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justification had been removed. The fairest | selfish and niggard dishonesty of German government, the kindest treatment, the most settlers, who objected to any taxation for so equal laws, the most unbounded and gen- plain a purpose. It is equally notorious erous aid in time of calamity, have done that of all the outrageous and virulent abuse nothing to appease a hatred which at last of England which so disfigures the American became at once criminal and insane. Politi- Press, nearly one-half proceeds from Irish cians, who had neither patriotism to inspire pens, and the other half is a disreputable them, nor wisdom to guide them, nor Chris- and dishonest pandering to the exigencies of tianity to restrain them, found gratification Irish passion. It must be set down either to for their passions and hope for their ambition a populace whom Irish lies have perverted or in exasperating to the utmost the blind fury to politicians to whom Irish votes are necesof the poor and ignorant, and giving to the sary. hatred between Celt and Saxon the deadly All this is well understood and deeply reand incurable character of an hostility of gretted by the respectable and sound-hearted race. Hundreds of thousands of Irish per- of the Americans themselves. They are ished in the famine brought on partly by deeply concerned and bitterly indignant at their own improvidence, partly by social and seeing their country's name thus taken in political mismanagement, partly by the un- vain, their country's policy distorted and mistakable visitation of God. They per- misdirected, their country's energies wasted ished in spite of the most gigantic and gen- and turned astray, and their country's repuerous efforts of English humanity to relieve tation lowered and stained, by a set of forthem. Hundreds of thousands more flocked eigners whose designs they see through and to America and flock there yearly still, whose character they loathe and despise as disturbing their adopted country with their heartily as ourselves. But, unhappily, in a incorrigible turbulence, inflaming it by their democratic land, the most violent are always wild passions, misleading it by their insane the most active, and the most active are delusions, and spreading through the length generally the most powerful. Still the evil and breadth of the land mental and moral has grown to so great a height that a widepoison of the most venomous, subtle, and de- spread and energetic movement has been grading kind. made towards neutralizing and curing it. In some cases greater length of residence has been required as a preliminary to full citizenship. And the basis of the great "Know-Nothing party is a conviction of the necessity of shaking off this low and ignominious foreign yoke, if the name of America is to be respected among nations, and if American citizenship is henceforth to be a title of honor and a word of trust.
And, unfortunately, the institutions and customs of America give great facilities to both these classes of aliens to influence the conduct and excite the feelings of their new country. Naturalization is easily obtained, sometimes after short residence, sometimes with scarcely any residence at all. In a land where suffrage nearly universal everywhere prevails, immigrants soon become voters, and as such are sought for, flattered, and deferred to by politicians of every party; their supFrom The Examiner, 10 Nov. port is bid for; their prejudices are humored AUSTRIA AND AMERICA. or adopted; and the ambitious and unscrupulous candidates for place or power or sen- THE recent appointment of Sir Hamilton atorial honors are soon made aware that the Seymour affords a pledge that the war will profession of the most rabid hostility to be prosecuted with vigor, no less decided Great Britain is the surest mode of securing than that since given by the promotion of Irish or German votes. Furious Hibernian Sir William Codrington. We are glad to orators, too, rave at public meetings and in the columns of the more worthless and disreputable organs of the Press. Already both the policy and character of America has suffered grievously at the hands of men who have no pretension whatever to be called American; who care no more for America than they do for England; but who perceive the power which circumstances have given them, and use it as their passions dictate. It is notorious that the refusal of several States to provide money for paying the interest of their debts-which brought upon the United States the imputation of being repudiators was mainly owing to the
welcome such indications; for that a nervous dread of offending Austria must have possessed some members of the Cabinet, not merely since it has been purged of Lord Aberdeen, but even since it has been delivered from Mr. Gladstone and the other members of the little-war party, began to be strongly suspected.
To what, for example, but our dread of alienating a power whose fleet we could sweep from the sea in a fortnight, and which by its own confession cannot keep an army in the field unless assisted by enormous subsidies from this country, are we to attribute our having run the risk of involving ourselves
in a war with the only nation in the world | instructions from the Foreign Office they had which (excepting France) we have the slight- contravened the law; and we have been brought to the very verge of open quarrel with America.
est reason to fear?
