chambers, though the general opinion of the profession is that the want of a receipt clause is amply supplied by the Acts referred to (ante, p. 172). As to No. XV. (p. 172), relating to the enrolment of decrees, we may mention that the case of Hill v. South Staffordshire Railway Co., referred to at p. 173, is noticed ante, p. 204, to which notice a reference should be made at p. 172.

Bankruptcy.-The questions and answers in this division will be found ante, pp. 172-177. As to No. I. (pp. 172, 173), the mention of a rateable division of the bankrupt's assets among his creditors must not be taken too strictly, for in some instances the statutes give express priority to certain creditors (see 3 Exam. Chron. 157, No. XIV.), and mortgagees, and others having securities are not obliged to give them up (see 2 Exam. Chron. 38, No. IX.). In reference to that part of No. II. (p. 173) which mentions the abolition of the distinction between traders and non-traders, it is not to be inferred that there are no distinctions, but only that the same tribunal must be had recourse to ; and that, in general, the same proceedings are to be taken, but there are some minor distinctions still existing between the proceedings against a non-trader and those against a trader; in particular there are certain specified acts which are acts of bankruptcy in cases of traders, and others which are so in the cases of non-traders (see 1 Exam. Chron. 212; 2id. 36, 60), and certain penal provisions of the Bankruptcy Acts are applicable to traders, but not to non-traders (see 3 Exam. Chron. 79, 154, 236). With respect to No. III. (p. 173), it may be remarked that the Examiners are in the habit of putting questions as to acts of bankruptcy being compulsory and voluntary, though no such distinction is made by the text writers. By compulsory acts they refer to those which are consequent upon some act of a creditor, such as non-compliance with a debtor summons, &c. By voluntary the examiners mean the old acts of bankruptcy, such as a fraudulent assignment by a debtor of his estate and effects, &c. It will be observed that the examiners now speak of an adjudication being obtained "adversely" against a debtor, which is by means of a compulsory act of bankruptcy. As to No. VIII. (p. 175), it must be borne in mind that a mortgagee, or other person holding any security, petitioning for adjudication against his debtor, must state what his security is when he proves his debt at the opening, and it must be sold before proof (Mont. & Ayrt. Pract. 29). This does not, however, apply where the creditor has a joint security from the bankrupt and another person (Ibid. 133; 2 Atk. 528). From No. IX. (p. 175) the reader will infer that the goods of third persons may be divested out of them, and pass to the bankruptcy assignees of the person in whose possession they may happen to be--a very harsh and unjust doctrine of the law, but owing its effect to statute law, and not being, as in the case of landlord and tenant,

chargeable upon the Common Law (see further 3 Exam. Chron. 68, 187). It will be noticed by No. X. (p. 175) that the only settlements made by a person, being insolvent at the time, which are valid, are settlements upon the marriage of any of the debtor's children, or for some valuable consideration. The marriage of the debtor himself is not a valuable consideration. It must not, however, be inferred that every settlement of that kind is invalid, but only such as purports to transfer some property of the trader. Thus in one case it appeared that a trader, being in insolvent circumstances, covenanted, by an ante-nuptial settlement, to pay £500 to trustees, to be held by them upon trust for such persons as the intended wife should appoint, and subject thereto upon trust for the intended wife for life, for her separate use; then for the husband for life, and then, as to the capital in trust, for the survivor. The settlement also extended to certain property belonging to the intended wife, who was wholly unaware of the intended husband's insolvency, and it was held, on the husband's bankruptcy, that the settlement was valid against the assignees, and entitled the trustees to prove for the £500. (Exparte Mac Burnie, 1 De Gex, Macnaght, & Gord. 441; 21 Law Journ., Bank., 15.)

SUMMARY OF DECISIONS.

AGENT.-Representations by.-An agent of an insurance company, having authority to solicit insurance and receive proposals, held to be a general agent, whose representations would bind the company. Letters written by such an agent to the company, and from the company to him, held inadmissible against the representative of a party who had effected an insurance with the company. (Splents v. Lefevre and others, 11 Law Tim. Rep. 114.)

