(b) As to the possession, however, if the appointing court has jurisdiction, and the receiver has qualified by giving the requisite bond, his possession will be protected as against all persons whomsoever, the property being regarded as in custodia legis. (c) Nor can another court of co-ordinate jurisdiction interfere with the possession of the receiver, regulate his action, or remove him from his position." In Kneeland v. American Loan & T. Co. supra, the court say: "The appointment of a receiver vests in the court no absolute control over the property and no general authority to displace vested contract liens." See also St. Louis, A. & T. H. R. Co. v. Cleveland, C. C. & I. R. Co. 125 U. S. 658, 673, 31 L. ed. 832, 837. Goods lawfully seized by attachment from a court of law will not be ordered by a court of chancery having no supervisory power to be delivered to the receiver in the absence of statutory powers. Ford v. Judsonia Mercantile Co. 52 Ark. 426, 6 L. R. A. 714. 'See Chap. IV; also, § 230; also Hagedon v. Bank of Wisconsin, 1 Pinney, 61. As a general rule a receiver appointed in a prior suit should not be displaced by the appointment of a receiver of the same subject-matter by the same court in a subsequent suit. The receivership in the first 3uit should be extended to the second, subject to the legal and equitable claims of all parties, and the rights of the parties in each suit are substantially the same as if different persons had been appointed at the several times when such receiverships were granted. If, however, a different receiver is appointed, then, if the court has jurisdiction of the subject-matter and parties, and is the same court which made the first appointment, the receiver in the first suit must deliver to the receiver appointed in the second. State v. Jacksonville, P. & M. R. Co. 15 Fla. 201. Cf. Skinner v. Maxwell, 68 N. C. 400; Walling v. Müller, 108 N. Y. 173; Maynard v. Bond, 67 Mo. 315; Atty. Gen. v. Guardian Mut. L. Ins. Co. 77 N. Y. 272; Blake Crusher Co. v. New Haven, 46 Conn. 473; Van Alstyne v. Cook, 25 N. Y. 489; Morrill v. Noyes, 56 Me. 458; Rutter v. Tallis, 5 Sandf. 610; Columbian Book Co. v. De Golyer, 115 Mass. 67; Sercomb v. Catlin, 128 Ill. 556; Texas Trunk R. Co. v. Lewis, 81 Tex. 1; Richards v. People, 81 Ill. 551; Peck v. Crane, 25 Vt. 146. The court has power to compel the delivery of property to the receiver. American Const. Co. v. Jacksonville, T. & K. W. R. Co. 52 Fed. Rep. 937; Keokuk N. L. Packet Co. v. Davidson, 13 Mo. App. 561; Vermont & C. R. Co. v. Vermont C. R. Co. 46 Vt. 792. See Jacobson v. Landolt, 73 Wis. 142. Young v. Montgomery & E. R. Co. 2 Woods, 606; O'Mahoney v. Belmont, 62 N. Y. 133; Gest v. New Orleans, St. L. & C. R. Co. 30 La. Ann. 28; Coe v. (d) Nor will the court permit its receiver, without its leave, to be harrassed and interfered with by litigation.' (e) Nor is the receiver bound to carry out the unexpired leases of the person or corporation over whose property he is appointed.* (f) Nor is he bound by the contracts of his predecessor, unless he adopts them as his own." Columbus, P. & I. R. Co. 10 Ohio St. 372; Albany City Bank v. Schermerhorn, 9 Paige, 372; Texas Trunk R. Co. v. Lewis, 81 Tex. 1; Wiswall v. Sampson, 55 U. S. 14 How. 52, 14 L. ed. 323; Storm v. Waddell, 2 Sandf. Ch. 494; Columbian Book Co. v. De Golyer, 115 Mass. 67; Van Alstyne v. Cook, 25 N. Y. 489; Skinner v. Maxwell, 68 N. C. 400; Yuba County v. Adams, 7 Cal. 35; Maynard v. Bond, 67 Mo. 315; Robinson v. Atlantic & G. W. R. Co. 66 Pa. 160; Stevenson v. Palmer, 14 Colo. 565; Hardy v. Tilton, 68 Me. 195. 