fixed salary, he is entitled to a preference as an employee, but not if the services were before the construction of the road.' Funds wrongfully paid to receiver's attorneys will be required to be paid back by the latter." (b) NOTES SECURED BY INVALID MORTGAGE. Notes secured by a mortgage, where the mortgage is subsequently declared invalid, will not be ordered to be given up and sold by the receiver where the purpose is to place them, subject to process of a state court, in favor of certain creditors." vania Finance Co. v. Charleston, C. & C. R. Co. 52 Fed. Rep. 678. 'An attorney employed by a railroad company at a fixed salary is an employee entitled to share in the income realized by a receiver appointed in a mortgage foreclosure under an order providing for the payment of all employees; but where the services rendered by him were before the construction of the road he is not entitled to share in the proceeds of sale although the income fails. Pennsylvania Finance Co. v. Charleston, C. & C. R. Co. 52 Fed. Rep. 526. A receiver will not be compelled to pay counsel of a creditor of the corporation whose property is in his hands, for services in procuring an order for payment by the receiver of the sum due under a contract with the corporation, although such creditor is preferred in having a right to possession of property in the hands of the receiver unless such sum is paid, and the claim of such creditor is undisputed, since there is no duty on the part of the receivers to proceed affirmatively and procure the allowance of claims against them. Central Trust Co. v. Valley R. Co. 55 Fed. Rep. 903. The cases of Philadelphia Invest. Co. v. Ohio & N. W. R. Co. 46 Fed. Rep. 696, and Easton v. Houston & T. C. R. Co. 40 Fed. Rep. 189, distinguished. 'A court receiver who, while a fund erroneously ordered to be paid over to him for distribution is in his possession, pays out a portion of it in good faith under the court's direction, will be protected to that extent; but attorneys to whom any portion of the money has been paid as fees will be required to pay it back to him, and upon receipt thereof he will be directed to pay it to the party entitled thereto. Re Home Provident Safety Fund Asso. 129 N. Y. 288. 3 Notes and a mortgage owned by a railroad company of which a receiver has been appointed with the consent of all parties in interest after the mortgage, is held invalid, and of whose property inventoried by the receiver, including such notes and mortgage, a sale has been decreed upon the same consent, will not, although illegally taken possession of by the receiver, be ordered to be given up and not sold by him, on the application of the creditors who joined in such consent, in order to enable the latter to subject them to process upon judgments obtained in a state court. Farmers' Loan & T. Co. v. San Diego Street Car Co. 49 Fed. Rep. 188; Gumbel v. Pitkin, 124 U. S. 131, 31 L. ed. 374. Cf. Lowe v. Stephens, 66 Ga. 607, as to effect of filing a general creditor's bill upon a pending attachment. (c) DEBTS DUE CONTRACTORS. Contractors upon a contract partially completed at the time of granting a receivership are entitled to be paid the contract price up to the time they are directed by the receiver to cease working.' (d) RENTS AND profits. Rents collected by a receiver upon mortgaged property pending a suit in which the first mortgagee is a party and who subsequently brings a suit to foreclose, are properly payable to the first mortgagee if there is a deficiency as to the first mortgage.' Where rent notes are given to a receiver for premises, pending an action in relation to the title, and the maker is subsequently decreed to be the owner, they should be canceled.' (e) EXPENSES AND ADVANCEMENTS. Where plaintiff pending suit advances money to pay taxes in an action to remove a cloud from the title, he is entitled to be 1 Contractors to erect a building for a railroad company which goes into the hands of receivers are entitled to the contract price up to the time they are directed by the receivers to cease work. Girard L. Ins. A. & T. Co. v. Cooper, 51 Fed. Rep. 332, 4 U. S. App. 631. 2 Cincinnati Nat. Bank v. Tilden, 50 N. Y. S. R. 366. A receiver was in possession of a wharf and of the adjacent land, having taken possession thereof from the defendant, and received money from the use of the entire premises, the adjacent land only was adjudged to belong to plaintiff,-Held that, upon discharge of the receiver, it was error to direct that the whole of the money be paid to plaintiff. Coburn v. Ames, 57 Cal. 201. Where a receiver was appointed in an action to determine rights to land, on the ground that the contract therefor had been rescinded, rent notes given by the plaintiff to the receiver for rents pending the action should be canceled and possession restored to him if he is adjudged to be the owner. The defendant can have no claim to the rents in such a case. Morgan v. Oliver, 11 Ky. L. Rep. 513. A court of chancery will not order a receiver of the rents and profits of real estate to pay over or account for them to a party whose charge upon the land. Chase, 2 Gill & J. 376. claim is not a Baltimore v. In Pacific R. Co. v. Wade, 91 Cal. 449, 13 L. R. A. 754, it was held that the amount to be paid for the joint use of a street railway track in the hands of a receiver may be determined by the court on a petition, where the statutes give the right to such use on payment of one half the cost of construction; and there is no right to a jury on the ground that it involves the exercise of the right of eminent domain. reimbursed upon a dismissal of his bill.' As elsewhere seen a receiver by direction of the court may incur such expenses as are required for the preservation of the receivership property." (f) MONEY PAID BY SURETIES. Sureties having paid money for the use of a corporation, growing out of appeal bonds given in condemnation proceedings are entitled to be paid from the proceeds of sale in a foreclosure proceeding.' 