 | John Stuart Mackenzie - 1915 - 998 pages
...any given 1 See his Principles of Ethics, Part I., chap. iv., § 16. " Pleasure somewhere, somewhen, at some time, to some being or beings, is an, inexpugnable element of the conception " (of a moral aim). Similarly, in chap. ix., § 62, he speaks of the "ultimately supreme end/ happiness... | |
 | George Lansing Raymond - 1920 - 400 pages
...probably agree with Herbert Spencer (1830-1903), who, in Chapter III. of hisPato of Ethics, declares the "ultimate moral aim a desirable state of feeling...whatever name — gratification, enjoyment, happiness." With reference to the origin of the sense of obligation which prompts effort to attain this end, however,... | |
 | Charles Franklin Dunbar, Frank William Taussig, Abbott Payson Usher, Alvin Harvey Hansen, William Leonard Crum, Edward Chamberlin, Arthur Eli Monroe - 1923 - 800 pages
...physical exertion. Its purpose is the satisfaction 6. Data of Ethics, sec. 10. " No school." he adds, " can avoid taking for the ultimate moral aim a desirable...whatever name — gratification, enjoyment, happiness." Ibid., sec. 16. of desires; and from one standpoint we can say, the more desires satisfied, the more... | |
 | Edgar Erastus Clark - 1906 - 1072 pages
...suffering, but the fact remains that happiness or enjoyment is the sole end of life. Herbert Spencer says: "No school can avoid taking for the ultimate moral...whatever name— gratification, enjoyment, happiness." This we believe is undeniable. To the great end of living all labor and learning, manners and morals,... | |
 | George Edward Moore, Thomas Baldwin - 1993 - 356 pages
...the chapter is devoted; and at the end Mr Spencer formulates his conclusion in the following words: 'No school can avoid taking for the ultimate moral...aim a desirable state of feeling called by whatever name—gratification, enjoyment, happiness. Pleasure somewhere, at some time, to some being or beings,... | |
 | Friedrich Nietzsche, Maudemarie Clark, Alan J. Swensen - 1998 - 228 pages
...good or bad, depending on whether it does, or does not, bring a surplus of agreeable feeling." Thus, " no school can avoid taking for the ultimate moral aim a desirable state of feeling by whatever name—gratification, enjoyment, happiness." GS 4 and 12 are two of the many passages that... | |
 | John Offer - 2000 - 696 pages
...value and that pain is an intrinsic disvalue. Ethics is rendered meaningless without this assumption. "Pleasure somewhere, at some time, to some being or beings, is an inexpugnable element of the [moral] conception. It is as much a necessary form of moral intuition as space is a necessary form... | |
 | James Hastings - 2004 - 396 pages
...dare to die' (Epistle, iv. 1 ft'.). And Herbert Spencer, in his Data of Ethics (p. 46), affirms that 'no school can avoid taking for the ultimate moral...whatever name— gratification, enjoyment, happiness.' Newman Smyth criticises Spencer's statement as a confusion between the form and the substance of the... | |
 | 1880 - 1136 pages
...writers themselves. Mr. Herbert Spencer shall speak first. ' No school,' he says in his latest volume, ' can avoid taking for the ultimate moral aim a desirable...gratification, enjoyment, happiness. Pleasure, somewhere, at gome time, to some being or beings, is an inexpugnable element of the conception. It is as much a necessary... | |
 | Charles Lowe, Henry Wilder Foote, John Hopkins Morison, Henry H. Barber, James De Normandie, Joseph Henry Allen - 1880 - 600 pages
...ultimate aim and end of all sentient, conscious life. On page 46 of The Data of Ethics, he says : " No school can avoid taking for the ultimate moral...whatever name, — gratification, enjoyment, happiness. ... It is as much a necessary form of moral intuition as space is a necessary form of intellectual... | |
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So that no school can avoid taking for the ultimate moral aim a desirable state of feeling called by whatever name — gratification, enjoyment, happiness. 