Admitting the necessity of a Foreign Enlistment Bill at all, it is perfectly notorious The excuse made for our ministers is, that that in Wallachia we could have obtained they were not aware of the existence of a last year as many recruits as we desired, considerable party in the States looking upwithout offering any bounty, and without on Russia with no unfriendly eyes. But even incurring the expense of conveying why were they not aware of it? For what them to the seat of war. We should thus do we carefully select, and highly pay, our have raised men animated with a deadly ha- ministers but that they should possess such tred against our enemies, the blessings of necessary knowledge? We thought it had whose " "protection they had so recently been notorious that for years Russia has, tasted; and sprung from a race which, if it been seeking to conciliate American travelhas not in late times distinguished itself in lers (usually persons of influence in their war, has at least in very difficult circumstan- own country) by treating them with marked ces managed always to maintain a quasi-in- attention. We believe the suspicion to have dependence. No one acquainted with the been very general, with all who have watched country can doubt that the inhabitants of the tone of certain portions of the American the mountainous region called Little Wal-press, that Russian diplomacy has also for lachia would at once have been found, even some years been exerting itself not less in without previous training, very useful auxiliaries, and that the other parts of Wallachia and Moldavia might have furnished at least fifty thousand men convertible during the winter into excellent troops. Of the advantage of acting with such Rouman auxiliaries to some extent even sections of their nonin Bessarabia- which the protecting power annexed to her Empire only in 1812, when she partitioned Moldavia-we need hardly speak. The invading army would have been received as liberators. Ismail might have been invested, a free outlet might have been obtained for that superabundance of wheat existing in the Principalities which is now kindly prevented by Austria from reaching the English market, and Odessa might have been threatened from the land as well as from the sea.
But supposing we still doubted the prowess of the Roumans, we might surely have accepted the offer of the Poles. There was only one condition attached to the proposal that they should not be confounded with troops of other nations; yet it is understood that this condition led to a rejection of their offer. The reasoning in both cases of course has been that, whether we took into our pay a Wallachian or a Polish legion, Austria would certainly feel offended.
that direction, and as successfully as in Germany itself. Every one certainly has known that the Irish emigrants of '48 and '49 had not abandoned their animosity against England, and had been able to inoculate with it
Celtic fellow citizens. Yet now we are told that all this falls like a clap of thunder on Downing Street, where they have been believing as complacently in the amiable and inalienable dispositions of America, as a little while ago they believed in the friendly eagerness of Austria.
We began by approving of the new appointment to Vienna: let us close by asking whether a change is less necessary at Stockholm. We have no hesitation in saying that this mission is rendered by circumstances at present one of the most important in Europe. Yet it is held by a gentleman who, while employed a few years ago at Vienna, neither very diplomatically nor very sagaciously expressed his regrets at the triumph of the constitutionalists in Hungary: the embassy to which he belonged having previously reported that the insurrection was quelled, at the very time when it was assuming the most gigantic proportions. What are the chances that we shall not be told a year or But when did excess of timidity fail to two hence that our Foreign Office was not bring increase of danger along with it? Just aware of the strong feeling which pervaded see into what peril our fears have been the people in Sweden, and was shared even plunging us. We have not merely incurred by the Royal family, until too late to take enormous expense in bribing Germans to en- advantage of it? There exists at Stockholm list by means of a high bounty, in construct- a section of the nobility despised in their ing barracks in Heligoland, and in conveying own country and looking for advancement to the seat of war these dear-bought and and honors to Russia alone. What security half-unwilling heroes. We have had to suf- is there that the English minister will not be fer the indignity of seeing, without protest, our Consuls arrested and tried by the tribunals of the countries in which they exercise their functions, because in pursuance of their
misled by these persons as to the intentions and feeling of the Swedish government and people, just as he was duped in '49 by the Austrian camarilla with regard to the true
character of the Hungarian war? Is a true disciple of Lord Westmorland, an avowed admirer of the Austrian Government, and one who believes that England ought to court the alliance of the despotic powers, a proper exponent at the present crisis of the views entertained by the people and ministry of England?