'Where plaintiff, on a bill to remove a cloud from a title, paid the taxes pending the suit, where the receiver should have paid the taxes from rents collected, upon his bill being dismissed is entitled to reimbursement from the funds in the receiver's hands. Wicks v. Sears, 4 Lea, 298. A court of chancery may incur such expenses as are necessary for the preservation of a railroad in its custody, after the company owning the road has forfeited its charter, when its income is sufficient by creating liens through the issue of receivers' certificates, which displace pre existing liens. State v. East Line & R. R. R. ·Co. (Tex.) 48 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 656; Union T. Co. v. Illinois Midland R. Co. 117 U. S. 455, 29 L. ed. 970. A receiver of a street railway company appointed in a suit to foreclose a mortgage will not be directed to pay out moneys in his hands for paving the street between and along the tracks, where no lien exists therefor, although there be a specific contract by the company to make such payment. Union Loan & T. Co. v. Southern California Motor Road Co. 49 Fed. Rep. 267. On petition that the receivers of mortgaged railroad property be ordered to pay the expense of certain negotiations for a purchase, it appearing that there was no surplus money in the receiver's hands, and that it was not absolutely certain that the negotiations would be successful,— Held that the petition should be refused. Central Trust Co. v. Wabash, St. L. & P. R. Co. 25 Fed. Rep. 69. 2 At the final settlement of the accounts of the receivers of an insolvent corporation, the court refused to inquire into and reduce the master's taxed bill of fees for services in the case, which had been paid by the receivers, and for which they had a receipt. Re Bank of Niagara, 6 Paige, 213. A receiver of a railroad company will not be authorized to pay expenses incurred by a committee appointed to reorganize a road, under an order authorizing the pledge of securities by the company for money to be borrowed to relieve it from its financial embarrassment at a time when no creditors had sought to foreclose any liens, leaving such expenses to be subsequently passed upon by the court, where, since such order, a bill to foreclose a mortgage has been filed, and the receivership extended thereto and modified so as to enable the mortgagee to reach equitable assets through the receivership, and other creditors have intervened and filed collateral proceedings upon liens, and such parties are not before the court upon the application. Clarke v. Central R. & Bkg. Co. 54 Fed. Rep. 556. Sureties on appeal bonds given on (g) WHEN ON JUDGMENTS. A receiver will not be required to pay a judgment claimed to be a prior lien until there has been a full hearing of all parties as to priority.' (h) WHERE COLLATERALS ARE held. Where collaterals are held by a national bank dividends are to be paid to the holder of such collaterals, after deducting the amounts collected on the collaterals, after the maturity of the loan and before the proof of the claim, but without deducting collections made after proof of claim.' appeal from judgments rendered in condemnation proceedings, who were forced to pay for the right of way over the appellee's lands because the railroad was in a reeeiver's hands when the bonds were enforced against them, are entitled to be repaid out of the proceeds of a mortgage foreclosure sale of the road. Rome & D. R. Co. v. Sibert, 97 Ala. 393. 1 Where funds are in the hands of a receiver, a creditor in a judgment at common law cannot obtain a rule against the receiver for the payment of the judgment in full, without a full hearing of all parties as to the priority of all claims. Lowe v. Stephens, 66 Ga. 607. A receiver will not be required to pay the full amount of the claim of an attaching creditor until the latter shows that he has by his attachment acquired a lien upon sufficient goods to pay the whole amount of his claim. Glines v. Supreme Sitting, O. of I. H. 50 N. Y. S. R. 743. A receiver of a partnership will not be directed to pay out of the assets a judgment recovered upon a partnership indebtedness after he took possession, where the estate is insolvent or there is nothing in the nature of the claim of the creditor which should entitle him to priority over other creditors. Hoerle v. McIlhargy, 29 Jones & S. 184. 2 Chemical Nat. Bank v. Armstrong, 50 Fed. Rep. 798. § 370. General. § 371. Suit pending. CHAPTER XXII. PRACTICE AND PLEADING. $372. Prayer for receiver. § 373. Necessary parties; allegations. § 374. Notice of application. § 375. At what stage of suit application made. § 376. When application granted be- § 377. Bond of receiver required. § 380. How liability enforced. § 381. The order appointing. § 382. Scope of order. §383. Findings embodied in order. § 384. Affidavits, order. when basis of § 385. Reference to master or referee. § 387. Statutory proceedings. § 391. In what name to sue. § 394. Limitations on power to sue. to sue. $370. General. § 396. Actions against receiver under void appointment. 397. Form of judgment against receiver. § 398. Proceedings in original cause when. 399. Right of set-off. $400. Petition of receiver for au- § 401. Application for directions. § 408. Power to enforce assessments. § 410. Leave to contract debts and § 411. Leave to issue certificates. ceiver. § 413. Effect of receiver's discharge pending action. 414. Order of discharge. 415. Conflicting claims; how determined. 416. Receiver's accounts. $ 417. Appeal by receiver. Owing to the dissimilar systems of practice existing under the prevailing methods of administering equity jurisprudence in the several states of the United States, the limits of this work preclude any attempt to enter into the details of such practice even as to the single subject of receiverships. The modification of the equity practice by statute in most of the states, as well as in England, has rendered much of the earlier practice in both |