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N April 13th, 1928, Mr. Houghton, the American Ambassador in London, addressed a letter to Sir Austen Chamberlain with a number of enclosures, including a draft treaty for the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy, which it was proposed should be signed by the Governments of the United States, France, Great Britain, Germany, Japan, and Italy. The covering letter explained the circumstances.

With the exception of the Washington Conference of 1921, which dealt with the comparatively narrow issues of armaments, and particularly naval armaments, and of certain outstanding questions in the Pacific, this is the first definite step taken by Washington to reënter the comity of nations since the American Senate rejected the Treaty of Versailles and the Covenant of the League of Nations with it.

Speaking from his place in the House of Lords on May 15th, the Archbishop of Canterbury described this latest proposal for ensuring the peace of the world in the following words 1:

I believe [this proposal] will stand out in history as one of the most remarkable that has been made in the story of civilization and the world.

On the same occasion the Marquis of Reading, who, it must be remembered, has served at Washington as His Majesty's Ambassador, had moved a resolution cordially welcoming the proposals and calling for prompt and favorable consideration and acceptance of them by His Majesty's Government. After a debate in which, but for the cautious shuffling of Lord Cushenden, every speaker had spoken in similar terms, the resolution was adopted unanimously by the House of Lords. In the House of Commons on May 10th Sir Austen Chamberlain used language which was interpreted everywhere as implying whole-hearted support and acceptance, provided the engagements already entered into were not affected adversely and that the British Dominions agreed. Referring to the initiative taken by the Government of the United States, Sir Austen Chamberlain said :

I will go further to-day, and I will say that not only have we warmly welcomed it, but we

1 Hansard, Vol. 71, No. 33, May 15th, 1928, cols. 28-29.

Publication rights in America controlled by Leonard Scott Publication Company,

are hopeful that it will be successfully concluded, and that it will make a real contribution to the peace of the world.

Both Mr. Ramsay MacDonald and Mr. Lloyd George had welcomed the Kellogg proposal and called for whole-hearted acceptance; while Lord Grey of Fallodon, that hundred-per-cent Leaguer, at a private meeting of Members of Parliament of all parties on April 25th, described his own attitude as 'one of cordial and unqualified welcome to the United States initiative.' It may fairly be claimed that the country accepted the Kellogg proposals whole-heartedly in the beginning.

In a debate last year, the Foreign Secretary had been pressed to propose a Treaty with the United States outlawing war as between the two peoples at a time when there was no inkling of Mr. Secretary Kellogg's action. Sir Austen Chamberlain replied that no such Treaty was necessary as 'war between England and America is outlawed in our hearts.'

IT

T would be as well, before considering the British reply and certain implications and reactions that may be expected, if we glance back at the history of this historic American proposal. In reality the ball was set rolling by Monsieur Briand in an interview with the Associated Press on April 6th, 1927, when, with true Gallic eloquence, the Foreign Minister of France declared the willingness of his Government to sign a Treaty with the American Government outlawing war as between the two peoples. Apparently Monsieur Briand was only paying compliments. But the effect of paying compliments. But the effect of his words was far-reaching. It was as if a child had strayed into a great sleeping power station and innocently turned a small switch starting the ponderous dynamos. The use of the very words 'war outlawry' generated electricity in every town in America. For there is in that country a virile, active movement of some fourteen years' standing for the outlawry of war. Like certain Eastern religions, it probably started simultaneously in widely separated centres and amongst independent groups of thinking Americans. But its two recognized parents were Mr. Levinson, a wellknown Chicago lawyer and active peaceworker, and Charles Clayton Morrison, Editor of the Christian Century.

Though the vast majority of thinking Americans supported the action of the Senate in rejecting the Treaty of Versailles and the Covenant, they have had an uneasy feeling that the people of the United States have a mission to fulfill in the cause of peace, and that mere isolation plus insistence on the Monroe Doctrine is not sufficient. One of the causes of the rejection of the Treaty of Versailles was general disgust with the European reaction following the Armistice. But revulsion against war itself was stronger than ever. The greatest War in which mankind ever engaged had ended apparently with nothing settled, and leaving Europe worse off and with more seeds of future war sprouting than before. The Outlawists therefore found fertile ground to till. Their public was receptive. The religious leaders, the women, the innumerable 'uplift' societies, the active peace movements, all seized with alacrity on the idea of disestablishing war as an institution. Its simplicity as well as the revolutionary character of the proposal made a wide appeal.

