posit in the hands of an individual. It would be clear that if the money had been left in the hands of an individual, it would have remained the property of the depositor, at least until it had been accepted by the person for whose use or benefit the deposit was made. There was no consideration for it. It was a mere gratuity and inchoate gift and the property did not pass from him who meditated the gift until it was accepted by her for whom it was intended.

The court, however, holds, that although Perry was liable to be taxed as owner of the deposit, a case of doomage had not been made out as there had been no willful omission to give a perfect invoice, and therefore three-fourths of the tax was abated.

A IN TRUST FOR B.

Bartlett, Adm'r. v. Remington, (1878), 59 N. H. 364. A deposited money "in trust for B," not intending to part with title so long as she lived, but intending that whatever might be left at her death should go to B.

Held: A retained title, and at her death, the money belonged to her estate, and not to B. The transaction was not a present gift to B but an attempt to make a testamentary disposition of property, not in accordance with the statute of wills.

Mary A. Remington deposited in a savings bank $500 in her own name "in trust for Sarah." The by-laws of the bank which she signed provided that no money should be paid without a production of the deposit book and that any depositor might designate, at time of making the deposit, the person for whose benefit it was made, and the depositor and his legal representatives should be bound by such condition. It was proved by parol evidence that by "Sarah" the deceased meant Sarah Sturoc. The referee found that the deceased did not intend to part with the title or power of disposing

of the property so long as she lived, but intended that whatever might be left of it should, at her death, go to Sarah Sturoc.

The administrator of Mary A. Remington brought suit to determine who was entitled to the deposit.

Held: Parol evidence was properly received to identify the person called "Sarah." The by-laws signed by the deceased, constituting a contract between her and the bank, to which Sarah Sturoc was neither party nor privy, it is proper to show the actual intention of the deceased. An executory trust without consideration is not enforceable. It is essential that the trust be executed and that the equitable title and beneficial interest be vested in the cestui que trust. A deposit in a savings bank in trust for another who is neither party nor privy to the transaction is an executory trust, if the depositor retains the title and the power of disposing of the property.

In cases of this kind the questions are whether the depositor intended to establish a trust and make himself a trustee, what is competent evidence of his intention, and what inference of fact is to be drawn from the evidence. In this case the depositor did not constitute herself a trustee. The nominal trust was a testamentary disposition of property not made according to the statute of wills, and the fund remains a part of the depositor's estate.

NEW JERSEY.

A IN TRUST FOR B.

Nicklas v. Parker, (N. J., 1905), 61 Atl. Rep. 267. A deposit in trust for a person not living at the time belongs to the estate of the depositor at her death. A mere deposit in trust for another does not establish a gift in favor of the beneficiary where the depositor retains complete control of the fund during her lifetime, and does not notify the beneficiary.

Ellen Cunningham deposited a sum of money in her name "in trust for Eliza Clark" and another sum "in trust for Mary Clark." It appeared that both of these persons had been dead for several years at the time of the deposits. It was held, upon the death of the depositor that the money belonged to her estate.

The depositor opened another account "in trust for Honora Finerty," the latter being a friend of the depositor. The beneficiary did not learn of the deposit until the death of the depositor. There was no evidence of any intent on the part of the depositor to create a trust, except the pass-book, which remained in the depositor's possession until the time of her death. It was held that this was not sufficient to establish a trust in favor of Honora Finerty.

In the opinion it was said: "The right of the person named as cestui que trust (Honora Finerty) to have the fund on deposit must rest upon one of two theories; i.e., that it was a gift inter vivos by the depositor to her, or that it was a valid trust now enforceable by her. In either event the intention must be clearly proven, and such intention must be shown to have been carried into effect by the donor or settlor. The nature and amount of proof required, and the essentials to be proven, are similar with respect to each of the two necessary contentions. The form of the transfer and the time of enjoyment by the beneficiary may be different with respect to a trust, but there must be the same definiteness and clearness of proof of the completed execution of intention in the one case as in the other. It is clear that the depositor in this case did not intend to make a gift inter vivos to Honora Finerty of the money deposited. If she had intended to do this she would either have deposited the money in the name of Honora Finerty, so that the latter could have drawn it at will, or, if she preferred to put it in the form of a trust, she would have vested Honora Finerty with power

to draw immediately, or under conditions which she might specify, from the trust funds." The court therefore concluded that there was neither a gift nor a trust in favor of Honora Finerty.

A IN TRUST FOR B. A, AFTER DEATH PAY B.

Smith v. Speer, (1881), 34 N. J. Eq. 336.

A deposit in trust for, or for the benefit of, another, wherein the beneficiary is to take no interest until the death of the depositor, is testamentary in its character and the beneficiary gains no title to the deposit.

A depositor ordered that the following entry be made in her account in the Provident Savings Institution, of Jersey City: "Frank B. Smith, hatter, Danbury, Conn., son of Joseph Smith and Cornelia; to be drawn by Rachel (depositor); after death, by Frank." Frank Smith was the depositor's nephew. In her pass-book in the Howard Savings Institution of Newark, N. J., she caused the following entry to be made: "This account is in trust for Frank B. Smith," and signed it with her name. She kept the pass-books of both accounts in her possession and drew the dividends up to the time when she was duly declared to be of unsound mind. Her husband was appointed her guardian and as such, claimed the right to draw the money. The nephew sued the guardian, claiming that the depositor had declared a trust in his favor of the moneys. It appeared that the depositor had told the nephew that she had had all her money "put in trust for him, but that both of them understood that he was not to have any of it until after her death. It was held that it was clear that the depositor did not intend to part with her complete and absolute control over the funds and that she had not parted with the legal title thereto. Her design in making the entries evidently was to make a disposition of a merely testamentary character and the nephew, therefore, had no valid claim.

A, IN EVENT OF DEATH, PAY B.

Stevenson v. Earl, (N. J. 1903), 55 Atl. Rep. 1091. A gift to take effect upon the donor's death is not valid. One of the rules of the Pennsylvania Railroad Employees' Savings Fund, required employees, who deposited in the fund, to state in their application "the name and residence of the person to whom, in the event of death, his deposits and the accrued interest thereon shall be paid." One of the employees, who opened an account, requested "that in the event of my death all deposits standing to my credit in said savings fund, and all interest thereon shall be paid to my wife." The amount on deposit varied from time to time, and at the employee's death his account contained $1,578. At the time of the initial deposit he gave the pass book to his wife stating to her that if he died the money should go to her and that she could get it by giving ten days' notice to the company. He left a will in which all his property, except a legacy to his executor, was given upon certain trusts set forth in the instrument.

It was held that there was not a valid gift to the wife. There was a clear donative purpose on the part of the husband, but that donative purpose was confined to the amount which should be left on deposit at the time of his death. He intended to retain the absolute control and ownership of the moneys deposited during his life. To legalize such a gift, there must be not only a donative intention, and a delivery, but also a complete stripping of the donor of all dominion or control over the thing given. This is the crucial test and, when it is applied to the present case, the gift cannot be sustained. Said the court: "Such a gift is purely testamentary in its character. If it is not then it is a perfectly easy thing for a person to retain the absolute control and dominion over his moneys and personal securities during his life, and transfer that dominion to another at his death, with