Where the application is on behalf of a junior mortgagee and it appears that the senior mortgagee is satisfied with the management and it further appears that the rents are being applied in payment of the mortgage indebtedness, taxes, etc., a receiver will be refused even if the mortgagor is insolvent and the security inadequate.'

§ 180. Application of parties other than mortgagees.

(a) IN BEHALF OF WIFE.

In foreclosure proceedings where the mortgagor's wife has joined her husband in the execution of a mortgage on his real estate to secure a debt due from him, and her inchoate interest in the mortgaged lands has for some cause become absolute, she is, upon a foreclosure of the mortgage entitled to an order that two thirds of the lands to which she has no claim shall be first exhausted before a resort shall be had to her interest in the mortgaged property upon the theory that she occupies the relation to the mortgage somewhat analogous to that of a surety for her husband, and in such case the wife may procure the appointment of a receiver of the rents and profits in order to protect her interest in the premises."

(b) IN BEHALF OF ANNUITANTS.

Where annuities are charged upon real estate which has been mortgaged to different mortgagees, the annuitant is entitled to a

waste or an abuse of his right of possession. Cummings v. Cummings, 75 Cal. 434.

'Myton v. Davenport, 51 Iowa, 583. A receiver, in general, is only entitled to the rents uncollected at the time of his appointment, and he is not entitled to the rents collected by an assignee in bankruptcy of mortgagor prior to his appointment. Rider v. Vrooman, 12 Hun, 299. Nor is the mortgagor accountable for rents collected prior to the appointment. Rider v. Bagley, 84 N. Y. 461.

Main v. Ginthart, 92 Ind. 180. The court say: "The right to have a re

ceiver appointed in aid of proceedings
to foreclose a mortgage does not rest
exclusively with the mortgagee, or his
assigns, but may be exercised by any
other party to the proceeding when
necessary to protect his interests in
the subject-matter of the litigation."
Cf. Medeker v. Parker, 70 Ind. 509;
Haggerty v. Byrne, 75 Ind. 499; Leary
v. Shaffer, 79 Ind. 567; Grave v. Bunch,
83 Ind. 4; Trentman v. Eldridge, 98
Ind. 525; Pouder v. Ritzinger, 102 Ind.
572; Cupp v. Campbell, 103 Ind. 213;
Hoppes v. Hoppes, 123 Ind. 397; Pur-
viance v.
Emley, 126 Ind. 419.

receiver of the rents and profits where the prior mortgagees are not in possession.'

(c) IN BEHALF OF BONDHOLDERS.

Where bonds of a corporation are issued and the property of the company real, and personal, is pledged to secure the same, a receiver may be appointed in behalf of the bondholders, the bonds being in the nature of a mortgage.

(d) IN BEHALF OF VENDORS.

Where a vendor sells land and gives a title bond and there is a default, tender of a deed and bill filed for a specific performance and it appears that the vendee is insolvent a receiver of the rents and profits pendente lite will be appointed.*

CHAPTER XI.

RECEIVERSHIP IN PARTNERSHIP MATTERS.

The power of a court of equity, or of a court exercising equity powers, to appoint a receiver in matters of partnership is of long standing and unquestioned, and usually is incidental to the main proceeding. The inability of partners to sue each other at law has always rendered an equity court the proper and, as a rule, the only forum for the adjustment of partnership difficulties, and the winding-up of such concerns in a proper case, and distribution of the partnership assets. Hence the receivership in all such cases is only incidental, and usually the question of jurisdiction and the inadequacy of relief in common law courts is not involved. The question of the necessity of a receiver is, however, involved in every case, for, in this class of actions, as in others, the appointment is not to be made merely because no one will be injured thereby, and, in fact, the necessity has been termed imperative.' But this probably is stating the doctrine too strongly, at any rate, the appointment rests in the sound judicial discretion of the court or chancellor, to be exercised or not as the circumstances of each case seem to demand, taking into consideration the preservation of the property, or its proceeds, and the protection of the rights of all parties, as their interests may appear in the final adjudication.'

'Morey v. Grant, 48 Mich. 326.

In Slemmer's Appeal, 58 Pa. 168, it is said: "A partnership will not be dissolved on slight grounds." "In making such a decree the court will consider not merely the terms of the express contract between the partners but also the duties and obligations implied in every partnership contract. Smith v. Jeyes, 4 Beav. 503. Where a valuable business has grown up, by the joint labors and contributions of all, the court should be careful to pre

serve it, if possible, and put all parties upon a fair and equal footing in competing for it. To appoint a receiver, to direct a sale of the whole and a winding up of the business would destroy its value without benefiting either party." The Master of Rolls in Madgwick v. Wimble, 6 Beav. 495, says: "It must be admitted that when an application is made for a receiver in partnership cases the court is always placed in a position of very great difficulty. On the one hand, if it

Stated in general terms a receiver will be appointed in partnership matters:

(a) Where there has been a violation of the partnership agree ment, or a breach of partnership duty.'

(b) Where one of the partners is guilty of fraudulent acts towards his copartner."

(c) Serious disagreement between partners as to the management or disposition of the firm property.'

(d) Mismanagement on the part of one partner in charge of business.