...reconciled to a character against which he was not at enmity, implies a contradiction. For it supposes a thing to be, and not to be, at the same time. For a call to a reconciliation supposes enmity. Therefore the Gospel did not call Adam after his fall...

...original doctrine to be absurd.' No absurdity can be greater than that the same principle should prove a thing to be, and not to be, at the same time; and if, therefore, we can demonstrate that Hume's rule on this subject is equally conclusive both against,...

...Leibnitz proposes two principles as the foundation of all our knowledge ; the first, that it is impossible for a thing to be, and not to be, at the same time, which, he says is the foundation of speculative truth; and secondly, that nothing is without a sufficient...

...Leibnitz proposes two principles as the foundation of all our knowledge ; the first, that it is impossible for a thing to be, and not to be, at the same time, which, he says is the foundation of speculative truth ; and secondly, that nothing is without a sufficient...

...Leibnitz proposes two principles as the foundation of all our knowledge; the first, that it is impossible for a thing to be, and not to be, at the same time, which, he says is the foundation of speculative truth; and secondly, that nothing is without a sufficient...

...a contradiction in itself, or to his own holy nature. We hesitate not to say, that God cannot make a thing to be and not to be, at the same time ; or to be both true and false under the same circumstances ; because, being and not being, truth and...

...Almighty is in the J that he cannot perform contradictions. It is not an object ol power, to cause a thing to be, and not to be, at the same time. No increase of power has the least tendency to produce this contradiction. But every thing which -is...

...least ^,ce Jiir.hed, that he cannot perform contradictions. It is not an object ot power, to cause a thing to be, and not to be, at the same time. No increase of power has the least •cndeniy to produce this contr.u1ic.iion. But every itiing which...

...which are absolutely impossible, and others which are only so ex parte ; as it is absolutely impossible for a thing to be, and not to be at the same time : But for a stone to move naturally upward, is only impossible ex parte matericB ; but it is not impossible...

...common to say that God can do all things, except, such as imply a contradiction — such, as to make a thing to be and not to be at the same time ; but this is unnecessary and foolish in the way of an exception, for such things are not the objects...