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of Philadelphia, two letters of credit each in the sum of $10,000. The letters were in the same words, of which this is a copy:

"We hereby authorize the bearers, W. A. Parry and Credit Minnie H. Parry, his wife, to value at sight upon Lyonnaise, London, to an amount not exceeding £2,000, or at their option, upon Credit Lyonnaise, Paris, to the

extent of 50,000 francs."

The credits were to extend to December 31, 1896. The husband and wife had been on their travels about four months when he died at Darjeeling, India, on February 8, 1896. At his death there remained a balance This unexpended on the letters of credit of $12,825.34. was drawn by the widow before she returned to her home in Philadelphia.

Before he left home, on March 29, 1895, the husband executed a will whereby he bequeathed to his wife absolutely, $20,000, and the income of nearly all the remainder of his estate, which was large, for life, and appointed her and Joseph Hopkinson, executors of his will. By their first account filed there was a balance of over $120,000

for distribution.

At the audit, the widow's co-executor claimed she should be charged with the balance $12,825.34 unexpended on the letters of credit at the death of her husband. The auditing judge sustained the claim. On the hearing before the court in banc, the court was equally divided, one for affirming, one for reversing, so the decree was affirmed. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, the decree is reversed, and the widow is held entitled to the balance shown by the letters of credit.

Held: The credit was purchased by the husband's money. The wife paid none. The learned auditing judge was of opinion that the letters were issued to them jointly, merely as a matter of convenience; that as they represented the husband's money and there was no evidence of

a gift or assignment by him to her, the unexpended balance should be charged against her.

We are clear the writings created an estate, as between husband and wife, by entireties, and such an estate at common law goes to the survivor. This estate may be created in a chattel as well as in realty, in a chose in action and in one in possession. Freeman on Cotenancy and Partition, Section 63 and 68. And as to choses in action, it is not abolished by the legislation affecting joint tenancy; for an estate that as to unmarried persons would be a joint tenancy, as to husband and wife is a tenancy by entireties. Therefore neither the act of March 31, 1812, that of April 11, 1848 nor that of June 3, 1887 applies.

These letters of credit on their face have nothing to distinguish them, in their legal consequences, from a draft drawn in favor of husband and wife, as payees, by the American bankers on the foreign ones, or from a certificate of deposit or promissory note to them jointly; all of which have been held to constitute an estate by entireties. It was not an absolute gift to the wife of the whole amount, nor intended so to be; it was an estate in personalty, the value of which to her depended upon two contingencies:

(1) On her survivorship during the life of the letters; (2) on how much was still payable at his death. Both contingencies happened and she survived as to so much of the estate as had not been spent.

The fact that they were going abroad and that this was a convenient method of providing money for their expenses does not rebut, or even cast doubt on, the intention expressed in the writings. The husband procured to be framed and delivered an instrument which effects certain legal consequences on the happening of certain contingencies. He knew that by means of it, they could readily obtain money in foreign countries; that if both survived to return home, he could receive from the

bankers who issued the letters, the estate being personalty, any balance not expended; that if he died abroad, the surviving wife took all that was left. There is not a spark of evidence indicating any other intention than that which legally arises on the face of the paper. In fact he may have, very reasonably, intended that if he died abroad among strangers, his widow should immediately be possessed of funds sufficient for her necessities and comfort, independent of any provision made for her in his will.

Appellees argue that, by such construction, if a letter of credit was issued for an indefinite amount, it would enable the widow to sweep the entire estate. We think it highly improbable that any banker would issue a letter of credit for an indefinite amount which would enable a wife to sweep her husband's entire estate and, perhaps, the banker's too; but if such a letter were issued at the request of the husband, the presumption, would be quite strong that he intended his wife should have his entire personal estate in case of his death. However any improbability as to the contention which might possibly be raised by such an extreme case is without weight here, for the husband took the letters for a limited amount, probably not one-twentieth of his large estate.

The court below erred in charging the widow with the sum of $12,825.34, balance unpaid on the letters of credit at her husband's death.

A IN TRUST FOR B.

Rambo v. Pile (1908), 220 Pa. 235, 69 Atl. Rep. 807. A real estate dealer deposited money in his name as "Trustee for E. S. Githens." He retained the pass book and continued to make deposits and draw checks against the fund. In fact it constituted his regular business account. After the depositor's wife died he married the beneficiary of the trust account, and later she died. After

the depositor died a controversy arose as to whether the deposit belonged to his estate or to the estate of the beneficiary. It was held that it belonged to the depositor's estate. All the surrounding circumstances tended to show that the deposit was made with the intention on the part of the depositor of retaining control and ownership of the deposit.

A IN TRUST FOR B.

Merigan v. McGonigle (1903), 205, Pa. 321, 54 Atl. Rep. 994.

A failure to notify the beneficiary of a trust deposit during the lifetime of the depositor will not defeat the trust.

A rule of the Philadelphia Saving Fund Society limited the amount of deposits by any one person to $300 per annum. In 1889 Mary Fitzgerald, a widow opened an account in her own name by depositing $300. In the same year she deposited $300 in her name "in trust for Mary Agnes Fitzgerald," her niece. Each year, for several years thereafter, she deposited a like amount in each account. She always retained possession of the pass book for the trust account and the niece did not learn of the existence of the account until after her death. During the time the deposits were being made the depositor had stated that "she had taken out a book " in her niece's name and that the money belonged to the niece and was deposited for her. It was held that a valid trust was created. It was argued that the object of the depositor was to deposit beyond the amount permitted to any one person and not to create a trust. This evidence, the court said, "was little more than a scintilla, and could not prevail against the admitted facts showing a contrary purpose.".

A, ATTORNEY FOR B.

Pennsylvania Title & Trust Company v. Meyer, (1902), 201 Pa. 299, 50 Atl. Rep. 998.

Where a person opens an account as attorney for another, the bank is protected in paying the attorney's checks.

Frank J. Fertig opened an account in a trust company in his name as "attorney for Anna Baumann." Fertig checked the money out and used it. After the death of Mrs. Baumann, her administrator brought suit against the bank. It was held that, Fertig being the depositor, the bank was bound to honor his checks and was not liable in the absence of notice of the intended misappropriation.

RHODE ISLAND.

A, TRUSTEE FOR B.

Ray v. Simmons, Admr. (1875), 11 R. I., 266. A deposited money in the name of "A, trustee for B." B was A's stepdaughter. A handed B the book, who thanked him for the present. A regained possession of the book and made subsequent deposits: he made one withdrawal of interest but afterwards deposited more than he withdrew. Upon A's death, B sued A's administrator for the deposit.

Held: A trust was completely constituted in B's favor entitling her to the money.

On April 6, 1868, Levi Bosworth deposited $484 in the Fall River Savings Bank in an account:

"Levi Bosworth, trustee for Marianna Ray, Prov." The account was credited with subsequent deposits and with divers dividends and there was only one withdrawal of a dividend of $25.66 which was paid to Bosworth, October 12, 1870. Marianna Ray was a daughter of Mrs. Bosworth, wife of Levi Bosworth, by a former husband. Levi Bosworth had no children and treated Marianna as his daughter. When Levi Bosworth made the deposit he brought the book home and threw it in Marianna's lap. She opened and read it, and said she was much obliged for the present. Bosworth said nothing in reply. Mrs. Bosworth then put the book in a box

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