1 Ellicott v. United States Ins. Co. 7 Gill, 307, unless the purpose of the bill is merely to preserve the property and not make a distribution. Leathers v. Shipbuilders' Bank, 40 Me. 386 (See statute). When the action is to dissolve the corporation the appointment suspends the right of action of creditors against the corporation and stockholders. Minnesota Thresher Mfg. Co. v. Langdon, 44 Minn. 37; Merchants' Nat. Bank v. Northwestern Mfg. & Car Co. 48 Minn. 361; Atty. Gen. v. North American L. Ins. Co. 6 Abb. N. C. 293. See City Water Co. v. State, 88 Tex. 600; Farmers' Loan & T. Co. v. Toledo & 8. H. R. Co. 43 Fed. Rep. 223. But see Allen v. Central R. Co. 42 Iowa, 683; Green v. Walkill Nat. Bank, 7 Hun, 63. An attachment of the property of an insurance company after the filing of a bill in equity against it under Mass. Stat. 1894, chap. 522, § 7, with a prayer for an injunction against its proceeding with business and for the appointment of a receiver of its property, is not valid, although made before any receiver is actually appointed; but on a subsequent appoint. ment the receiver's rights relate back to the commencement of the proceedings. Merrill v. Commonwealth Mut. F. Co. (Mass.) 44 N. E. 144. The court appointing a receiver of a corporation may order a creditor living within the jurisdiction to dismiss garnishment proceedings instituted by him against debtors of the corporation in other states, and upon his failure to comply therewith punish him for contempt. Besuden v. E. Besuden Co. 3 Ohio N. P. 165. 2 Ante, 36; § 230, Te; also, Re New Jersey & N. Y. R. Co. 29 N. J. Eq. 67. 3 Lehigh Coal & Nav. Co. v. Central R. Co. 38 N. J. Eq. 175, 41 N. J. Eq. 167; Kansas P. R. Co. v. Bayles, 19 Colo. 348; Cf. Com. v. Franklin Ins. Co. 115 Mass. 278; Ellis v. Boston, H. & E. R. Co. 107 Mass. 1; Southern Exp. Co. v. Western N. C. R. Co. 99 U. S. 191, 25 L. ed. 319; Dow v. Memphis & L. R. R. Co. 20 Fed. Rep 260. The New Jersey cases fully sustain the proposition announced in the text, but if the receiver is the arm of the court and, in good faith, makes a contract, the doctrine that such contract is not binding on his successor seems to be inequitable and un just. (g) Nor does the appointment of a receiver of a defunct corporation revive its corporate powers.' (h) The debtor's dominion or control over the property which forms the subject-matter of litigation and which is specified in the order at once ceases and becomes vested in the receiver.' (i). Where the proceeding is a statutory one instituted to dissolve the corporation, and to wind up its business, and a judgment of dissolution is pronounced, and a receiver appointed to collect and distribute the assets it will be an abatement of all pending actions against the corporation." 1 Stark v. Burke, 5 La. Ann. 740. And in many of the states having statutes authorizing the winding up of corporations by reason of insolvency, the appointment of a receiver operates as an assignment or transfer ipso facto of all the property of the corporation to such receiver, for the purpose of distribution. It displaces the officers and directors from the possession and control. Rochester v. Bronson, 41 How. Pr. 78. Where a receiver is appointed by a Federal court, and afterward a suit is brought in the state court and the charter forfeited, it was held that the appointment did not dissolve the corporation; nor was its existence in any way affected thereby; and suit against the corporation might be prosecuted for an indebtedness accruing before the appointment, and judgment may be rendered against it and enforced against any property not embraced in the receivership or that it might thereafter acquire. City Water Co. v. State, 88 Tex. 600; Heath v. Missouri, K. C. & T. R. Co. 83 Mo. 621; St. Louis, A. & T. R. Co. v. Whitaker, 68 Tex. 636. The appointment of a receiver does not dissolve the corporation. Bank Comrs. v. Bank of Buffalo, 6 Paige, 497; Kincaid v. Dwinelle, 59 N. Y. 553; Pringle v. Woolworth, 90 N. Y. 510; Ohio & M. R. Co. v. Russell, 115 Ill. 52; Slee v. Bloom, 19 Johns. 