The Outlawists made little progress in American official and political circles until they won over the redoubtable Senator Borah, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate. This hundred-per-cent. American, isolationist, and alleged former Anglophobe, has an immense public following. He has a reputation of honesty and singleness of purpose and is recognized as speaking for the ordinary man-in-thestreet. Once converted, the Senator lost little time before acting, and, in February, 1923, he tabled his famous motion in the Senate resolving that war between nations should be outlawed as an institution by making it a public crime under the law of nations.

Since then the movement has grown in the United States, the propaganda in its favor has been continuous, and war outlawry has become a slogan which no politician of any party and no public man in America can ignore.

It is necessary to appreciate the way popular movements start in the United States, gather momentum, and finally sweep all before them. The public seizes on some simple sentence and makes it a political war cry. No Slavery,' 'No Saloons,' 'No More War,' or 'War Outlawry' are examples. Public opinion having forced the idea on the politicians,

the politicians in their turn have to work out a policy to fit it. The reasons for this American procedure are to be found in the vast area of the country, the mixed races inhabiting the subcontinent, and the underlying idealism of a people descended from pioneers and emigrants, and liable to great emotional waves despite an apparent materialistic outlook.

IN

N this mental atmosphere Monsieur Briand's message was received. The ordinary busy American citizen thought the Outlawists had made a further capture in the French Foreign Minister. Senator Capper, indeed, brought forward a special resolution in the Senate to give effect to the Briand offer. But Mr. Capper not only persisted in his resolution that a Treaty should be drawn up and signed between America and France, but that 'other like-minded nations' should be invited to sign also. And from the Capper resolution we can trace directly the response of Mr. Secretary Kellogg to the Briand statement of April 6th.

At first the French Cabinet was delighted. There had been some coolness between the two Republics over the matter of the French War debt. In any case, the French Government could not draw back, and in June of last year Monsieur Briand sent his Note to Washington proposing a Pact of perpetual friendship between France and the United States. This proposed Pact condemned recourse to war, renounced it as an instrument of national policy as between France and America, and bound the high contracting parties only to seek the settlement of disputes between them by pacific means. The next events have been vividly described in caricature in the New York Herald Tribune. In the first picture, Monsieur Briand is shown penning a note on behalf of his wife, Madame France, and himself to Mr. Secretary Kellogg inviting him and Madame Columbia to a little private tea-party tea for four, en famille. The second picture shows Mr. Kellogg arriving at the household of Briand and Madame France accompanied by the German, Italian, Japanese, and British paterfamilias and their wives, while in the distance follow the other nations of the world in continuous procession, and the horror of Briand and his partner at the invasion.

Mr. Kellogg's reply, proposing to extend the Treaty to include the six principal Powers, and thereafter to extend it to other like-minded nations, caused consternation in Paris. The French Government has wriggled ever

since. Matters were made no easier by the prompt acceptance of the invitation by the German Government and the wholehearted but only slightly belated acceptance of Japan. Violent efforts were made to win over the British Foreign Secretary to the French viewpoint, and a no less violent effort was made to show that the proposed Treaties were aimed at undermining the Covenant of the League of Nations. The former effort, especially in its first result of a proposal by the British Government for a Conference of Jurists to discuss the details of the proposed Pact, was countered by private remonstrances from Washington. The second effort was countered by Secretary Kellogg himself

Paris

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ALL THE REST OF THE WORLD

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Briand

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before the American Society of International Law on April 28th last, when he declared that the proposals were not made with any intention of interfering with the machinery and the obligations of the Covenant and the Treaty of Locarno. The stage was thus set for the British reply.