BAILMENT.-Gratuitous permission to use a shed-Liability of licensee of real property for negligent user—. -Master and servantNegligent act by servant not within the scope of his employment.-The gratuitously permitting a person to use a shed, by himself or his servant, for a particular purpose, is a mere revocable license, and has no analogy to a bailment of personal property; and the only duty imposed upon such person is, that there should not be negligence in the use of the shed. Therefore, where plaintiff gratuitously permitted the use of his shed to defendant, for the purpose of the latter having a job of carpentering work done therein by a workman employed by defendant, and the workman, while so employed, accidentally dropped a match with which he had lighted his pipe, and thereby set fire to his shed. It was held (by Martin, Bramwell, and Pigott, BB.) that defendant was not responsible for such damage, although the jury found that the fire was caused by the

negligent act of defendant's workman: but, semble, that if the workman, in the course of his employment, had been guilty of any negligence which at all could be applicable to the employment, defendant would have been responsible. (Williams v. Jones, 11 Law Tim. Rep. 108.)

The

CREDITORS' DEED.-Inspectors-Duties and liabilities ofIndependently of any question of fraud, the liability of inspectors is confined to the accounting for moneys received by them, or by their order, or for their use; but the extent of that liability will vary in different cases. Where all the clerks and other persons employed in the business are under the control of the inspectors, they will be liable to account for all the moneys received in the course of the business; but if the original debtor is himself managing the business, and cannot be removed except under a new arrangement between him and his creditors, that may alter the case. extent of the liability of the directors depends, in each case, upon the contract between the parties. If a mortgagee enters into possession, he places himself in the same position as the mortgagor, and therefore has to account for all that he ought to have received, whether he has, in fact, received it or not. So, if inspectors undertake to carry on a business, they will be liable to account as if they had carried it on; but if they undertake to see to the manner in which the business is carried on, then, in the absence of culpable negligence, they will be considered only liable to account for what they have actually done. Where a creditors' deed provided that, after the payment out of the debtor's assets of certain mortgages, he should carry on the business under the control of inspectors, one of the mortgagees was to have the option of either continuing in the possession of the business until the mortgagees were satisfied, or "of allowing the inspectors to manage the business on behalf of him and them," and the inspectors were allowed by the mortgagee to manage the business: it was held, that they were only liable to the same extent as they would have been after the payment of the mortgages. (Chaplin v. Young, 11 Law Tim. Rep. 10.)

EXECUTORS.-Gift of residuary estate to executors.-Upon the question whether executors, by virtue of their appointment as executors, and not under a specific gift, were before the statute 11 Geo. 4, & 1 Will. 4, c. 40 (Testator's Effects' Act), entitled to their testators' residuary personal estate, not otherwise specifically given, the rule was clear that an executor, by his mere appointment, took the legal interest in the whole personalty not specifically given, or as to that part of it not so given, there being no one who, under the will, could contend that he was not SO entitled. No doubt a testator might intend that, although executors were to take the legal estate, they were not to take it

beneficially. Where there was one executor to whom a legacy was given, the Courts considered that he could not take the residue, because it was inconsistent that he should have a portion only given if the testator intended him to take the whole. But with this rule eminent judges had been dissatisfied-Lord Hardwick, Sir Wm. Grant, and Lord Eldon among the rest. The latter considered it a stretch of the law, which produced in the decisions of subsequent judges a stretch in a contrary direction. It had also been decided that where equal legacies were given to two or more executors for their trouble they could not take a benefit in the residuary estate. In the following case, in which the will was prior to the 11 Geo. 4, & 1 Will. 4. c. 40, a testator, after giving various legacies to his children and grandchildren, and £10 each to F. and O., provided they accepted the executorship of his will, gave the residue of his real and personal estate, subject to the payment of his debts and legacies, to F. and O., and appointed them executors of his will. By a codicil the testator, after charging his estate with certain specific bequests, devised a particular messuage to F. and O., and sell and divide the proceeds equally between his children :-Held, that F. and O. took the residuary estate, not qua executors, but beneficially. (Re Henshaw, 11 Law Tim. Rep. 17.)

