have absolutely for her own use what might be left of it after the depositor's death. The depositor retained the pass book until she was dying. After the depositor's death the niece brought suit against her executors. For the purpose of establishing a gift causa mortis of the deposit the niece showed that, before her death, the depositor gave her a key to a trunk which contained the pass book, directed her to get it and draw the money. The trunk was in another room, not within the sight of the depositor. The niece obtained the book and almost immediately delivered it to an attorney acting for the estate, for safe keeping. It was not shown that the depositor was notified that the book had been obtained by the niece. Evidence was introduced to the effect that the book was in fact taken from the person of the depositor when she was unconscious.

It was held that there was not a valid gift causa mortis. There was not a sufficient delivery of the deposit, or of the book which represented the deposit. The delivery of the key to the trunk, which contained the deposit, would not, under the circumstances, it was said by the court, be taken as the equivalent of the delivery of the pass book. If Mrs. Kane wished to give her niece the pass book, there was no reason why she should not have sent for it and deliver it to the niece, after seeing and identifying it. The key was not the symbol of the pass book, although it might be regarded as the symbol of the entire contents of the trunk. That is Mrs. Kane might have made a gift causa mortis of the trunk and all its contents by the delivery of the key to the trunk, but she could not in that manner make a gift of some particular thing contained in the trunk.

But there was a valid gift inter vivos. The deposit in the two names alternately, although Mrs. Kane retained possession of the pass book, left nothing to be done to complete the gift, Mrs. Kane retained the right to draw

from the account during her life time. The book was kept by her in order to enable her to exercise that right and its retention, therefore, did not leave the gift incomplete as in the case of an attempted gift of a deposit standing in the depositor's name alone.

The court said: "Perhaps the same result could be reached by regarding what took place between the bank and Mrs. Kane and her niece as amounting to a settlement in the nature of a trust. Whichever of these two theories may be adopted, the result is the same. The retention of control over the property during the life of the donor, and a reservation of power to consume the property and make the donative transfer of no value, do not affect the fact that a transfer of property by way of donation has in fact been made."

A OR B.

Schippers v. Kempkes, (1907), N. J.; 67 Atl. Rep. 74. Aff'd. 72 N. J. Eq. 948; 73 Atl. Rep. 1118.

The mere deposit by A of his money in an account entitled "A or B," does not constitute a valid gift to B.

At the request of a depositor, Elizabeth Kempkes, her savings bank account was changed by adding the name of her son. The account then read "R. Herman or Elizabeth Kempkes." It was held that this did not constitute a valid present gift in favor of the son. The depositor "in no sense gave over the possession of the pass book to Herman, or ceased either her actual dominion over it or right to reduce the fund represented by it to her own possession at any time." The evidence seemed to establish that the change was made for convenience in drawing in the account.

Nor did the transaction amount to a gift to take effect at the death of the donor. "Such attempted gifts, donatio causa mortis, are not valid, but are clearly void under our decisions; not, of course, because of the lack

of a donative purpose, but because the intent or direction is testamentary in character, and not made in the manner prescribed by the statute of wills."

A OR B.

Carlin v. Carlin, (N. J., 1906), 64 Atl. Rep. 1018.

A deposit in the names of a father and daughter, where the fund represents the earnings of the daughter, and the bank book is kept in a place accessible to the daughter, belongs to the daughter upon the father's death.

The bank account in question was entitled "Peter Callinan or Maggie Callinan," "Callinan," being intended for "Carlin." The parties were father and daughter. It appeared that for a long time the daughter had been in the habit of turning over her wages to her father. The father made such use of it as he chose, spending some of it for his daily needs, and depositing the balance to the credit of an account in a trust company, standing in his name, together with money from other sources. Later the father closed the account standing in his name and caused the balance to be transferred to an account in the names of himself and his daughter, as stated above. Upon the death of the father the daughter claimed the deposit.

The evidence did not disclose clearly any reason for the change in the account. One witness testified that she had heard the father state to the daughter, speaking of the deposit, that "it was hers, and if any one got any more of it, it was her own fault." There was evidence of other declarations by the father tending to show that he regarded the money as belonging to her. It also appeared that in enumerating his estate to the person who drew his will he did not refer to the bank account.

It was urged that the daughter did not have sufficient possession of the pass book to establish her ownership of the fund. The book, it seems, was kept in a common

repository and was accessible to the daughter. It was held that her possession was sufficient. The fund was declared to belong to the daughter. "I am satisfied," said the Court, "that the testator in changing the account intended to pay to his daughter the fund in bank in settlement of what he had saved of her earnings for her."

A AND WIFE, OR EITHER.

Schick v. Grote, (1886), 42 N. J. Eq. 352, 7 Atl. Rep. 852. A husband deposited his money in a savings bank in the following form:

"Bank for Savings, in account with A, and wife E, or either."

The husband had already deposited there, on the same occasion, as much as the bank would receive in his name. He drew the interest on the deposit himself. There was no proof of a delivery, and the only evidence of a gift was a declaration to his wife, when she was scolding him about drawing out and spending his money, that he would have nothing more to do with the deposit.

In a controversy, after the death of the husband, as to whether the money belonged to the wife, or the husband's estate,

Held: The form of the account to which the deposit was made, is not evidence of a gift to the wife, nor is it in connection with the other evidence in the case sufficient to establish a gift. To constitute a perfect gift, the donor must part with the possession of, and the dominion over, the property. In this case, the husband retained control over the property to the time of his death.

NEW YORK.

A IN TRUST FOR B.

Martin v. Funk, (1878), 75 N. Y., 134.

In this case, the form of the deposit alone unexplained by

other evidence, is held sufficient to create a trust in favor of B, who, after A's death, is held entitled to the deposit as against the administrator of A.

Susan Boone, in 1866, deposited a sum of money in a savings bank, declaring at the time she wanted the account to be in trust for Lillie Willard, a distant relative. The account was opened as follows:

"The Citizens' Savings Bank in account with Susan Boone, in trust for Lillie Willard."

Mrs. Boone retained possession of the pass-book until her death in 1875, and Lillie Willard was ignorant of the deposit until after that event. The money remained in bank with accumulated interest until the death of Mrs. Boone, except that she drew out one year's interest.

Lillie Willard, having sued the bank and Mrs. Boone's administrator, was held entitled to the deposit.

The court held that the form of the deposit alone, where its import was uncontradicted by other evidence, was a sufficient declaration of trust, and transferred the title from the intestate individually to herself as trustee. Retention of the pass-book was not inconsistent with this effect, notice to the cestui que trust was not necessary, nor did the ignorance of the latter of the trust until after the death of the depositor, affect its completeness.

A IN TRUST FOR B.

Willis v. Smyth, (1883), 91 N. Y. 297.

The decision in this case is similar to the last, certain circumstances such as the depositor retaining pass-book, withdrawing interest offering to loan the fund and depositing in the same account after the beneficiary's name had been changed by marriage, being insufficient to negative the

trust.

On June 28, 1850, Clarinda P. Urner deposited $288 in the Seamen's Savings Bank in an account headed: "Clarinda P. Urner, in trust for Sarah J. Urner."