To make the picture complete, I will anticipate events by a few days. On May 30th, President Coolidge delivered his May Day address at Gettysburg. A Presidential address on this battlefield has a peculiar sanctity, comparable to a British Coronation Oath. In his speech America's First Citizen endorsed the Kellogg proposals for the outlawry of war in terms which graft them on to

KELLOGG

the American political fabric. Attempts have been made to suggest that the whole Kellogg proposal was tactics before the Presidential Election in November in order that the Republicans might have a counter programme to the pacifism of the Democrats. Little is gained by looking too closely into any motives of any politicians of any country in the world. But when a proposal such as this is endorsed by the President under such circumstances, it passes, like the Monroe Doctrine itself, outside the purview of party bickerings.

ANG

NGLO-AMERICAN friendship received a set-back in Geneva last autumn. The failure of the tripartite Naval Conference - which failure rested on disagreement between the English and American delegates, for no one blamed the Japanese - brought the two peoples face to face for the first time for a hundred years in naked rivalry for maritime supremacy. Despite all the talk of the unthinkability of war between England and America, the rival delegations were exposed counting ships and guns and strategical factors against each other just as Britain and Germany did between the years 1904-1914. And a peculiar combination of circumstances had guided the hand of Secretary Kellogg into snatching an opportunity to make good the damage once and for all.

The best friends of England in America had hoped that, like the German and Japanese replies, the British reply would have been a simple and wholehearted acceptance. The speeches and declarations of party leaders, including the Foreign Secretary himself referred to above, had led the world to expect some such reply. But there was Paris to be considered. In the event, the Chamberlain Note of May 19th was too long and discursive, even allowing for the difficulties of reconciling our obligations to France with our desire for the friendship of America. But the tenth and eleventh clauses included reservations of the most far-reaching character. In the tenth clause it was declared that 'there are certain regions of the world the welfare and integrity of which constitute a special and vital interest for our peace and safety,' and complete freedom of action was claimed with regard to these unspecified territories outside the British Empire. The note was accepted with caution in the American newspapers and with polite cordiality by Mr. Kellogg. For the next move was with France, and, if possible, the French Government must be induced to swim with the tide. But the Washington Post, in an outburst of candor, described this

reservation as taking the heart out of the Treaty; while the inspired French newspapers declared that the British had gone further even than the French had proposed to do. The reserved territories are generally taken to be Afghanistan, Egypt, and possibly Persia. But, be it noted, once certain territories outside the British Empire are declared reserved areas about which we refuse to settle disputes by arbitration, France will be at liberty to claim similar rights where Poland, Yugo-Slavia, and her other Poland, Yugo-Slavia, and her other satellite States are concerned; Italy can claim Albania, possibly the whole of the Balkan Peninsula, and a good deal of North Africa and Anatolia. And except for its psychological effects and these are important and will be referred to later there will be not much left of the Treaty for the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy. As for the eleventh clause, which has received far less attention than the tenth, it obviously aims at the non-conclusion of any Treaty for the renunciation of of any Treaty for the renunciation of war where Russia is concerned. For it declares, "There are some States whose Governments have not been universally recognized, and some which are scarcely recognized, and some which are scarcely in a position to ensure the maintenance of good order and security within their territories.' This latter does not refer to Russia, who rules her own territories with an iron hand, but probably means China. It is difficult to exaggerate the seriousness of this reservation. It means either: (a) that we anticipate a war with Russia in the future, or (b) that we fear she will break her engagements and attack her neighbours or even ourselves. If the former, we disclose ourselves guilty of tortuous and dishonest policy. guilty of tortuous and dishonest policy. If the latter, and it is true we fear Russian aggression, surely from even the narrow military point of view, having once signed a treaty for the renunciation of war we should then be in the position of a nation whose quarrel is just. We could pose as the injured party with the enemy the aggressor. We should thus have all the advantages from the propaganda point of view with our own people, the neutrals, and the enemy. As for the plea that Clause Ten is complementary to the American Monroe Doctrine, it has become the fashion to overlook the origin of this Doctrine. Far from establishing a United States imperialism over both the Americas, it was first adumbrated as a defensive measure against an active Holy Alliance which was contemplating a Franco-Spanish military and naval expedition to South America to reconquer the recently liberated Spanish colonies. It was furthermore a declaration of defense of the institution of

republicanism as against the, at that time, militant and resurgent European institution of monarchy. To pretend that Clause Ten of the Chamberlain reply constitutes a British Monroe Doctrine is diplomatic sleight of hand and thoroughly dishonest.