FACTOR.-Principal and agent-Undisclosed principal-Set-off. -The plaintiff, having timber for sale, placed it in the hands of a factor, to sell on a del credere commission. The factor sold in his own name to the broker of the defendant. The broker knew that the timber was the property of the plaintiff, but did not disclose that fact to his principal:-Held, in an action for the price of the timber (reversing the decision of the Court below), that the defendant was not entitled to set off a debt due to him from the factor, inasmuch as he must have been presumed to have known that the goods were the property of the plaintiff, his broker having acquired such knowlege prior to the purchase. (Dresser v. Norwood, 11 Law Tim. Rep. 111.)

FRAUD-Definition of in equity.-Fraud in equity is an act by which a man does an illegal thing to gain a personal advantage to himself, and to obtain an unlawful gain. It is fraud if he so act as, by the suppression of the truth, or the suggestion of what is false, to gain a personal advantage to himself; and the word "fraud" in equity cannot be too strictly confined to cases of the above description. (Re Spackman's case, 11 Law Tim. Rep. 13.)

FRAUDS, STATUTE OF.-Acceptance and receipt of goodsWhat sufficient evidence of, under sect. 17.-In the following case Mr. Baron Bramwell said: "It is not necessary in order to satisfy the Statute of Frauds that there should be such an acceptance as would preclude a purchaser from making a subsequent complaint; but there must be such an acceptance as to show his recognition of a

compulsion to take the articles delivered to him under a contract for the sale of them. It appeared that the defendant, a builder, being employed by K., for whom he had built a house, to fit it up and furnish it, verbally ordered some settees to be made for one of the rooms by plaintiff, at a price agreed on at the time of the order. Upon their being brought home, defendant, before they were taken from the cart, remarked that the legs were not so stout as he had ordered, and said, 'I wish they had been stouter legs.' Plaintiff, however, said they were according to order. Nothing further then passed on the subject, and defendant assisted plaintiff in taking them from the cart, and placing them in the room. After they were placed K. came in, and objected that they were not wide enough in the seat, and thereupon defendant asked plaintiff if they could be altered to meet K.'s wishes, to which plaintiff replied he would consider, and let defendant know to-morrow what could be done. A day or two afterwards he told defendant they could not be altered, on account of the expense, whereupon defendant refused to pay for them :-Held, that there was no evidence for the jury in an action by the plaintiff for goods sold and delivered, of an acceptance by receipt of goods by defendant, to satisfy the Statute of Frauds, and that a nonsuit was rightly directed. (Barnet v. Farley, 11 Law Tim. Rep. 107.)

HEIR LOOMS.-Money and perishable articies not.-An heirloom is a limb or member of the inheritance, and in very old times there were customs in some parts of the country by which, irrespective of a devise, certain chattels were heir-looms, and passed from ancestor to heir in a perpetual course of succession, and were always annexed to the mansion, such as state beds, &c. An heir-loom must have a certain degree of durability, and therefore an article which can only be enjoyed by its consumption is not an heir-loom. In the following case it appeared that a testatrix, by her will, directed that all the plate, plated articles, furniture, implements of household, linen, china, goods, chattels and effects, except books, which should be in and about a certain house in her occupation and possession, should be annexed to the same house as heir-looms:-Held, that plate, jewellery, and a pianoforte passed under this gift, but that money found in the house, and articles perishable in a short time, such as live stock, carriages, wines, or wearing apparel, did not pass. (Hare v. Pryce, 11 Law Tim. Rep, 101.)

INJUNCTION.-Change of residence of trader - Post-officeOpening letters.-The plaintiff had been the manager of a company, but had quitted their service, and opened a place of business in a similar trade to the company. Advertisements had been published calling public attention to the fact of the plaintiff being no longer manager of defendants' company. Letters, some of which were admitted to have been intended for the company, were addressed to