 | Lorenz B. Puntel - 2006 - 720 pages
...lautet die »pragmatische Maxime«: »To attain perfect clearness in our thoughts of an object, [...] we need only consider what conceivable effects of...may involve - what sensations we are to expect from him, and what reactions we must prepare. Our conception of these effects, whether immediate or remote,... | |
 | Robert D. Richardson - 2006 - 660 pages
...produce; that conduct is for us its sole significance." Then James expands it, trying for maximum clarity. "To attain perfect clearness in our thoughts of an object, then, we need only consider what effects of a conceivably practical kind the object may involve — what sensations we are to expect... | |
 | María Uxía Rivas Monroy, Celeste Cancela Silva, Concha Martínez Vidal - 2008 - 310 pages
...consist in anything but a possible difference of practice. To attain perfect clearness in our thought of an object, then, we need only consider what conceivable...expect from it, and what reactions we must prepare. Our conceptions of these effects, whether immediate or remote, is then for us the whole of our conceptions... | |
 | Richard Rorty - 1991 - 368 pages
...themselves as following out the antiessentialist consequences of Peirce's "principle of pragmatism" ("To attain perfect clearness in our thoughts of an...effects of a practical kind the object may involve . . ."), a principle entailing the anuessentialist insistence on relationality that Peirce called "synechism."... | |
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To attain perfect clearness in our thoughts of an object, then, we need only consider what conceivable effects of a practical kind the object may involve — what sensations we are to expect from it, and what reactions we must prepare. 
