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total disregard of the requirements contained in the statute of wills, by the simple device of depositing such moneys and securities under an agreement with the depository that he shall have the right to use them or deal with them as he pleases during his life, and that at his death so much of them as may remain shall be delivered to such person as is named in the agreement, who shall then become the owner thereof, and then delivering the agreement to the beneficiary with a statement of the same purport, as that made by the deceased to his wife when he gave the pass book to her. To hold that such a method of disposing of property is valid would be to practically repeal the statute of wills in its operation upon personal property, so far as its mandatory provisions are concerned."

A AND B.

Skillman v. Wiegand, (1896), 54 N. J. Eq. 198, 33 Atl. Rep. 929.

A deposit in two names jointly, coupled with loose declarations indicating a gift, are not sufficient to create a gift.

A depositor in the Bee Hive Bank in Jersey City, N. J., had his account changed by the addition of his daughter's name. His object and purpose in making this change were not shown by any direct evidence, but the circumstances indicated that it was done, not for the purpose of making a gift to the daughter, or creating a joint estate with the right of survivorship, but merely for convenience in drawing the money. The book remained in the depositor's possession until the day before his death, when the daughter obtained it and drew the money. There was no evidence as to how the book came into her possession. After the depositor's death, when the money was demanded by the executor of his will, the daughter refused to give it up, but did not claim to be entitled to retain it as a gift to her. There was evidence that, a few weeks before he died, the depositor had said “they”

had compelled him to make a will but that Lizzie, the daughter, "would down them all." The court found that the evidence showed that the depositor did not intend to make a gift, but added his daughter's name for the purpose of great convenience in drawing the money. There being no intent to give and no delivery to the daughter, it was held that the fund belonged to the testator's estate.

In the opinion it was said: “In view of the well known practice of savings banks to pay money only upon the presentation of the depositor in person of his or her pass book, the motive of drawing money without personal attendance becomes at once prominent and a not uncommon purpose in the placing of moneys in bank to joint account. The effect of the creation of such joint account is, in such cases, simply to make the one party the agent of the other to draw the money; and, in case of savings bank, the proprietor of the fund, by retaining the pass book in his possession, retains complete control of it."

A AND B.

Dennin v. Hilton, (N. J., 1901), 50 Atl. Rep. 600.

A deposit by A in the joint names of himself and B, with intent to make a gift to B, coupled with a delivery of the pass book to B, constitutes a valid gift.

One Caroline Jones entered the family of a retired sea captain as a domestic. She had, or subsequently acquired four savings bank accounts, which stood in her own name. A strong attachment grew up between the captain's family and Caroline Jones and, after living with the family for a number of years she was accepted as an equal. A few months before her death she determined to give her money to the captain. With that view she consulted the president of one of the savings banks as to the most efficient mode of making the gift, and he advised her to have the moneys standing to her credit in

the various banks placed to the joint credit of herself and the captain. Shortly after this she was advised by her physician that she was stricken with a fatal disease. She then deliberately set about having her four savings bank accounts consolidated into two, and the whole put in the joint names of herself and the captain. Two accounts in New Jersey were consolidated in the Provident Institution for Savings in the joint names of the two, with these words added: "This account and all money to be credited to it belongs to us as joint tenants, and will be the absolute property of the survivor of us, either and the survivor to draw." Two accounts in Brooklyn, N. Y., were consolidated in the Brooklyn Savings Institution in their joint names, with this addition: "Money on this account to be paid to either party; in case of death of either one the survivor to draw the balance." Before her death Caroline Jones delivered both of the new pass books to the captain and told him how she wished part of the money used in the erection of a monument and in the making of certain small presents. It was held that there was a gift to the captain and that the balance on deposit belonged to him.

A AND B.

Taylor v. Coriell, (1904), 66 N. J. Eq. 262, 57 Atl. Rep. 810.

A deposit in two names jointly will not create a gift where it appears that the depositor's object was convenience in drawing the money.

Richard B. Coriell deposited money in an account entitled "Richard B. and Mary E. Coriell," in which form it remained at his death. Mary was the daughter of Richard. After his death Mary and her step-mother both claimed the deposit.

It appeared that, before the opening of this account, the depositor had had difficulty in drawing deposits of

members of his family who had died. After that every account owned by any member of his family stood in two names. The court was satisfied that the only reasonable presumption that could be drawn was that his object was to provide for the convenient management of the fund in event of the death or incapacity of the owner and depositor. In this particular instance the depositor retained the pass book until the time of his death, and, under the rules of the bank, money could not be drawn out without the production of the pass book. The depositor also drew sums out of the deposit whenever he wished and in general retained control and dominion of the fund. It was held that the daughter was entitled to no interest in the fund for the reason that the father never intended that she should have any interest. elements of a gift inter vivos were not present.

The

A OR B, PAYABLE TO EITHER OR SURVIVOR. Hoboken Bank for Savings v. Schwoon, (1901), 62 N. J. Eq. 503, 50 Atl. Rep. 490.

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Where A deposits money to the credit of " A or B, payable to either or survivor," and gives the pass book to a friend with instructions to deliver it to B upon A's death, there is a complete declaration of trust in favor of B.

Helena Roche had a deposit in her name in the Hoboken Bank for Savings. She went to the bank with Henry Schwoon, her grandson and had the pass book changed to read "Helena Roche or Hy. Schwoon, in account with Hoboken Bank for Savings, payable to either or survivor." At the same time she signed a writing, authorizing the bank to make such change, and stating that she and Schwoon would be copartners in the ownership of the money, and that either or the survivor might draw. Subsequently, when the pass book was filled with figures, a new one was issued, inscribed as the old one had been. Mrs. Roche delivered the book to, a friend with instruc

tions to give it to Schwoon upon her death. It was held that the signing of the statement at the bank, the opening of the joint account and the delivery of the book to a third person for the donee made a complete declaration of trust. "The bank would have been perfectly justified in paying the amount due on the book to the donee upon presentation of the book."

"The objection to this mode of making a gift is that it is testamentary in its character, and, in effect, a will, and therefore void under our statute. In support of this conclusion is pointed out the circumstance that the power of disposition by the donor continues during his or her lifetime. But this circumstance has not deterred the courts from giving effect to such arrangements. This has been done on two grounds: First, that a joint estate or interest is created, with an express right of survivorship, which operates naturally and legally upon whatever of the fund remains unused at the death of the donor; and, second, on the ground of a completed trust."

A OR B.

Dunn v. Houghton, (N. J., 1902), 51 Atl. Rep. 71. The changing of an account, so as to make it payable to the depositor or another, constitutes a valid gift inter vivos.

A depositor in the Emigrant Industrial Savings Bank, in New York, one Mary Kane, in 1894, took her fourteen year old niece to the bank with her and caused the account to be transferred to the credit of "Mary Kane, or niece Katie Pender." Both of them placed their signatures upon the book kept by the bank for that purpose. The account was not added to nor drawn from during the lifetime of Mrs. Kane. The rule of the bank in regard to deposits in two names was to pay either party upon presentation of the pass-book. It was clearly shown that the depositor's intention was that she should control the deposit during her lifetime and that her niece should

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