456. After the appointment of a receiver a creditor cannot sue to enforce unpaid subscriptions to the capital stock of an insolvent corporation. Big Creek Stone Co. v. Seward (Ind.) 42 N. E. 464; Minnesota Thresher Mfg. Co. v. Langdon, 44 Minn. 37; Merchants' Nat. Bank v. Northwestern Mfg. & Car Co. 48 Minn. 361. So also the appointment suspends all right of action by the corporation, unless the statute or order appointing otherwise provides. Milwaukee Mut. F. Ins. Co. v. Sentinel Co. 81 Wis. 207, 15 L. R. A. 627; San Antonio & G. S. R. Co. v. Davis (Tex.) 2 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. N. S. 374. 3 McCulloch v. Norwood, 58 N. Y. 562; Colorado Nat. Bank v. Scott, 19 Abb. N. C. 348; Davenport v. City Bank of Buffalo, 9 Paige, 12; Leathers v. Shipbuilders' Bank, 40 Me. 386 (see Stat.); Pendleton v. Russell, 144 U. S. 640, 36 L. ed. 574. But the fact of the appointment of a receiver alone does not effect an abatement (Heath v. Missouri, K. C. & T. R. Co. 83 Mo. 617; Toledo, W. & W. R. Co. v. Beggs, 85 Ill. 80; Mercantile Ins. Co. v. Jaynes, 87 Ill. 199), though the means of enforcing the claims after judgment may be taken away (Ibid; Texas Trunk R. Co. v. Lewis, 81 Tex. 1; Skinner v. $231. The receiver's relationship. The receiver of a corporation occupies a three-fold relationship. (a) He is the agent of the court from which he receives his appointment, and his powers and duties are measured by the order of his appointment and the rules and practice of the court making such order. (b) He is also the trustee of the corporation creditors and shareholders in respect to their interests in the property and assets of the corporation and their respective rights to participate in the distribution thereof.' (c) He is likewise the representative of the corporation in respect to the title to the corporate property and the right to sue and defend in regard thereto. In general he takes the rights of the corporation such as could be asserted in its own name and on that basis only can he litigate for the benefit of creditors and stockholders, except where acts have been committed in fraud of the rights of creditors, such acts being valid as to the corporation, but invalid as to the receiver in his representative character. It Maxwell, 68 N. C. 400; Rutter v. Tallis, 5 Sandf. 610; Maynard v. Bond, 67 Mo. 315; Gest v. New Orleans, St. L. & C. R. Co. 30 La. Ann. 28), until the property of the corporation is returned to it. Heath v. Missouri, K. C. &T. R. Co. supra. No doubt the court may in a proper case enjoin the prosecution of suits against the corporation. Atty. Gen. v. Guardian Mut. L. Ins. Co. 77 N. Y. 272. 'Mr. Justice Andrews, in Pittsburg Carbon Co. v. McMillin, 119 N. Y. 46, 7 L. R. A. 46, says: "The general rule is well established that a receiver takes the title of the corporation or individual whose receiver he is, and that any defense which would have been good against the former may be asserted against the latter. But there is a recognized exception which permits a receiver of an insolvent individual or corporation in the interest of creditors to disaffirm dealings of the debtor in fraud of their rights." Gillet v. Moody, 3 N. Y. 479; Porter v. Williams, 9 N. Y. 142; Curtis v. Leavitt, 15 N. Y. 9, 108; Libby v. Rosekrans, 55 Barb. 202; Alexander v. Relfe, 74 Mo. 495; Atchison v. Davidson, 2 Pinney, 48; Morrill v. Noyes, 56 Me. 458; Brown v. Warner, 78 Tex. 543, 11 L. R. A. 394; Com. v. Franklin Ins. Co. 115 Mass. 278; Herrick v. Miller, 123 Ind. 304. See last note above, also, Mande. ville v. Avery, 124 