From the Examiner, 10 Nov. A SWEDISH ALLIANCE. THOUGH Ostensibly the mission of General Canrobert to the Court of Sweden is only to decorate the King with the Grand Cross of the Legion of Honor in exchange for the Swedish order which Admiral Virgin recently brought to the Court of the Tuileries, it may reasonably be hoped that the employment, at this season of the year, of so distinguished a person as the late commander of the French army, has some deeper aim and more practical object than a mere exchange of decorations, significant as the latter is on the part of a sovereign in the position of King Oscar.
Two comparatively fruitless campaigns in the Baltic, at a cost of probably not less than ten or twelve millions sterling to England and France, must by this time have convinced both governments that, to achieve important and permanent results on that side of Russia, a considerable land force, such as neither country is likely to be able to spare, and a much larger number of gun-boats than it is possible to see ready by May next, are indispensable. Unless, then, the Allies are content again to incur, in 1856, an expenditure in the Baltic of which the enormous disproportion to the smallness of the injury done by it is an outrage on English and French taxpayers, some steps must at once be taken to secure from other quarters that army to operate on Finland, and that flotilla of small craft, which the governments of the two countries either cannot or will not provide for themselves. To persist in carrying on war next year in that sea as we have done for two years past, will not only be a scandalous waste of money and of power, but involve a loss of reputation such as England at least cannot afford. That which thirty gun-boats, in addition to the fleets, would have accomplished in 1854 at Sweaborg and Cronstadt, nearly that entire number failed to achieve at Sweaborg in 1855; and judging by the past, it will require three or four times thirty, acting in concert with an army, to reduce Sweaborg and get at Helsingfors in 1856. Wherever, then, the means of successfully carrying on the next campaign in the Baltic are to be acquired, his appears certain-that its cost will
largely exceed that of either the campaign of 1854 or 1855.
We press this consideration on public attention, because if we are to secure a Swedish alliance and co-operation, as appears to be so greatly desired, we must be content to pay for it. But, on the other hand, in the proportion that we receive assistance for money paid to Sweden, we diminish outlay
on our own armaments.
Sweden has an army which by the spring could be raised to something like 60,000 effective men: and she has now afloat and under cover, in her ports and on her lakes, about 200 gun-boats of all sizes and armaments. Her army is brave, well disciplined, hardy, and it is believed by no means disinclined to act against Russia; and her flotilla of small craft could quickly be manned by seamen even abler and more competent than her soldiers. Here is just what the Allies want, therefore, at the very doors of Russia all ready prepared for active use next
Hence arise the questions-Ought we to purchase this co-operation? if we ought, can we do so? and if we can, what price is worth paying for it? In a contest like the present, governments must leave refinements and speculations to the philosophers, and be content to act on those principles and practices which have always prevailed in war. If we are engaged (and the present war has no other justification) in a struggle for the independence of Europe, then clearly we are well entitled to call on other nations to join us; and just in proportion as the danger threatens them, are we justified in expecting that they will join us. The marvellous insensibility of our German friends is quite an exceptional case. If Sweden sees that next to Turkey it has most to apprehend from Russian ambition, and regards the Anglo-French alliance as the most effective protection from such danger, it has ample cause, without any such immediate provocation from Russia as that country is sure at this crisis of history to carefully abstain from giving, for seeking permanent safety where it thinks it can best be found. Otherwise Sweden would be denuded of one of the rights and attributes of self-protection, and be condemned to wait patiently until Russia was ready to swallow it up, and the rest of Europe incapable of averting its destination.
But then comes the question of the terms on which Sweden might be found willing to join the Western Alliance. To begin with,
Sweden and Norway would require a permanent guarantee from England and France against Russia, and on the restoration of peace an immediate settlement of all boundary disputes. Also, most assuredly, Sweden
may be expected to inform the Allies, that, or implied, seems to be the natural and logithough possessed of armaments such as they want, the Swedish finances are in no condition to bear the expense of active service; and that though it can furnish men, vessels, guns, and munitions of war, these must be maintained and paid for by the Allies. It is moreover very possible that Sweden may desire to engage the Alliance to the restoration of Finland.
