not deep enough for the huge ships which Germany is building, and 10.000,000l. will be required for widening and deepening it. Germany is in the absurd position that she is building an enormous fleet without possessing adequate harbors for her ships, and she is therefore compelled by necessity either to acquire the great harbors of the Netherlands or to give up her claims to oversea expansion. Consequently it seems absolutely certain that Germany will earlier or later make a most determined attempt to make Rotterdam and Antwerp German ports, and from her point of view she is quite justified in doing

So.

The

Germany must be able industrially and politically to expand; she must become a great maritime and colonial Power or she will, for lack of space, lose her rank as a Great Power. Emperor's watchword, "Germany's future lies upon the water," has become the watchword and the rallying cry of the German nation, and as Great Britain rules the sea, and possesses practically all the most desirable colonies situated in the temperate zone, Germany must be able to overcome this country in order to carry out her aims. Therefore the preamble to the great German Navy Bill of 1900, by which about 200,000,000l. were voted for naval purposes, plainly stated "Germany must have a fleet of such strength that a war against the mightiest naval Power would involve risks threatening the supremacy of that Power." Through that document Germany proclaimed to the world her determination to challenge the naval supremacy of this country. By the supplementary Navy Bill of 1906 an additional sum of about 50,000,000l. was voted for naval purposes, and in a few years some twenty German ships of about 20,000 tons, each of which is to be larger and stronger than our own

Dreadnought, will be built, and the new Reichstag, which contains an expansionist majority, may be expected to vote further huge sums for naval purposes. Germany is challenging in earnest the naval supremacy of Great Britain.

Germany may enter upon her career of active expansion either by a naval attack upon this country, or by an attempt at securing an adequate base for her oversea operations by acquiring in some form or other the harbors of the Netherlands. Circumstances will determine whether she will follow the former or the latter course, but both eventualities should carefully be considered.

As Germany is not yet strong enough on the sea to attack this country alone, she has naturally tried to gain partners in a possible enterprise against Great Britain. France would have been a very useful ally to Germany because she has a strong fleet and because an invasion of this country could more easily be effected from the French than from the German harbors. Russia's support would have been very valuable because a joint Russo German expedition might threaten India. Through the far-seeing diplomacy of King Edward, France and Russia have abandoned their policy favoring Germany's aims, upon which they had embarked through Bismarck's skill and the clumsiness of our own amateur statesmen.

Last, but not least, America could threaten Canada and could therefore serve as a valuable counterpoise against this country. To this consideration the "traditional" friendship of Prussian statesmen for America, from Frederick the Great, who supported the revolted colonies against the Motherland, to Bismarck, was due, and the gift of a monument of Frederick the Great, which William the Second made to the United States, was full of sig

nificant meaning. So far German diplomacy has been too crude and too obvious, and has therefore failed in securing America's support in her expansionist policy. However, it seems by no means impossible that, with more skilful statesmen in Berlin and less skilful ones in Washington, German diplomacy may succeed in securing the support of the United States for her policy of expansion.

The fact that, notwithstanding the breakdown of Russia and the peaceful attitude of France, Germany is rapidly increasing and strengthening her army seems to indicate that she contemplates using her land forces for expansion in Europe, and it seems not unlikely that she will make the acquisition of the Netherlands the first step in her programme. The Netherlands would make Germany paramount on the Continent of Europe and immensely strengthen her power of aggression against Great Britain, which could comparatively easily be invaded from the numerous harbors on the mouths of the Rhine. If Germany should acquire the Netherlands, a situation would be created which would be as threatening to all European nations, and especially to this country, as was the situation created by Napoleon I.

The foregoing analysis of the politi cal situation clearly proves that Great Britain, if she wishes to preserve the Empire, is compelled to maintain the two-Power standard against the United States and Germany, although she is at present not threatened by either country, because the natural development of Germany and of the United States will probably cause them to encroach upon the British Empire unless the British Empire is strong enough at sea to forbid such encroachment. Therefore we must now consider the question: will Great Britain be able to maintain her naval suprem

acy against the combined fleets of the United States and Germany?

Great Britain has no longer the moonpoly of maritime ability. The Germans and Americans have proved themselves able seamen and excellent shipbuilders. The longest national purse can build the strongest national flect. Therefore the question whether Great Britain will be able to maintain the two-Power standard against the United States and Germany is mainly a financial one.

