demanded by France (reëchoed by Britain) and accepted by Mr. Kellogg in his famous speech."

warlike deeds, but the support of all civilization. The existence of the treaty will afford encouragement for a reduction of effort in a democratic society which is already only too much inclined to let things slip.

'Here is Germany, through M. Stresemann's mouth, declaring herself ready to abandon her national industry-war. That is all very well, but does anyone think that she will at the same time give up her imperialistic ideas? See her already alive, hard at work, producing, growing, throwing out blandishments toward Austria. Peace is the means that she will use to conquer the world now that she has been disappointed in war. She is hard at it already."

range themselves behind the red flag of Communism.'

HE Americans, the British, the Italians, the Czechoslovaks, and the rest are under no illusions as to the significance of this treaty,' says the conservative Figaro (Paris). 'Not a warship the less in the British fleet, not a single cannon the less in Italy! We shall presently see our politicians, journalists, professors, schoolmasters taking the treaty as a text for sermons on "moral disarmament." That is, they will set to work to strangle the military virtues which are not merely the source of great and

paper, Arbeiter-Zeitung, comes a bitter and skeptical wail. Reminding its readers of the high hopes with which the Peace Conference was greeted and their ultimate disillusion, it exclaims sarcastically: 'Foreign ministers and diplomats whose business it is to make political preparations for war- these are the men who renounce it! It is as if the great freebooters should assemble and sign a treaty for the exploitation of the poor. All the fundamental hocus-pocus and insincerity of bourgeois society finds its expression in this diplomatic assemblage in Paris. Even Kellogg, the man whose name the treaty bears, and who dis

219

covered the formula about 'renouncing war as an instrument of national policy,' comes from the very nation that has reduced the little Latin American republics to the worst kind of slavery with its marines and has done the same to the greater Latin American republics with its millions; from the very country that wants to build itself the greatest fleet on earth and enter into an armament competition with Great Britain and Japan.'

HE London Spectator, always

THE

interested in furthering the cause of world peace or improving Anglo-American relations, regards the Treaty with rather temperate approval. "This,' it says, 'is the best we can do in a world where nations are at different stages of civilization or hold different views of religion or morality, for who can say that no Asiatic or even African race may ever run amok? But such a solemn declaration of high purpose by the leading nations of two hemispheres is a mighty bulwark

against war. More and more will every nation susceptible of shame feel that it cannot begin a war. That is the spirit which the world is rightly trying to foster. Written treaties may be broken by governments who are careless of honor or frightened of holding to the consequences, though a rupture may lead logically to war: but war will not follow if the spirit has thriven which makes the public opinion of every nation say, "We cannot begin a war." It is the duty of the world to foster this spirit, not only for our own generation: even more do we owe it to the next. . . . It is for us to see that our successors grow up, not merely struggling to avoid war, but simply not considering war as an instrument to hand. Towards this frame of mind the Pact is another step on the road along which the League is marching.'

"The whole affair looks like a cloudy sunrise,' says the Tory Saturday Review (London). Its reasons are bluntly stated: "There has been too much wavering, backing, and bargaining about this Pact. People have not forgotten that Mr. Kellogg himself declared it at first to be "fantastic and visionary," while the reaction of President Coolidge was decidedly unfavorable; that when America finally made up her mind to mother it, the change was supposed to be a covert attack against the League of Nations; finally, that this so-called outlawry of war includes war in its very wording. When Mr. Kellogg says that it debars