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In one instance several accounts were opened in the name of Isaac S. Allen, " in trust for Cynthia S. Weaver," the latter being the daughter of the depositor. Cynthia Weaver did not learn of the deposits until after the death of her father, when the pass books came into the possession of his executor. In an action, which she brought against the bank, it was held that the failure to notify her of the deposits was immaterial, and that she was entitled to the money.31

But the omission of the depositor to give notice to the beneficiary may, under some circumstances, have significance as evidence tending to show that there was no intention to create a valid trust.3

On the other hand, where the depositor notifies the beneficiary that the deposit has been made, the act of notification renders the trust irrevocable.33

§ 8. Limit to amount of individual deposit as explanatory of depositors intent. In many states there are statutes under which no individual depositor is allowed to deposit more than a certain amount in any one savings bank. Savings banks are intended as a means of enabling people of small means to safely invest their savings in a manner in which they will be assured of a reasonably adequate return upon their money. It is not their object

31. Weaver v. Emigrant Industrial Savings Bank, (1885), 17 Abb. N. C. 82.

32. Bath Savings Institution v. Fogg, (1906), 101 Me. 188, 63 Alt. Rep. 731.

33. Matter of Totten, (1904), 179 N. Y. 112, 71 N. E. Rep. 748; Kelly v. National Savings Bank, (1908), 124 N. Y. App. Div. 103, 108 N. Y. Supp. 216; Petition of Joanna E. Atkinson, (1889), 16 R. I. 413, 16 Atl. Rep. 712.

to provide facilities for the investment of large sums of money. Presumably it is with the object of carrying out this idea that these statutes have been enacted. Consequently, in many instances, where a deposit has been made in trust for some person, and the depositor has an account standing in his individual name in the same bank, the argument has been advanced that the object of the depositor, in opening the account, was not to give title to the fund to the beneficiary named, but to evade the deposit limit. The same argument has been used where the deposit is limited in amount, not by statute, but by a rule of the bank.

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In Matter of Mueller, it appeared that one Henry Dohrmann had a deposit in his own name in a savings bank, amounting to $2447.17. He also opened an account in his name "in trust for Katie Dohrmann," in which was deposited the sum of $1265.00. It appeared that the object of opening the second account was to get around the New York statute, limiting the amount, exclusive of interest, which may be carried to the credit of an individual depositor in a savings bank, to $3,000.00. It being thus clearly established that Henry Dohrmann did not intend to give to the beneficiary any interest in the deposit, it was held that the deposit, upon his death, belonged to his estate, and not to Katie Dohrmann, notwithstanding the form of the deposit. This is but a repetition of the rule that the existence of a trust of a bank account depends upon the intent of the depositor. In cases of this kind the object of the depositor is shown

34. 15 N. Y. App. Div. 67, 44 N. Y. Supp. 280 (1897).

to be the evasion of a statute or bank rule, which is, of course, inconsistent with the intent to create a trust.

In other words, where it actually appears that the object of the depositor in making the deposit was to avoid some statute, or by-law of the bank, limiting the amount to be accepted from any individual depositor, it will be held, that no trust was created, upon the theory that the intent of the depositor governs.35

In a New York case, where the defendant deposited money in a savings bank in his name, in trust for the plaintiff, his daughter, it appeared that he made the deposit in this form in order to obtain a higher rate of interest and that he had no intention of parting with the ownership of the fund. To protect the defendant it was agreed between the plaintiff and the bank that no sums should be withdrawn without the production of the pass book, and the defendant always retained possession of the book. It was held that no trust was created in favor of the daughter.3

The argument, however, that the object of the depositor, having two different accounts in the same savings bank, is a scheme to obtain interest on a larger deposit than would otherwise be allowed, is not generally favored by the courts. The mere fact that the depositor has opened two accounts in one bank, standing alone, is not sufficient to controvert the apparent intent of the depositor in opening the trust account.3

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35. Brabrook v. Boston Five Cents Savings Bank, (1870), 104 Mass. 228. See also Parkham v. Suffolk Savings Bank for Seamen, (1890), 151 Mass. 218, 24 N. E. Rep. 43.

36. Weber v. Weber, (N. Y. 1880), 9 Daly 211.

37. Meislahm v. Meislahm, (1900), 56 N. Y. App. Div. 566,

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The reason for this is that the transaction is open to other equally plausible explanations and that dishonesty of motive is not to be thus easily imputed to the depositor. In one case it was said: "The argument at best is speculation upon a possible motive. argument based upon a scheme for interest does not carry special force in any given case; for it is available in every case where the depositor's own funds in the same bank have reached the limit." The court here called attention to the fact that, if the deposit had been made for the sole purpose of evading the rule as to limit in the amount of deposit, there were other banks open to the depositor, in which he might have deposited the money in his own name.38

In Miller v. Seamen's Bank for Savings,39 it was said that such a motive should not be attributed to a depositor on mere suspicion. In a case arising in Pennsylvania it was contended that the object of the depositor in opening a trust account was to thereby increase his deposit in the bank beyond the limit allowed to one person. But the only evidence offered in substantiation of this contention was the fact that the depositor died leaving two accounts in the bank, one in his own name and one in his name, as trustee for Polly McKim." This

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67 N. Y. Supp. 480; Williams v. Brooklyn Savings Bank, (1900)' 51 N. Y. App. Div. 332, 64 N. Y. Supp. 1021; Miller v. Seamen's Bank for Savings, (1901), 33 Misc. Rep. (N. Y.) 708, 68 N. Y. Supp. 983; Gaffney's Estate, (1891), 146 Pa. 49, 23 Atl. Rep. 163; Merigan v. McGonigle, (1903), 205 Pa. 321, 54 Atl. Rep. 994; Ray v. Simmons, (1875), 11 R. I. 266.

38. Williams v. Brooklyn Savings Bank, (1900) 51 N. Y. App. Div. 332, 64 N. Y. Supp. 1021.

39. 33 Misc. Rep. 708, 68 N. Y. Supp. 983 (1901).

was held to be insufficient and it was decided that there was a valid trust in favor of Polly McKim.40

In another Pennsylvania case the same contention was unsuccessfully advanced. It appeared that there was a rule of the Philadelphia Saving Fund Society, under which the deposits by any one person were limited to $300 per annum. In 1889 Mary Fitzgerald, a widow, opened an account in her own name by depositing $300.00. In the same year she deposited $300.00 in her name “in trust for Mary Agnes Fitzgerald," her niece. Each year, for several years thereafter, she deposited a like amount in each account. In answer to the argument that the object of the depositor was to deposit beyond the amount permitted to any one person, the court said: "This evidence was little more than a scintilla, and could not prevail against the admitted facts showing a contrary pur

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Even where a depositor, upon being notified by an official of the bank in which his deposit was kept that the amount was in excess of the amount not subject to tax by the state, thereafter transferred a portion of the account to a trust account for this son, and stated that his object was to avoid taxation, it was held that his action was not inconsistent with the creation of a valid trust.42

§ 9. Withdrawal of interest by depositor. It is held that, where a person deposits his money in a bank in

40. Gaffney's Estate (1891), 146 Pa. 49, 23 Atl. Rep. 163.

41. Merigan v. McGonigle, (1903), 205 Pa. 321, 54 Atl. Rep. 994. 42. Connecticut River Savings Bank v. Albee, (1892), 64 Vt. 571, 25 Atl. Rep. 487.

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