The Invisible origins of legal positivism : a re-reading of a tradition

One: The Positive Law/Natural Law Dichotomy, Aristotle and the Greek Totemic Culture.- 1. The Rise of the Positive Law – Natural Law Dichotomy.- 2. The Constraint of the Positive Law – Natural Law Dichotomy.- 3. The Determinative Sense of Natural Laws.- 4. The Exclusionary Character of the Nomos/Physis Dichotomy.- 5. The Figurative Sense of Natural Laws.- 6. The Laws of the Totemic Culture.- 7. The Positive Law – Natural Law Dichotomy as Suspect.- Two: Invisibility in Modern Legal Thought.- 1. The Invisible Author.- 2. The Invisible as an Inaccessible Immediacy.- 3. The Invisible as an a priori Concept.- 4. The Invisibility of the Absent Origin.- Three: The Tradition of Legal Positivism in Modern Legal Thought.- 1. The Impersonality of Posited Laws.- 2. Is there a Tradition of Legal Positivism?.- 3. Three Inquiries.- 4. The Authorizing Origin of Posited Rules/Norms.- 5. The Problematic of Modem Legal Positivism.- Four: An Invisible Nature: The Origin of Thomas Hobbes’s Civil Laws.- 1. The Parado.- 2. Why is Language Important?.- 3. Nature as a Condition lacking a Shared Language.- 4. The Actors of a Language.- 5. The Problematic of Hobbes’ Theory of Sovereignty.- 6. The Natural Condition.- 7. The Authority of Written Laws.- 8. Legal Obligation.- 9. The Mythology of Legal Authority.- 10. The Invisible Origin of the Authority of Hobbes’ Civil Laws.- 11. The Forgotten Origin.- Five: Naming the Unnamable: Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s General Will.- 1. The Author as the General Will.- 2. The Legislature.- 3. Civil Laws as the Expression of the general will.- 4. Naming the Unnamable.- Six: The Habits of the People: The Origin of John Austin’s Laws Properly So Called.- 1. The Problematic of Austin’s Theory of Law.- 2. Austin’s Commentators.- 3. The Excise of theNatural Condition from Civil Society.- 4. The Historical Author.- 5. Is the Historical Author’s Authority Unlimited?.- 6. The Inaccessibility of the Will of the People.- 7. Austin’s Inaccessible Arche.- 8. Who are `the People’?.- 9. The Spirit of `the People’.- Seven: The Invisible Origin of Legal Language: The Grundnorm.- 1. The Impure Origin of the Structure.- 2. An Hypothetical or a Catogorical Origin?.- 3. The Origin as an a priori Concept.- 4. The Invisible Origin of the Authority of Norms.- IChapter Eight: The Forgotten Origin: H.L.A. Hart’s Sense of the Pre-Legal.- 1. The Rule of Recognition.- 2. The Immediacy and the Statement.- 3. Examples of Hart’s Distinction between Immediacy and Legal Statements.- 4. Does the Authorizing Origin Pre-exist Primary Rules?.- 5. Is the Authorizing Origin Internal to the Primary and Secondary Rules?.- 6. Is the Authorizing Origin Accessible to Legal Officials?.- 7. The Forgotten Origin.- Nine: Forgetting the Act of Forgetting: Raz’s Inaccessible Origin of Legal Reasoning.- 1. Experiential Bonding as the Origin of the Legal Structure.- 2. The Official’s Forgetting of the Experiential Origin.- 3. The Legal Point of View.- 4. The Unwritten Experiential Beliefs.- 5. The Language of the Legal Point of View.- 6. Violence and the Constitution of the Institutions.- 7. The Idealism of Raz’s Legal Reasoning.- 8. Forgetting the Act of Forgetting.- Conclusion: The End of Legal Positivism.- 1. The Finality of the Trace of Auctoritas.- 2. The Invisible Origin.- 3. The Violence of the Juridical Production of the Origin.- 4. The Contradiction.- 5. Forgetting the Origin.- 6. The Crisis.- 7. The End of a Tradition.- 1. Primary Sources.- 2. Secondary Sources.