Unfortunately it seems clear that Great Britain will financially not be able to maintain her naval supremacy against the United States and Germany, and it must even be doubted whether Great Britain will be able to continue for long outbuilding the German Navy, notwithstanding all official and semiofficial declarations to the effect that for every ship laid down by Germany Great Britain will lay down two ships. It is generally known that the United States are richer than Great Britain, but it is not generally known that Germany also is apparently richer than is this country; that in a financial duel for naval pre-eminence Germany may prove stronger than this country. Great Britain has some 40,000,000 inhabitants, Germany has some 60,000,000 inhabitants, and as the German workers are fully employed whilst a very heavy percentage of British workers is always out of employment, we may say that in productive manpower Great Britain and Germany stand not in the relation of 4 to 6, but approximately in the relation of 4 to 7. Besides, all the German industries, including agriculture, are exceedingly flourishing, as may be seen from the fact that, notwithstanding the immense yearly increase of her population, Germany suffers chronically from a dearth of workers, so that immigration into Germany is greater than emigration from Germany, whilst most British in

dustries are stagnant or decaying, as may be seen by the fact that, notwithstanding a yearly emigration of from 200,000 to 300,000 people, the British labor market remains congested, and that Great Britain suffers continually, and very acutely, from a dearth of work and consequent unemployment and pauperism. In view of this state of affairs, we cannot wonder that, if we compare the British and German income-tax statistics, we find that the income of the German classes has, during the last fifteen years, increased five times faster than that of the British classes, and that, if we compare British and German savingsbanks statistics, we find that the savings of the German masses have, during the last six years, increased ten times faster than those of the British masses. These and many other facts, which it would lead too far to mention in this space, make it clear that Germany is considerably richer than is Great Britain, and that her wealth is rapidly growing whilst ours remains comparatively stationary, and if we look at the other side of the account we find that the German citizens are not only richer but are also less heavily taxed than are the British citizens. For every 17. paid in the form of income tax by the average German taxpayer, the average British taxpayer has to pay 21., and for every 11. paid by the average German householder in local taxation the average British householder has to pay 21. 10s. The foregoing facts indicate that Germany is financially able to outbuild the British fleet, and the result of the recent Reichstag election seems to show that the nation has also the ambition and the will to do so.

The wealth of a nation depends in the first instance, not upon the quantity of commodities exported and imported, and upon the quantity of its possessions of printed paper in the

shape of stocks and shares, but upon the number of its inhabitants engaged in active production. The United States have some 80,000,000 inhabitants, Germany has some 60,000,000 inhabitants, Great Britain has some 40,000,000 inhabitants. The German population increases three times faster than the British population, the American population increases five times faster than the British population, and the population of Germany and of the United States combined increases eight times faster than the British population. In man-power, which after all is a more important economic factor than machine-power, although it is hardly mentioned in the textbooks of political economy, Germany and the United States are so far superior to Great Britain, and the disproportion between the man-power possessed by Great Britain and her two greatest rivals is increasing to our disadvantage with such alarming rapidity, that it is evident that Great Britain cannot much longer maintain her naval supremacy, because she will lack the necessary financial means, and, having lost her naval supremacy, she will certainly be deserted by her present allies.

The foregoing remarks make it clear that the British Empire can be preserved only if the supremacy of the British Navy be maintained against both the United States and Germany, but they make it equally clear that Great Britain will soon financially be unable to continue maintaining her naval supremacy not only against the two second strongest naval Powers, but even against Germany alone. As the burden which rests upon the British producer can hardly be greatly increased, it seems almost certain that within ten, or at the utmost within twenty, years, Great Britain will have sunk either to the second or to the third rank among naval Powers, and

that the British Empire will then be a

thing of the past.

The position of the Empire is evi.dently a most critical, though it is not yet a desperate, one. Happily, the possession of the rule of the sea gives us several years' breathing time, and enables us to provide against the very great dangers of the future. Although Great Britain, standing alone, cannot possibly much longer preserve her naval supremacy, the United British Empire can certainly maintain it. The latent resources of the British Empire are greater than are the latent resources of the United States and Germany combined. Although the British Empire cannot possibly be defended by Great Britain alone against the two second strongest naval Powers, it can certainly, as far as one can see into the future, be defended practically for all time by a navy which is paid for by an Imperial Ex

chequer.

Necessity, not parliamentary resolutions and after-dinner orations, creates States and Empires. The necessity of making the British Empire, which is at present merely a geographical expression, a political reality has now arrived, and that necessity is most urgent. The British Empire can be preserved only if the Governments of Great Britain and the Colonies are willing to place Imperial above local interests. The British Colonies are naturally averse from paying into the British national exchequer large contributions for Imperial defence, over the spending of which they have not the slightest control, which are to be used towards the maintenance of a navy which is exclusively directed by a British Admiralty. Therefore, an Imperial defence based upon Imperial means can be organized only if the nucleus of an Imperial Cabinet, with an Imperial Navy Board, an Imperial Exchequer, and an Imperial Senate,

representing the whole Empire, be created.

