Now if we will annex a meaning to our words, and speak only of what we can conceive, I believe we shall acknowledge, that an idea, which considered in itself is particular, becomes general, by being made to represent or stand for all other particular... Dogmatism and Evolution: Studies in Modern Philosophy - Page 195by Theodore De Laguna, Grace Mead Andrus De Laguna - 1910 - 259 pagesFull view - About this book
| 216 pages
...Conceptions. If, as you say, a man may consider a figure merely as Triangular (sect, xvi.) ; if an Idea becomes general, by being made to represent or stand for all other particular Ideas of the same tort (sect, xii.), then you concede * According to Mr. Manscl, " throughout Berkeley's Dissertation,... | |
| Jerzy Brzeziński - 1990 - 292 pages
...several particular ideas, any one of which it indifferently suggests to the mind [Berkeley, 1710, p. 31], represent or stand for all other particular ideas of the same sort" [id., p. 32]. This ineliminable function of general ideas leads to the erroneous conclusion that there... | |
| Noel Balzer - 1993 - 164 pages
...tribulation I returned to Berkeley's work and focussed on his answer to the problem. Here is what he said: "Now, if we will annex a meaning to our words, and...or stand for all other particular ideas of the same sort."8 While I agreed that Berkeley's description of our mental processes was, in the main, fairly... | |
| R. D. Rollinger - 1993 - 214 pages
...idea represents others (Principles, Introduction, 15). Thus he thinks that it is sufficient to say "that an idea, which considered in itself is particular,...stand for all other particular ideas of the same sort" (Principles, Introduction, 12). This point is illustrated by considering what goes on in the mind during... | |
| Douglas M. Jesseph - 1993 - 335 pages
...for many others by treating it as a representative of a kind. This is summed up in Berkeley's slogan, "an idea, which considered in itself is particular,...by being made to represent or stand for all other particulars of the same sort" (Introduction, §12). 18. The letter is reprinted in Works 8:49-50. We... | |
| Wayne Waxman - 2003 - 368 pages
...essentially identical. Consider the circularity evident in Berkeley's definition of generality : " an idea, which considered in itself is particular,...stand for all other particular ideas of the same sort" (PHK Intro. §12). How in the first place does one know they are "particular ideas of the same sort"!... | |
| Stanley Cavell - 1996 - 220 pages
...to call nothing (else) "the same thing." And even if you say, with Berkeley, that "an idea [or word] which considered in itself is particular, becomes...stand for all other particular ideas of the same sort" (Principles), Introduction) you still haven't explained how this word gets used for these various "particulars,"... | |
| R. A. Watson - 1995 - 202 pages
...means no more by this than Berkeley who says in paragraph 12 of the Introduction to the Principles that "an idea, which considered in itself is particular,...or stand for all other particular ideas of the same sort."32 In any event, the point that there cannot be general ideas has been drummed home for generations... | |
| Leslie Armour, James Bradley - 1996 - 390 pages
...early works is the oblique remark in the Introduction to the Principles of Human Knowledge: 'Now, if we annex a meaning to our words, and speak only of what...by being made to represent or stand for all other particulars of the same sort' (sect. 12). What Berkeley does not seem to have realized, or to have... | |
| Béatrice Longuenesse - 1998 - 442 pages
...particular ideas that function as signs "representing" or calling to mind other, equally particular ideas: "Now if we will annex a meaning to our words, and...for all other particular ideas of the same sort." 36 In the same vein, Hume says that "a particular idea becomes general by being annexed to a general... | |
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