VET the American peace proposals

YET

Ican and should have great value, despite these reservations. They might have been a long step forward toward the abolition of the institution of war. As it is, though they will be a shorter step, that step will be considerable and important.

I referred above to the psychological effects. Take ourselves and America. In the draft of the suggested treaty, and it should be noted that no departure from this treaty is being suggested in America but only an alteration in the preamble, Article II declares that the High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement or solution of all disputes and conflicts, of whatever nature, or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise between them shall never be sought except by pacific means. Despite reservations, expansions, British, French, and Italian Monroe Doctrines, talk about self-defense and third parties, here we have war outlawed as between England and America by solemn treaty. There should be no excuse now for the breakdown of the next conference on naval armaments, which must be held before 1931, when the Washington Treaty of 1921 can expire. The next step should be the calling of the proposed conference of the Great Powers, which might be preceded by conversations between England and America, as proposed by Senator Borah, for the discussion of outstanding questions of international law at sea. It is common knowledge that the American demand for naval parity with Britain is due to fear of the institution of a private blockade in a private war instituted by the British Navy. But with a multilateral treaty outlawing war, there will be no private blockade. We are forced back, indeed, to the second of President Wilson's Fourteen Points, namely, that the seas shall not be closed in whole or in part except for the enforcement of international action. If this step can be taken successfully, we shall remove a possible danger of a world war.

England and Japan signing such a Treaty should remove the necessity of proceeding further with the proposed great naval arsenal and dockyard at Singapore.

With regard to third party reservations insisted on by France, these need

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not be so dangerous to peace as they sound. A, B, C, and D are four Powers who have signed the Treaty. C attacks D. That relieves A and B of their obligations under the Treaty not to go to war with C; but it does not relieve them of their obligations not to go to war with each other.

a national pledge not to go to war? The much vaunted Treaty of Locarno depends on faith. If France attacks Germany, and Germany calls on England and Italy under the Pact to go to her aid with their armies and navies, how does she know that they will respond, and who is going to force them to fight on Germany's side? She relies only on their good faith to go to war in her defense, and France relies on the same good faith if she is attacked by Germany. Then why can we not rely on the good faith of nations to keep their pledged word not to go to war? If the majority of civilized nations can so rely on the sanctity of treaties to keep the peace, war is fairly on the way to be outlawed and disestablished as an institution or as an instrument of national policy. The six nations originally invited to sign the Kellogg Draft Treaty are the wealthiest, the most powerful, and the most heavily armed, actually or potentially, in the world. If they can keep the peace amongst themselves, they should certainly be able to keep it in the rest of the world.

the courts, and it would not be legal for me to proceed to his house to recompense myself from his goods, or to seek vengeance from his family. Yet this latter proceeding has been the practice in previous wars. The victorious have dictated peace terms, taking what compensations they could, and slaking their thirst for vengeance to the extent their public opinion and, to a lesser degree, the opinion of neutrals, would permit. With war outlawed there will be no victors and no vanquished, only lawkeepers and law-breakers; and the penalty for the latter will be judicially awarded. When these things are realized by the common people,' as President Wilson called them, the cause of peace will certainly be advantaged. War is an anachronism to-day, and the perverted and exaggerated nationalism which leads to it is a psychological disease. The cure must be psychological, and the psychological effects of the Kellogg proposals remain of great value. As to the fears of the signatories not keeping faith, why is it to-day that we accept a national pledge to go to war, but not

As for the right of nations to fight in their own self-defense, no paper treaties could ever prevent a people from 'fighting back' when attacked. Duelling and the vendetta have been disestablished and outlawed. Yet a man attacked by a miscreant in the street can defend himself to the death, and can shoot a burglar breaking into his house. This is the common law of all nations. But the difference between fighting in self-defense and waging a war for the furtherance of national policy is that, after the fighting is over and the attacker beaten off, the peace terms will be dictated by an international tribunal and not by the victor. Just so, having wounded the burglar breaking into my premises, I must hand him over to the police to be tried before

6

I

Body

and Tragedy Blend

By A. Koshko

BEGIN my story with a certain hesitancy. In writing my memoirs, I was unwilling to discuss the sombre figure of Russia's evil genius whose appearance was at once the pretext and the signal for a campaign of vilification against my country throughout the entire world. Another reason why I wished to be silent with regard to this episode was that the sinister shadow of the adventurer falls on the memory of the Emperor and of the régime which I have served faithfully all my life.