The British Empire has grown out of its old clothes. We can no longer leave the organization of the Empire in a state of chaos, and follow a happy-golucky hand-to-mouth policy without any definite aim, making Imperial interests subordinate to the British party-political requirements of the moment, but we must follow a far-seeing policy of deliberate and constructive Imperialism. We must organically connect our vast colonies and possessions with the Motherland, and planfully rear a solid Imperial edifice. We must, before all, protect the magnificent undeveloped or partly developed Imperial domain for future generations, by organizing the defence of the Empire on an Imperial basis. We must, under the protection of a supreme fleet, people our colonies as rapidly as possible, and thereby strengthen them both militarily and economically. We must re-create the British industries which our blind faith in the wisdom of certain economic theories and our consequent policy of deliberate neglect have caused to decay, so that Germany, notwithstanding her poor natural resources and the burden of militarism, is now actually richer than Great Britain, and can afford to challenge our maritime supremacy.

The question of the unification of the Empire by the creation of a supreme Imperial Government representative of the whole Empire as well as the question of the protection of the national resources and the home industries of Great Britain by suitable State action, fiscal or otherwise, is not a party question, but is the most important national question. It is in the first instance a question of military defence, and it is a question upon which depends the life or death of Great Britain and of the British Empire. The latent resources of Great Britain and

her Colonies are practically boundless, but they have been insufficiently developed, and these latent resources must be developed to the utmost and fully utilized for the preservation of our possessions, of our position in the world, of our peace, of our prosperity, and of our civilization. This is the most urgent political problem of the moment. Our policy should therefore be to develop our latent resources with the greatest vigor, not in accordance Iwith the dictates of abstract scientific theory, but in accordance with the dictates of common sense, and with the universal practical experience of mankind.

The Nineteenth Century and After.

I think it is clear that Great Britain cannot much longer defend the Empire single-handed. Therefore the Prime Ministers of Great Britain and of the Colonies must seriously think of creating without delay an Imperial force for the defence of the Empire. directed by an Imperial Cabinet and financed by Imperial means. The action of the present Colonial Conference may determine the fate of Great Britain and of the Empire, for the next ten or twenty years should decide whether the British Empire will stand or fall.

J. Ellis Barker.

The "sweet uses of adversity" are telling very favorably at the present time on Hellenic studies in general, and on that of the Greek drama in particular. Never, probably, has the utility of Greek been more widely questioned than it is to-day, and seldom, if ever, has the study itself been more vigorously pursued. The apparent paradox needs little or no explanation. long as Greek was regarded as something mysterious but essential to every type of mind that could possibly be brought into touch with it, the study of it languished through being superstitiously regarded. But now that

So

1. "Euripides the Rationalist (1895). Four Plays of Euripides (1906)." By A. W. Verrall, Litt.D. (Cambridge University Press.)

2. "Euripide et l'Esprit; de son Théâtre." By Paul Decharme. (Paris: Garnier, 1894.) 3. "The Moral Standpoint of Euripides." By W. H. S. Jones, of Selwyn College, Cambridge. (London: Blackie, 1906.)

4. "Translations of Euripides (Hippolytus, Bacchae, Troades, etc.)." By Gilbert Murray. (London: G. Allen, 1903-7.)

5. "Balaustion's Adventure. Aristophanes' Apology." By Robert Browning. (London: smith, Elder.)

the urgent claims of science and modern languages have made themselves heard even in what are sometimes described as the antique homes of classicism, and unwise heads begin to "despair of the Republic," more sagacious teachers and thinkers realize that Greek will live and thrive, not as a badly enforced mystery but as a supremely rich literature. It is not, perhaps, past hope, but it is past probability, that we shall recover from Egypt, or Herculaneum, or elsewhere, the lost treasures of the Greek lyric muse. It is through lyrics that we first fall in love with our own or any other language: Wordsworth's “lyric cry" for the discovery of some fresh "tender-hearted scroll from pure Simonides" must have been re-echoed by many a scholar and teacher, doomed at present to teach boys Greek by fragments of dramatic wholes which as fragments are apt to be desperately dull. Not enough use, perhaps, is made, for the young, of the Anthologia, from which an ideal book of excerpta