It was also held that a codicil to the will of Mrs. Beers, subsequent to the change in the deposit, making a different disposition of the deposit could not be introduced in evidence. The rights of the parties became fixed before the codicil was made.

A OR B, PAY TO EITHER OR THE SURVIVOR OF EITHER. Hallenbeck v. Hallenbeck, (1905), 103 N. Y. App. Div. 107, 93 N. Y. Supp. 73.

A deposit by a person of his money in his name and that of another gives the other prima facie title.

Huldah Van Aernam, having a deposit in the Albany County Savings Bank, told the teller of the bank that she wished the name of her niece added so that either or the survivor could draw the money. The teller produced a printed form, which was filled out and signed, as follows:

"Oct. 7, 1897.

"The Treasurer of the Albany County Savings Bank will please add the name of my niece, Huldah B. Hallenbeck, as owner and creditor with me of all moneys heretofore or which may hereafter be deposited in said bank under its account No. 12413, together with all the interest which has been or may hereafter be credited to the said account, with full authority for each or either of us, or the survivor of us, to draw out from the said bank the whole or any part of such moneys or such interest.

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(Signed) HULDAH VAN AERNAM." A new pass book was issued and entitled "Huldah Van Aernam or Huldah B. Hallenbeck. Pay to either or the survivor of either."

No further deposits were made. Two withdrawals were made by the niece, who must have produced the pass book, according to the rules of the bank. The depositor afterwards stated to a friend that she intended to do well by the niece and that she had a bank book for

her, and that it was hers, (the niece's). The depositor retained possession of the pass book up to the time of her death.

It was held that the form of the account gave the niece prima facie title. Before this could be destroyed there must have been a finding that the change in the account was made for some other purpose than to pass title, for example, for the convenience of the original depositor in drawing. This not having been found, or passed on by the trial court, it was held that a dismissal of the niece's complaint was unwarranted. The judgment in favor of the defendant, the executor of the depositor, was reversed and a new trial granted.

A AND B.

A OR B.

Matter of Meehan, (1901), 59 N. Y. App. Div. 156, 69 N. Y. Supp. 9.

Accounts opened in the names of "A and B," and "A or B," the parties being husband and wife, held to belong to the wife upon the husband's death.

Three bank accounts were opened in the names of a husband and wife, with the husband's money. The accounts were entitled as follows: "Christopher and Mary Meehan," "Mary J. and Christopher Meehan," and "Christopher or Mary Jane Meehan." The wife conducted the husband's business subject to his direction including the making of deposits in and withdrawals from the bank accounts. The pass books were kept in the house, accessible to the husband at all times. The husband had made declarations that the deposits would belong to the wife after his death. The wife survived. It was held that the accounts belonged to her.

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It was also held that the use of the word or" between the names in one of the accounts, instead of " and

in no way lessened the form of the account, and as fully conveyed the idea of survivorship.

B, SUBJECT ALSO TO CONTROL OF A. A, IN CASE OF MY DEATH, PAY B.

Matter of King, (1906), 51 Misc. (N. Y.) 375, 101 N. Y. Supp. 279.

Mrs. Charlotte E. King deposited money in the Troy Savings Bank in the name of "Harriet J. Warren, subject also to the control of Aunt Mrs. Charlotte E. King." She opened another account in the Security Trust Company of Troy, N. Y., in the name of "Amelia E. Haswell, subject also to Charlotte E. King." There was evidence of admissions and declarations by Mrs. King showing that she intended these deposits for the relatives in whose names they were made. It was held that the form of these deposits, supplemented by the evidence of the intent of the depositor, established trusts in favor of the parties named. The funds, therefore, did not belong to her estate.

Mrs. King opened another account in her own name, in the bank of D. Powers & Sons, Lansingburg, N. Y. Later she went to the bank and, after a consultation with the officers of the bank, had the following written in the book: "In case of my death pay to the order of (for her own use) Mrs. Emma Harvey only." This she signed. An order to the same effect was filed with the bank. It was held to be doubtful if this form of deposit standing alone, would have created a trust. But, in this instance the court was not confined to the inscription on the book or the terms of the order for the evidence upon which to determine that a trust was intended and was created. There was testimony from a number of witnesses as to admissions and declarations by Mrs. King, which the court held established the deposit as a trust.

IN A'S NAME-A OR B TO DRAW.

Brown v. Brown (N. Y., 1857), 23 Barb. 565.

A deposited his money in his name. Both he and B, his wife, signed in the signature book of the bank. Opposite their signatures was written "to be drawn by either." It was held that, on A's death, the money belonged to his administrator, not to B.

On the 20th day of October, 1852, Charles Brown, Jr., went with his wife to the Rochester Savings Bank, where he deposited $500, saying that "he wanted it so that either he or his wife could draw the money." Both entered their names in the signature book, opposite which the clerk of the bank wrote the words "to be drawn by either." The account was opened with Mr. Brown, and a pass book was given as a voucher for the deposit, which he took away with him. The day after Mr. Brown's death, and before the bank was apprised of his demise, Mrs. Brown drew the money, giving a receipt signed "For Charles Brown-Christina Brown." Mr. Brown's administrator brought suit against Mrs. Brown for the deposit.

It was held that the administrator was entitled to recover. Though Mr. Brown intended that his wife should have the money at his death, he had misjudged what was necessary to be done in order to secure the money to her. It was not in the power of the court to give her the money because her husband intended she should have it. The transaction was not valid as a gift, for the reason that it was not consummated by delivery. Mrs. Brown's authority to draw the money terminated on the death of Mr. Brown.

PENNSYLVANIA.

A TO B IN TRUST FOR C.

Withers v. Weaver, (1849), 10 Pa. St. 391.

A assigned a certificate of deposit to B in trust for C but,

having made the transfer subject to his, A's, disposition and control, there is held to have been no delivery, and the money continued A's property until his death. Hence upon A's death, his wife, by virtue of the provisions of an ante-nuptial agreement, and not C, became entitled to the money.

Jacob Weaver deposited $400 in the Lancaster Savings Institution for which he held a certificate. Afterwards, on the eve of his marriage, an ante-nuptial agreement was entered into providing that if the intended wife should survive her intended husband, she should then have all the real and personal estate of which the husband should die seised or possessed, the husband however having entire power of disposition of his property during his life.

After the marriage Jacob Weaver assigned the $400 certificate to one Withers in trust for M. Weaver, a son of Jacob Weaver, it being intended as a provision for the son. When the assignment was executed, Weaver directed it to be delivered to Withers saying it might be he might want some money; if he did he would call on Withers for it. One of the witnesses to the transfer said it was to be the old man's as long as he lived, and his son's at the old man's death.

On the day of the assignment Withers surrendered the old certificate to the bank and took out a new one for the principal and interest which had accrued.

After the death of Jacob Weaver, his widow brought this action against Withers for the money which had been paid over by the bank to Withers after the death of Weaver.

Held: The question is was there a gift consummated by delivery to the donee? If there was not a gift, the money remains the property of Jacob Weaver. He died possessed of it and consequently after his decease, by the terms of his marriage contract, it passed to his widow. From the testimony it is manifest the money, after the transfer, remained as before, subject to his disposition