But I have changed my mind. The passing years have demonstrated so clearly the superiority of the old order to all the forms of government that have followed it in Russia, that, in discussing Rasputin and the faults of a recent past, I can no longer cast reflections upon its prestige. Moreover, Prince Yusupov has recently published his own story of his crime and Czarist Russia has no reason to fear the truth!

One morning in December, 1916, the city of Petrograd awakened to learn with amazement that Gregory Rasputin, whose name was then on everybody's lips, had disappeared. The news seemed incredible because everyone knew how closely he was guarded, but the fact was, nevertheless, confirmed. Rasputin had really disappeared.

It would be difficult to describe the joy with which the city received these tidings. Not only those who had some share in political life, but private individuals as well were elated by it. As a citizen, I shared the general emotion; and I did not feel called upon to order an inquiry into this disappearance, for I had been instructed by the head office of the judicial police that the Rasputin affair was of a distinctly political character. Moreover, the duty of guarding Rasputin had been entrusted to a special detachment of the Okhrana, or Political Police, under the orders of Colonel Kommissarov of the Gendarmes, the same Kommissarov who later became a brigadier-general, prefect of Rostov-on-Don, and finally a Bolshevist agent provocateur in the Balkans.

I presently received, however, an

GREGORY RASPUTIN

FROM A PENCIL SKETCH by Princesse Lucien Murat

urgent order from Protopopov, Minister of the Interior, directing me to use all means at the disposal of the Judicial Police to find Rasputin, and, in compliance with these instructions, I sent for Kirpichnikov, who was in charge of the service of inquiry in Petrograd, and directed him to begin investigation.

Rasputin was so detested by everybody in the Judicial Police that, in spite of their usual excellent discipline, murmurs of dissatisfaction arose over the order, the first example of bad discipline that had come to my attention during more than twenty years' service.

It was Kirpichnikov himself who telephoned me that the fifty men whom he had assigned to this mission were protesting, saying, 'What's the use of hunting for that rotter? He's gone and a good thing too!'

I went in person to quiet this extraordinary 'mutiny,' ordering the inspectors to go to work at once and reminding them of their professional duty and their oath to carry out the orders of their superiors without discussion. But from the group came such exclama

tions as "The Political Police let him get away from them; now let them hunt for him!' 'Silence!' I shouted. Finally the 'mutineers' quieted down, and the investigation began.

HE police agent stationed near Prince Yusupov's home thought that the night before he had heard shots inside. Immediately afterward he had been called to the Prince's house where a man who was slightly drunk, and who said he was deputy Purishkevich, received him with the words, 'Do you love Russia?'

'Yes, sir.'

'Do you want her to be happy and prosperous?'

'Yes.'

'Then you may as well know that Gregory Rasputin was killed to-night.' The agent made his report to the Commissioner, who sent it on to the proper authorities and next morning there was an inquiry in the presence of Nandelstedt, the Imperial Procurator. When the courtyard of the building was examined, traces of blood were discovered at intervals between the threshold of a little side door and the barred gate. The servants explained them by saying that the young prince had killed. a dog in the courtyard and, as a matter of fact, a dog's body was brought to the police next day.

That very same day Nandelstedt and S. Zavadski, the Procurator at the Petrograd Court of Appeals, were summoned by Makarov, the Minister of Justice, to go over the results of the inquiry. In the Minister's waiting room they observed a military overcoat bearing the epaulets of the Corps of Pages which, as they at once suspected, indicated the presence of Prince Yusupov, whose name was already being mentioned everywhere in connection with the disappearance of Rasputin. They were not mistaken. Yusupov was already in the room into which the two Procurators were ushered. He seemed nervous and preoccupied.

He was soon called in to the Minister, which somewhat surprised the magistrates. It is true that Yusupov had come