Taking the last point first, the only question fairly to be raised upon it would be, whether the restoration of Finland to Sweden is likely to give strength to the Swedish monarchy. We must remember, in discussing the question, that if Sweden lost Finland in 1808, it was recompensed by the addition of Norway in 1815; and that if the Fins themselves have reason to apprehend any diminution of their trade and wealth by restoration to Sweden, Russia would be assisted, not weakened, by such a proposal. We do not now express an opinion on this point; but supposing such a condition proposed and refused, the desire to avoid the introduction of new difficulties and dangers into Sweden itself it must dictate the refusal, rather than any desire to avoid inflicting the utmost possible amount of humiliation and degradation upon Russia.
That Sweden would require money to repay the cost of the military assistance she would render the common cause is most certain; and probably the Swedish government would be more exacting than the Sardinian government proved. In the case of Sardinia, pecuniary aid assumed the form of a loan; but we can hardly hope that Sweden, with no very bright prospects of future wealth before it, will undertake the repayment of such sums as may be required to move its forces. Piedmont can afford to look hopefully forward to acquiring the neighboring duchies, if not the Milanese; and, rich already by anticipation, consents to mortgage its great expectations. Unlike Piedmont, Sweden lives not on the future, but on the past. It has no such speculative investments to indulge in; at most it can only hope to retain what is left; and it will therefore reasonably require to be protected against expense for the co-operation it gives. The Allies, on the other hand, can afford no such enormous subsidies as Sweden got from England towards the close of the last war; and if Sweden will be content with the cost of its forces, and place those forces both by sea and land at the entire disposal of the Western Powers and their general, then probably Swedish co-operation would be cheaply pur
A guarantee of the present territories of Sweden and Norway, be it either expressed
cal basis of an alliance which Sweden will enter into on the ground of danger from the ambition of her neighbors; and as, on the restoration of a general peace, England and France must in some form or other take securities against an extension of the Russian empire, by any engagement of that kind Russia will give her adherence to such a guarantee, and so diminish, if not remove, its exclusive character. In accepting the services of Sweden the Allies will accept also the duty and responsibility of rendering Russia in future a safe neighbor to her.
On the whole, then, it would appear that the motives are strong for a Swedish alliance ; that the objections are weak; that terms are easy, if moderation prevail on the part of Sweden; and that with Swedish co-operation we may safely trust that the campaign of 1856 in the Baltic, whether the commander be a Dundas or a Napier, will be as disastrous for Russia as the campaign of 1855 in the Black Sea.
MANAGEMENT OF THE TIDES.
MRS. MARTHA PARTINGTON, the same whose unsuccessful tussle with the Atlantic ocean has been recorded by the Rev. Sydney Smith, having taken to heart her discomfiture on that occasion, and misliking the scene of her defeat, removed to a cottage, by name Threadneedle, inland on the banks of the river Dee, where she takes in washing on a large scale. Like a prudent, careful person, which she truly is, Mrs. Partington considered how she should conduct her business, which requires the consumption of a good deal of water, so as to guard against draining the river dry. And the method she has adopted with the most complete success is as follows:
When the river is rising Mrs. Partington plies her buckets freely at the bank, so that there may be no overflow, laying the low-lying lands under water, and so injuring or destroying property. But when she observes that the river is falling, she holds her hand, suspends the work of the laundry, and turns her customers away; for she has then to take care that the river be not drained dry, and to compass bringing back the ebbing stream.
