...the founding principles of pragmatic thought: Peirce's maxim that "there is no distinction of meaning so fine as to consist in anything but a possible difference of practice" and its corollary, that "different beliefs are distinguished by the different modes of action to which...

...that, to develop a thought's meaning, we need only determine what conduct it is fitted to produce: that conduct is for us its sole significance. And the tangible fact at the root of all our thought distinctions, however subtle, is that there is no one of them so fine as to consist in anything...

...real distinction of thought, no matter how subtle it may be; and there is no distinction of meaning so fine as to consist in anything but a possible difference of practice. To see what this principle leads to, consider in the light of it such a doctrine as that of transubstantiation....

...real distinction of thought; no matter how subtlc it may be; and there is no distinction of meaning so fine as to consist in anything but a possible difference of practice." (W3:265) Am Beispiel des Begriffes der Kraft'"1 erläutert Peirce den Zusammenhang von Wirkungen eines...

...real distinction of thought, no matter how subtle it may be; and there is no distinction of meaning so fine as to consist in anything but a possible difference of practice.64 This is the pragmatic theory of meaning. As Peirce stated it in the famous maxim of 1878,...

...that, to develop a thought's meaning, we need only to determine what conduct it is fitting to produce: that conduct is for us its sole significance. And...as to consist in anything but a possible difference in practice. (1907, p. 46) The principle serves as a criterion of significance. A notion that makes...

...pragmatic method. The dispute is resolved according to the notion that 'the tangible fact at the root of our thought-distinctions, however subtle, is that...as to consist in anything but a possible difference in practice'.4 To clear up the squirrel-tree issue, the group must conceive what relevant concrete...

...produce; that conduct is for us its sole significance." Then James expands it, trying for maximum clarity. "To attain perfect clearness in our thoughts of an object, then, we need only consider what effects of a conceivably practical kind the object may involve — what sensations we are to expect...

...real distinction of thought, no matter how subtile it may be; and there is no distinction of meaning d. Thus much you have, if I mistake not, long since agreed to. Ну/. I do see what this principle leads to, consider in the light of it such a doctrine as that of transubstantiation....

...that, to develop a thought's meaning, we need only determine what conduct it is fitted to produce: that conduct is for us its sole significance. And the tangible fact at the root of all our thought distinctions, however subtle, is that there is no one of them so fine as to consist in anything...