N. Y. 376; Pittsburg Carbon Co. v. McMillin, 119 N. Y. 46, 7 L. R. A. 46; Wright v. Nostrand, 94 N. Y. 31; Atty. Gen. v. Guardian Mut. L. Ins. Co. 77 N. Y. 272; Whittlesey v. Delaney, 73 N. Y. 571; Bostwick v. Menck, 40 N. Y. 383; Zuckerman v. Brown, 33 N. Y. 297; Bate v. Graham, 11 N. Y. 237; Manley v. Rassiga, 13 Hun, 288; Leavitt v. Yates, 4 Edw. Ch. 134; Chamberlain v. O'Brien, 46 Minn. 80; Farmers' Loan & T. Co. v. Minneapolis Engine & Mach. Works, 35 Minn. 543; Walsh v. Byrnes, 39 should be observed in this connection that where the receiver is the trustee or representative of the creditors his rights are coextensive only with the rights of such creditors, and he can maintain a suit in their behalf to the extent only to which, but for the receivership, they might maintain such action.' This principle Minn. 527; Bliss v. Doty, 36 Minn. 168; Weston v. Loyhed, 30 Minn. 221; Alexander v. Relfe, 74 Mo. 495; Hamlin v. Wright, 23 Wis. 491; Hill v. Western & A. R. Co. 86 Ga. 284; Prescott v. Pfeiffer, 57 Mich. 21. In many of the states the power of the receiver to institute and carry on actions to set aside fraudulent conveyances is given by statute. The doctrine of the text, so far as it relates to the receiver's right to avoid the fraudulent acts of the debtor, is probably supported by the weight of authority, but is strenuously opposed by the supreme court of Illinois in Republic L. Ins. Co. v. Swigert, 135 Ill. 150, 167, 12 L. R. A. 328. In that case Mr. Justice Baker, after an exhaustive review of the authorities in this country and in England, holds that a receiver can maintain an action to set aside a transaction binding on the person or corporation for whom he is receiver, only: (1) Where the receiver by force of some statute can act for the creditors; (2) where the act complained of was ultra vires and not binding on the corporation; (3) where the receiver was appointed in a proceeding prosecuted by creditors at whose instance and to secure whose claims he was appointed in actions supplemental to execution; (4) where the receiver was suing for property or assets that belonged to the debtor, and concludes in the following language: "We think the decided weight of authority sustains the rule in respect to the powers of receivers, where there has been no enlargement of their powers by legis lative enactment, that they have such rights of action only as were possessed by the persons or corporationsupon whose estates they administer. But see Haxtun v. Bishop, 3 Wend. 13; Eastern Bank v. Capron, 22 Conn. 639. 1 Young v. Clapp, 147 Ill. 176; Russell v. Chicago Trust & Sav. Bank, 139 Ill. 538, 17 L. R. A. 345; Goddard v. Stiles, 90 N. Y. 199; Bostwick v. Menck, 40 N. Y. 383; Storm v. Waddell, 2 Sandf. Ch. 494; Corning v. White, 2: Paige, 567; Burrall v. Leslie, 6 Paige, 567; Safford v. Douglas, 4 Edw. Ch. 538; Porter v. Williams, 9 N. Y. 150; Banks v. Potter, 21 How. Pr. 473; Howell v. Ripley, 10 Paige, 43; Cumming v. Edgerton, 9 Bosw. 684; Detroit First Nat. Bank v. Barnum Wire & I. Works, 60 Mich. 487; King v. Goodwin, 130 Ill. 102; Osgood v. Ogden, 3 Abb. App. Dec. 425; Zuckerman v. Brown, 33 N. Y. 297. A receiver of a corporation stands in the places of the corporation itself, and is estopped from maintaining any action or setting up any defense where the corporation would have been estopped. McLaren v. Milwaukee First Nat. Bank, 76 Wis. 259; Lincoln v. Fitch, 42 Me. 456; Curtis v. Leavitt, 15 N. Y. 9, 296; Cutting v. Damerel, 88. N. Y. 410; Farwell v. Metcalf, 63 N. H. 276; Hoar v. Harshow, 49 Wis. 379. If, however, he represents the creditors, it is otherwise, Huiskamp v. Moline Wagon Co. 121 U. S. 310, 30 L. ed. 971. Where a corporation is being wound' up the receiver is a statutory trustee |