These are Mrs. Partington's two systems of action on the currents of the Dee, and so well are they adjusted, so complete is their success, that perseverance in them for six hours, or a little more, never fails to correct and reverse the tendency to excess either way. For example, if at noon she finds the river swelling, she fills her pails freely, and by six or thereabouts the effect is seen in the subsiding of the waters, and the turn of the
current the other way. Thus is avoided | ders it extremely probable that a blow is on any overflow, any waste, any destructive in- the point of being struck which will for undation. But at six, when the waters be- years incapacitate the Czar both for playing gin to sink, and set out, it is time to refrain the aggressor himself and for aiding the agfrom drawing on the diminishing current, gressions of others, Francis Joseph proceeds and then Mrs. Partington shuts up shop, as to offer two distinct hostile insults to Sarit were, and hangs up her buckets to dry. dinia, so gratuitous and undisguised that If a customer comes to her door at this sea- Sardinia cannot avoid noticing them with son she raises her prices for washing, so as resentment, and so arrogant and indefensible to check all transactions in that line; and so that England and France cannot avoid supprevents the use of water, which would in- porting Sardinia in her resistance. crease the ebbing of the stream, and perhaps dry it up altogether. By perseverance in this system for six hours or more, the current is acted on; the reflux gives place to a flow, the tide turns, the channels are gradually refilled, and water is abundant.
It is not wonderful that Austria should hate Piedmont: it would be wonderful were it otherwise. She hates her from the double motives of jealousy and fear. Piedmont is a standing reproach to every other Government in Italy, and to that of Lombardy most of Such is Mrs. Partington's prudent man- all. It is the only State in that Peninsula agement of the tides. The miller who lives where the people and the rulers are in harin the neighborhood, and who has got a mony. It has proved to Europe the capacity name of caring for nobody and for nothing, of Italians to conduct their own affairs, and presumes to scoff, indeed, at Mrs. Parting- the rapid prosperity which is the result of ton's precautions; and pretends that the their self-government. It is a perpetual, river would ebb and flow all the same whether though silent and inactive, stimulant to the she filled or emptied her tubs, and that she oppressed classes of all the other provinces had better mind her business, and do her washing always at fair prices, without troubling herself about the Dee, and its currents up and down. But this idle talk is confuted by the undeniable fact that the rising or falling of the stream is sure to follow Mrs. Partington's measures for restricting or stimulating the supply of water. That she has thus acted on the currents, and regulated the changes, is undeniable; and not less certain it is that the action has been most advantageous in preventing a drain on the one hand, or an overflow on the other. Post hoc, ergo propter hoc, is an accepted conclusion. Examiner, 10 November.
From The Economist, 27 Oct. "THE DEVIL IS AN ASS."
to strive for a condition of similar well-being. It is a proclamation to the wretched citizens of Milan, Venice, Naples, Tuscany, and Rome, of what they might become were the incubus of Austrian tyranny once shaken off. It is a strong, hourly, unmistakable warning that German misgovernment in Italy cannot last much longer-that Austria must either alter her system or withdraw herself. Hence it is impossible that Piedmont should not be an object of intensest dread and wrath to Austria; but it is surprising that that Power, which is not usually deficient in prudence or in craft, should have selected for the manifestation of these passions precisely the moment when the Western Powers are strongest, when Russia is weakest, and when Sardinia has deserved so well of the allies that they must stand by her, and are, it is conceived, thinking how they can reward her.
SUCH is the title of one of the plays of the second of our old English dramatists; and the adage seems to be verified by the conduct Moreover, it would appear as if the grounds which Austria is pursuing in Italy. The of dispute with Sardinia have not arisen, but facts of the case are not yet very completely have been carefully and artificially created. or officially before the public, and therefore The bare facts, as far as they have yet transwe must argue upon them with some slight pired, are briefly these: :-we do not vouch reserve; but it would appear that Austria for the perfect accuracy of the statement, but has, with strange infatuation, seized the mo- give it as far as it is known through the ment when the allies-wearied out with her usual public channels of information. The disloyal conduct and her mischievous vacilla- Sardinian convents recently suppressed or tions have resolved to leave her out of their reduced by the Government of that country, councils for the future, to force a quarrel on some of them held property in Lombardy. her Italian rival whose proceedings have con- This property the Austrian Government has trasted so favorably with her own. While confiscated; and in answer to a protest the fall of Sebastopol has proved the supe- against the shameless robbery, is understood riority of the Western Powers in their deadly to have replied-(such, at least, is the cool struggle with the Great Bear, and while the defence set up by the Oesterreichische Zeiperilous position of the Russian army ren-tung)—" that the convents having been sup